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SUMMARY 
Immigration to Britain from the New Commonwealth began in 
earnest in the late 1940s and the early 1950s. British 
governments, both Socialist and Conservative, found the 
issues raised by such immigration difficult to deal. with. 
This is evident from the succession of immigration control 
and race relations measures in the period 1961 to 1981. 
These dates mark respectively the Parliamentary debates on 
what became the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act and the 
1981 British Nationality Act. As such these measures 
delineate clearly the development of this major policy 
area. One of the noticeable features of this policy area 
is the recognition by participants of the existence and 
importance of values and attitudes characterised by the 
term "liberal". Such liberal values were commonly 
associated with opinion formers in a wide variety of 
institutions, but particularly amongst leaders of the 
Labour and Liberal Parties, the churches and government- 
sponsored race relations bodies. This study examines the 
values and attitudes of such people and suggests that 
several themes have been predominant in the liberal 
response to race politics. Five themes are identified and 
discussed: a social determinist view of human behaviour 
together with a desire for rationality, equality, pluralism 
and community. These themes are examined for evidence of 
any inconsistencies or conflict of values, both within themselves and in relation to each other. The purpose 
throughout is not to question or criticise such liberal 
values; rather it is to study any inconsistencies within them. 
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Introduction 
I 
Immigration from the New Commonwealth to Britain began in 
earnest after the end of the Second World War; slowly, but 
then in increasing numbers, immigrants from the Caribbean 
and from Asia settled in Britain. 1 During the late 1940s 
and much of the 1950s, this phenomenon produced a response 
in successive British governments and much established 
political opinion, of studied public detachment. However, 
as immigration increased, opposition to it began to appear 
amongst members of the indigenous population and, notablyr 
amongst some right-wing Conservative MPs. 
Violent racial disturbances between white Britons and 
black Britons in Nottingham and Notting Hill in 1958 
brought some of the issues involved into the limelight. 2 
However, many politicians of all parties were reluctant to 
control Commonwealth immigration. There were perhaps three 
main reasons for this reluctance. Firstly, there was a 
genuine and deep-seated fondness and sense of 
responsibility for the Empire and newly-emerging 
Commonwealth countries. Britain was seen as 'the Mother 
Country' to a family of mostly young nations. 3 Citizens of 
the Empire and Commonwealth were deemed to be British 
subjects; Britain was proud to operate an 'open Door' 
policy towards such people. They were allowed to enter and 
leave Britain at will, or settle permanently if they 
wished. This 'Open Door' policy was seen by much 
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established political opinion at the time as one of the 
factors binding the Commonwealth together. The 
Conservative Party Home Secretary told the House of Commons 
in 1961 that as much as a quarter of the world's popuýation 
were entitled to enter and settle in Britain via these 
provisions. 4 Secondly, immigration from the New 
Commonwealth was seen by many as a source of extra labour 
which Britain's economy desperately needed. Without such 
additions to the work force, it was suggested, Britain 
would not be able to match her competitors' economic 
performance or to fill jobs that needed doing. So it was 
that Enoch Powelle later to become well known for his views 
opposing New Commonwealth immigration, was instrumental in 
persuading workers from the Caribbean to come to Britain to 
work in the Health Service. 
Thirdly, the immigrants from the New Commonwealth were 
non-white; it was difficult, perhaps impossible, to draft 
legislation to control their numbers which did not at least 
appear to discriminate against them on racial grounds. 
Such discrimination was anathema to many British 
politicians, and to much established political opinion at 
that time. 
Support for immigration-controls was most marked amongst 
back-bench Conservative MPs and in local Conservative 
constituency associations. Gradually, pressure for 
controls built up in the Conservative government, and 
eventually a bill was introduced to control immigration 
from the Commonwealth. The 1962 Commonwealth Immigration 
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Act was the first piece of legislation to seek to control 
specifically immigration from the Commonwealth. It did 
this through a system of employment vouchers: category A 
vouchers were for those immigrants with a specific job 
awaiting them, category D vouchers were for those 
immigrants whose work skills were in short supply in 
Britain, and category C vouchers were available to all on a 
first come, first served, basis. Although the 1962 Act has 
great symbolism as the first Act to seek to limit directly 
New Commonwealth immigration, its effect on immigrant 
numbers was not that great: immigrationg increasingly that 
of dependants, continued at around 50,000 a year for much 
of the 1960s and 1970s. 5 This figure reflects the concern 
of successive governments not to act illiberally in this 
area. 
It is clear that the Conservative government brought in 
the 1962 Act with great reluctance. R. A. Butler, the Home 
Secretaryl introduced the Bill at the Second Reading debate 
in the Commons. He made only a half-hearted attempt to 
justify it and was ill-prepared to defend it. He began his 
speech: "It is only after long and anxious consideration 
and a considerable reluctance that the Government have 
decided to ask Parliament to control immigration from the 
Commonwealth". 6 The leaders of the Labour Party, the 
Liberal Party and the churches together with much 
established political opinion, as expressed in the quality 
press, vehemently opposed the Bill. Howeveri the Act was 
popular among the electorate and also among many party and 
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political activists outside Westminster. Labour and 
Liberal politicians found themselves under very strong 
pressure from their constituents to support immigration 
control. By 1965, the Labour Party# Liberal Party and the 
churches had all changed their policies and were supporting 
control of coloured immigration from the New Commonwealth. 
The Labour Party won the 1964 General Election and 
continued the policies of the 1962 Act; indeed, in 1965, 
the Labour Government drastically limited New Commonwealth 
immigration even further. Policy proposals in Labour's 
1965 White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth adopted 
similar arguments to the Conservatives' in 1962: the number 
of New Commonwealth immigrants was the key to harmonious 
race relations in Britain. These race relations, it was 
implied in the White Paper, were poor and under threat, 
hence more stringent immigration control was required. The 
White Paper's proposals included the abolition of the 1962 
Act's C category vouchers for those with no jobs awaiting 
them, or without specific skills. 'The number of vouchers 
available to Commonwealth citizens was reduced to 8,500, 
one thousand of which were specifically allocated to Malta. 
It was also in 1965 that the Race Relations Act was 
passed. This Act, for' the first time in English law, 
specifically made racial discrimination in a public place 
an offence. It was now illegal to refuse anyone goods or 
facilities, for instance in a shop or public house, on the 
grounds of racial identity. The Act made a distinction 
between public and private places and did not, for example, 
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extend to the areas of employment and housing. The 1965 
Act was also used as an opportunity to amend the 1936 
Public order Act so as to make incitement to racial hatred 
an offence. Controversially, like the 1936 Act# the 1965 
Race Relations Act did not require deliberate intent to 
incite racial hatred before an offence was committed. The 
1965 Race Relations Act was subjected to much criticism, 
mainly from right-wing conservatives who doubted whether it 
would be effective, and who also saw the Act as an 
infringement of individual liberties. 
At the time of the passage of the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act, the Conservatives had established the 
first race relations body created by central government, 
the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council (CIAC). The 
CIAC's brief was to advise government on immigration issues 
and to monitor efforts to produce racial harmony. Labour's 
1965 proposals in the White Paper immigration from the 
Common-wealth replaced the CIAC with a new and more 
prominent body, the National Committee for commonwealth 
immigrants (NCCI). A further body was also created at this 
time, as a product of the 1965 Race Relations Act: this was 
the Race Relations Board. The Board's duties were solely 
to enforce and administer the 1965 Actr save for the 
incitement to racial hatred provisions, which were the 
responsibility of the Home Secretary. 
The period from mid-1965 to late 1967 was one in which 
issues of race and immigration appeared to have been dealt 
with satisfactorily. Leaders of the major political 
10 
parties and established political opinion were generally 
agreed that the existing controls and race relations 
measures were the correct policies. This period has been 
referred to as "the liberal hour", a time when liberal 
values ruled unchallenged. 7 This harmony was broken by the 
intervention of Conservative Shadow Cabinet member Enoch 
Powell, and some other Conservative MPs. Against a 
background of increased immigration by Asians from East 
Africa, Powell made several controversial speeches. In his 
most well known, the 'rivers of blood' speech in April 
1968, Powell warned of great trouble ahead unless coloured 
immigration was brought to an almost complete halt and 
repatriation begun. Powell breached the liberal consensus 
in this area in a highly controversial way, and this speech 
must rank as one of the most publicised and strongly 
criticised in British post-war politics. Support among the 
electorate for Powell's views appeared to be great and 
spread widely amongst voters of all political persuasions. 8 
In response to the campaign led by Powell and fellow 
Conservative MPSO the Labour Government hurriedly 
introduced a new and more restrictive immigration control 
measure, the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act. This Act 
attempted to limit immigration to those with close links 
with the United Kingdom and included a preference towards 
those who could show that they had a British grandparent or 
parent. This 'grandfather clause' caused great controversy 
since* despite government denials, such a clause clearly 
affected coloured New Commonwealth immigrants more than it 
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did whites from the "old" Commonwealth. 
As in 1962 and 1965, immigration control measures were 
accompanied by attempts to help black Britons. The 1968 
Race Relations Act was a stronger and more extensive 
version of the earlier 1965 Actt now bringing employment 
and housing under its control* The 1968 Act abolished the 
NCCI and replaced it with a similar but more powerful bodyt 
the Community Relations Commission (CRC). Almost certainly 
as a result of Powell's 'rivers of blood' speech, Harold 
Wilsont Labour Prime Ministert also initiated the Urban 
Programme. This was an attempt to bring special aid to 
needy geographical areas, some of which had high 
concentrations of black Britons. Care was taken not to 
identify black Britons as being Ispecial. problems'p mainly 
by directing help at deprived geographical areas and needy 
white Britons as well. It is generally agreedt however, 
that the Urban Programme grew out of the desire to help 
needy black inhabitants. 
In 1971t the newly-elected Conservative Government 
fulfilled an election manifesto pledge by tightening 
immigration controls via the 1971 Commonwealth immigration 
Act. This Act replaced employment vouchers by work 
permitst which did not' have the attendant right of 
permanent settlement or the right for dependants to enter 
the country. People who had close links by birth or 
descent with the United Kingdom, 'patrials' in the words of 
the Acti were not subject to immigration controls. The Act 
was strongly opposed by the Labour Party, the Liberal 
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Party, the race relations bodies and the churches. 
In 1976, a third race relations measure, the 1976 Race 
Relations Act, was created by the Labour Government. This 
Act further strengthened the 1968 Race Relations Act, 
notably by forbidding indirect racial indiscrimination. 
This was defined in the Act as resulting from practices 
which, whilst applied to everyone, had a particularly 
adverse effect on one or more specific racial groups. The 
1976 Act also abolished both the Race Relations Boardo 
whose duty was to enforce the 1968 Act, and the Community 
Relations Commission, whose task was to work for better 
race relations. A new body, the Commission for Racial 
Equality, was formed by the 1976 Act both to enforce the 
Act and to promote better race relations. 
In the area of race policy, two events of 1981 are 
noteworthy: the British Nationality Actl and riots in 
Brixton. The British Nationality Act was introduced in 
1981, and presented by its supporters as a long-overdue 
attempt to organise Britain's citizenship laws. It was 
hoped that if citizenship was clearly defined and linked to 
rights of settlement in Britain, then this would both 
clarify immigration practice and avoid the charge of racial 
discrimination. Critics of the Act viewed it as a further, 
if disguised, immigration control measure. Also in 1981, 
violent and well-publicised riots occurred in Brixton and 
elsewhere. Opinion was divided over how much they were 
11ra 
. 
cial" riots: certainly many, but not all, the rioters 
were young black people; they were seen on television news 
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throwing stones and petrol bombs at the police and looting 
and destroying property. As a leading judicial figure, 
Lord Scarman was asked by the Conservative Government to 
produce a detailed report on the riots; this made several 
detailed policy recommendations, designed particularly to 
improve relations between the police and the community in 
inner-city areas. 
The period from the creation of the first Commonwealth 
Immigration Act in 1962 until the 1981 British Nationality 
Act and Lord Scarman's report on the Brixton riots, 
provides an appropriate framework within which to examine 
established political opinion's response to race politics. 
The constant revision of immigration control and race 
relations measures in the period suggest that successive 
British governments found race politics a difficult area 
with which to deal. The debates surrounding legislation 
and policy development in this area thus provide an insight 
into how opinion formers and political leaders in Britain 
reacted to some problematic issues. Such debates are 
revealing of basic political attitudes and motivations. 
14 
II 
One of the interesting features of this policy area is the 
frequency with which the word "liberal" was used. The word 
occurs frequently in politicians' speeches, academic works, 
newspaper articles and similar contexts. The liberal view 
in this area of social policy is commonly associated both 
with a reluctance to control large-scale coloured 
immigration from the New Commonwealth and with support for 
policies leading to the full acceptance and participation 
of black Britons in British society. Such views have been 
expressed particularly by leaders of such groups as the 
Labour Party, the Liberal Partye race relations bodies and 
the churches. Despite its wide usage, or perhaps because 
of it, the meaning attached to the word "liberal" has 
rarely been defined or discussed in the area of race 
policy. It seems that participants in this area of social 
policy have viewed its meaning as self-evident, "liberal" 
appearing in the debate as a shorthand term used to cover 
an ill-defined set of beliefs, policies and attitudes. 
This imprecise usage should not be a surprise. There are 
considerable difficulties in trying to establish a precise 
meaning of "liberal" in British race politics, as indeed 
there is in defining liberalism generally. Most 
commentators are agreed that liberalism is a long and broad 
political tradition which defies easy definition or 
description. 9 
Clearly, however, the liberal tradition is fundamentally 
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about liberty. Liberty itself is subject to varying 
interpretations. The political thinkers usually associated 
with theories of liberalism, such as Locke, J. S. Mill, and 
J. M. Keynes, all favoured promoting freedom and individual 
liberty, but differed both in how to achieve this goal, and 
indeed, as t6 what the goal of liberty was. ' A useful 
distinction here is that between ideas of negative and 
positive freedom. 10 The older liberal tradition emphasised 
negative freedom; the absence of constraints, particularly 
constraint by the state, made people free. This justified 
a minimalist state whose role was to provide a framework 
which stopped citizens from restricting each other's 
liberties. The idea of positive freedom carried with it 
the notion that the social environment restricts liberty 
and must be changed to set people free from its 
constraints. This requires a state which takes an active 
part in society, changing, shaping and moulding- it and 
individuals within it, to promote more liberty. This idea 
of positive freedom grew strongly in Britain in the 
eighteenth, nineteenth and twentieth centuries. By 1945, 
the term Liberal was reserved for members of the Liberal 
Party, or perhaps for supporters of negative liberty, 
whilst "liberal', was us6d for those who favoured state 
political intervention to positively create conditions 
which would lead to more freedom for people. 
In the post-war period, such liberals, with their concern 
for positive liberty, had moved some distance from the 
traditional form of negative liberalism. Their desire to 
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create conditions which would favour liberty led them to 
view the state as an instrument for persuasion, social 
engineering and social provision. With this went their 
view that people did not necessarily know what was best for 
them, that their essential personalities were malleable and 
subject to change in the right direction, and that 
individual freedom should be subject to policies aimed at a 
conception of the maximum collective freedom and liberty. 
Values and attitudes characterised as liberal in race 
politics in the period under discussion have drawn most 
heavily from the positive freedom tradition. The concept 
of individual negative freedom has, for example, not been 
heavily emphasised, whilst policies of pos itive freedom to 
change society and individuals within it have received 
emphasis. 
Liberal values within the race area are not derived from 
one particular political party or group or any one 
particular political school of thought. Nor does it seem 
that true liberals must share the same opinion on the 
politics of race, or hold these opinions equally strongly 
or consistently. For example# the leadership of the Labour 
Party has often been perceived as being liberal in the 
period 1965-67, when Roy aenkins was Home Secretary; this 
has been widely described as 'the liberal hour'. However, 
when the Labour Government passed the 1968 commonwealth 
Immigration Act, it was commonly seen as acting in an 
"illiberal" manner. Moreoverl the Labour Party, Liberal 
Party and the churches all changed their "liberal" policy 
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of outright opposition to immigration controls in 1962, to 
support for controls in 1965. Liberal attitudes in race 
politics, it can be deduced, have not been based on a grand 
design or blueprint to deal with a particular issue or set 
of issues. Rather, they have been largely ad hoc 
responses, informed by prior values to particular and 
largely unforeseen events and political problems. 
All political recommendations and social analysis, of 
whatever political persuasion, rest on choices made from a 
range of available values, explanations and assumptions. 
Examination of the race policy area in the period 1961 to 
1981 reveals that liberal attitudes are associated with a 
wide diversity of beliefs and ways of looking at man and 
society. 11 Some themes can, however., be isolated as 
central. Five of them are identified in this study as 
forming key elements of the liberal response. They are a 
particular view of man and human behaviour together with 
the values of rationality, equality, pluralism and 
community. These values have been pressed frequently and 
prominently in the liberal debate on race politics. 
Despite some differences of emphasis and change over time, 
there is a degree of consensus and coherence on these 
values in the debate on race policy. The word "liberal" is 
used# thereforet in this study to describe no more than 
values widely held by these groups and individuals who are 
commonly identified as belonging to the liberal tradition 
in this policy area. 
Political argument is rarely simple or straightforward. 
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Often choices have to made not between the self-evidently 
good or evil, but between good or a mixture of the good and 
less good. To achieve a desired aim may require the 
promotion of one value whilst disregarding or minimising 
values which in other circumstances would be pre-eminent. 
Such choices between values exist in all political 
traditions: liberal, conservative, socialist or whatever. 
Within these traditions, some values may be held more 
strongly than others, and within the overall tradition 
conflicts may occur between particular values. The aim of 
this study is to examine the coherence and consistency of 
values within the liberal tradition as it faced the issues 
of race politics in the period 1961-81. For example, 
liberals may have a commitment to democratic majority rule 
and also to preventing racial discrimination. This may 
produce problems if the majority of the population wish to 
discriminate on racial grounds against the minority: this 
would initiate a conflict between moral and political 
imperatives. Detailing such conflicts, however, is not to 
suggest that liberal values have been either incorrect or 
unsuccessful. 
Race politics has been chosen as the subject of this 
study since this is an ar6a where a liberal response has 
been widely recognised. In this sense, the politics of 
race provide an excellent vehicle for an examination of 
British liberal values in the period 1961-81. It seems 
probable that similar basic values have shaped and informed 
liberal stances in other areas of policy during this 
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period. Whilst this assumption awaits further research, it 
is hoped that the arguments of this study will provide some 
insight into and leverage upon liberal values in other 
areas of policy. 
III 
In order to examine the coherence and consistency of 
liberal reactions to race politics in Britain, the 
following procedure has been employed. Firstly, the 
evidence from those groups most commonly associated with 
liberal values was examined in great detail: the Labour 
Party, Liberal Party, race relations bodies and the 
churches. The values, attitudes and policy proposals from 
political and social leaders in these groups are found to 
be particularly revealing. Examination of this evidence 
discloses that there has been a broad consensual response 
amongst these leaders to issues of race. Several ideas and 
themes appear frequently and seem to influence the debate 
strongly in all these groups. These ideas, as mentioned 
above, include a view of man and human behaviour and ideas 
of rationality, equality, pluralism and community. once 
this consensus had been identified and some key components 
recognised, material was collected to substantiate these 
claims. This material constitutes Part one of this study. 
Part Two discusses the themes that emerge from the material 
of Part one, with a view to examining their coherence and 
consistency. 
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In Chapters One to Four, the reactions of the leadership 
of the Labour Party# the Liberal Party, race relations 
bodies and the churches to race politics is outlined. The 
material selected to represent their views is chosen 
deliberately in order to highlight the themes which it is 
claimed are typical of their responses. These chapters 
constitute a qualitative content analysis of some of the 
prominent ideas in the liberal response in the period 1961- 
81. A number of points about these chapters require 
emphasis. The material selected concentrates on what 
appear to be the basic values of liberal opinion in this 
area. Little attention is paid here to technical details 
such as, for example, the intricacies of nationality and 
citizenship law. Interest is focused instead upon the 
broad political and philosophical justifications of policy, 
for these justifications are revealing of fundamental 
values. It is hoped that the variety of sources cited will 
avoid criticism that these are carefully selected remarks 
of a few elite formers of opinion. Group policy-making is 
undoubtedly a more complex process than a small number of 
people at or near the centre of political power formulating 
policies and practising them. No particular decision- 
making model is therefore being proposed in this study# 
despite the emphasis placed upon established political 
opinion at or near the centre of government. The purpose 
of this study is not directed at the method of policy- 
making, but at basic and fundamental values and ideas. The 
recent history of race policy has been well documented, 
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particularly the period of the 1960sl and it is not 
intended to add to those accounts. 12 It is hoped, however, 
that sufficient historical detail is provided to allow 
those unfamiliar with this policy area to follow 
developments. In many respects# the material available 
dictates the*format and character of the chapter concerned 
with groups' reactions to race politics: where, for 
example, the group is a major political party there is 
considerable material available in Parliamentary debates, 
party policy documents and elsewhere. At the other 
extreme, church leaders have been only intermittently 
active in this area, and material is thorefore less 
abundant. Recourse is made in this instance, therefore# to 
more ephemeral material such as church newspaper reports of 
speeches. 
In some ways, the history of liberal reactions to the 
politics of race is that of the Labour Party. Amongst its 
leaders have always been those who strongly espoused 
liberal values, who have been in governmentr and were thus 
able to implement policy shaped by these values. The 
Labour Party has had the resources? and the commitment# to 
research and publicise its views in this area. Sometimes, 
particularly in the case oi immigration control as against 
race relations, Labour politicians have been accused of 
acting illiberally. However, as will be suggested belowt 
even when controlling New Commonwealth immigration, Labour 
politicians have justified their actions with arguments 
which have been recognisably part of the liberal consensus. 
22 
Hansard, the House of Commons record of debates, is a prime 
source of research for evidence of the Labour Party 
leadership's values in this area. of particular usefulness 
are the Second Reading debates concerned with race and 
immigration legislation. These debates tend to be of a 
broadly political and philosophical nature, and they form 
the basic material from which the policy of Labour leaders 
is deduced in this study. Accompanying this material is 
evidence from speeches, manifestos and biographies. 
The Liberal Party was a small party during the period 
under consideration, and material illustrating its leaders' 
views is less abundant than is the case with the Labour 
Party. Neverthelessr Liberal leaders participated in many 
of the House of Commons debates on the subject of race. 
The Liberal Party has also been active in publishing 
documents and making conference resolutions concerning race 
relations and immigration. That the party has not been in 
government during this period (the 1976-78 Lib-Lab Pact was 
no exception) has perhaps allowed it to reflect more 
faithfully the liberal tradition than might have been the 
case were it constrained by governmental responsibility. 
The annual reports of the various government-created race 
relations bodies since 1962 provide a year-by-year account 
of the development of policy in the area of race. on issues 
of race relations, these bodies have frequently been ahead 
of government and their proposals have foreshadowed future 
legislation. The yearly description and analy'sis of trends 
provided by these bodies is invaluable in tracing the 
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development of ideas and themes. 
The position of the Bishops in the House of Lords coupled 
with an increasing emphasis on the political involvement of 
the churches means that there is considerable evidence of 
the views of church leaders. Many evidently viewed their 
role as that of the nation's conscience and have been 
outspoken on several issues of racial policy. Material is 
presented here from debates in the House of Lords, speeches 
and documents published by the churches. 
There is here no detailed discussion of liberal opinion 
in the Conservative Party. There are a number of reasons 
for this. Firstly, liberal Conservative views on race were 
most prominent in the late 1950s and early 1960s, but began 
to lose their importance from 1965. Many leading liberal 
Conservatives accepted immigration control after 1962, and 
gradually the remaining opponents of immigration control 
left the Commons. Edward Boyle, for example, became Vice 
Chancellor of Leeds University in 1970; Iain Macleod, 
perhaps the staunchest liberal Conservative in this area, 
and who fought hard against the restriction on Kenyan Asian 
immigration in 1968, died in 1970. A few Conservative 
liberals such as Lord Whitelaw and Lord Hailsham continued 
to be influential in tfiis area until the mid-1970s, but 
they were a diminishing voice. The rightward drift of the 
Party in the 1970s muted the voice of liberal Conservatism 
on issues of race relations. Compared with earlier 
occasions, the views of many Conservative MPs during the 
debates on the 1976 Race Relations Act and the 1981 British 
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Nationality Act, were markedly more right-wing. Moreover, 
recent books by leading Conservative liberals show complete 
support for tough immigration controls and the new 
Nationality laws. 13 These developments mean that At is 
difficult to trace a consistent strand of liberal 
Conservatism through the race policy area. 14 
Chapter Five examines the evidence on the views of the 
indigenous white British population on race politics. 
Majorities are notoriously silent, rarely making speeches 
or writing books, so that much of the evidence supplied 
here is derived from opinion polls. Whilst the limitations 
of such data is acknowledged, there is strong evidence to 
be gained on certain issues. Evidence suggests, for 
example, that the majority of white Britons have been 
hostile to the phenomenon of large-scale coloured 
immigration from the New Commonwealth. This chapter is 
included in the study since the evidence provided by 
opinion polls leads to problems of conflicting values and 
consistency for those holding liberal views. 
In Part Two of this studyi (Chapters Six to Ten)# the 
themes which were identified earlier as being key liberal 
values in this area are discussed in detail. The initial 
aim in each of these chapters is to draw together and 
summarise the data reviewed earlier, and once a summary has 
been made, to analyse these themes in depth. Any evidence 
of conflicting or inconsistent values both within themes 
and between them, is identified and studied. It is 
important to emphasise that these chapters do not attempt 
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to cover the philosophical or theoretical literature on 
topics such as 'rationality' or 'equality', nor do they 
enter the philosophical debate on the problematics of such 
issues. Identification is made, however, of the major 
values underlying liberal attitudes to race politics, and 
dilemmas posed by inconsistent or conflicting values. 
Nomenclature is a major problem for any investigation of 
British race politics, since Britain has experienced an 
extensive, large-scale immigration of people with different 
cultures and skin colour. many of these immigrants came 
from the New Commonwealth. Pakistan ceded from the 
Commonwealth in 1973, so that continuing immigration is now 
technically from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan. This 
title has been little used in discussion. Much of the 
concern of participants in the race debate has been 
towards immigrants from the New Commonwealth and Pakistan 
and their descendants, who are settled in Britain and who 
hold British nationality. A variety of terms has been used 
to describe these groups, and in such a controversial area, 
the usage of certain terms tends to indicate support of a 
particular stance towards them. There is no completely 
satisfactory solution to this problem. In this study, 
where reference is primarily to non-white immigrants from 
the New Commonwealth including Pakistan, the term 
"immigrants" is employed to describe such people. Where 
reference is to those who have settled in Britain and have 
full citizenship, the term "black Britons" is used. The 
term "white Britons" is used to denote members of the 
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majority white indigenous population. It is hoped that this 
terminology is accurate without being perjorative. 
27 
Introduction: References 
1. The number of New Commonwealth immigrants to Britain 
has been hotly disputed, See Commonwealth Immigration 
to the United Kingdom from the 1950s to 1975 -A 
Survey of Statistical Sources (House of Commons, 
Library Research Paper No. 56, London# HMSOj 1976). 
See also Immigration, the First Report from the Select 
Committee on Race and Relations and Immigration, 
Session 1977-8, Vol. 1. (London, HMSO, 1978). 
2. For details of these 1958 racial disturbances see 
James Wickendenj Colour in Britain (London, OUPj 
1958). 
3. The influence of Empire and Commonwealth on British 
political leaders is usefully surveyed in chapter one, 
'The Imperial Legacy' in Zig Layton-Henry, The 
Politics of Race (London, Allen and Unwin, 1984). 
4. R. A. Butler, Hansard Vol. 649, Col. 687. 
S. Commonwealth Immigration to the United Kinqdom from 
the 1950s to 1976 -A Survey of Statistical Sources 
OP. cit. 
6. R. A. Butler Ibid. Butler's biographer suggests that 
Butler was able to '... convey the impression of the 
liberal-minded Home 'Secretary 12ar excellence... The 
immigration legislation tarnished his liberal 
image... It seems to me that one of the few things in 
his past that Butler remains personally bitter about 
is the criticism he had to endure during the passage 
of the Immigration Bill'. Patrick Cosgrove, R. A. 
28 
Butler: An English Life (London# Quartet Books, 1981) 
pp. 122,123,124. 
E. J. B. Roseg Colour and Citizenship (Oxfordi OUPt 
1969) p. 9. 
For further details of reactions to Powell's views, 
see Chapter Five below. 
9. Professor Laski, referring to liberalism, wrote that 
'It is not easy to describe, much less to define, for 
it is hardly less a habit of mind than a body of 
doctrine'. See Harold Laskit The Rise of Eur02 
Liberalism (London, Allen and Unwint 1962) p. 13. 
Kenneth Minogues The Liberal Mind (London, Methuen# 
1963) p. VIII, 'Liberalism is a vague term'. 
Alan Bullock and Maurice Shock# The Liberal Tradition 
(Londont Adam and Charles Block, 1956) p. XIXj 'At 
first sight, the most striking thing about the Liberal 
tradition is its intellectual incoherence'. 
I 
See also Barbara Goodwin# Using Political Ideas 
(Chichester, Wiley# 1982), Gordon Grahami politics in 
its Place (Oxford, Clarendon* 1986), John plamenatz, 
'Liberalism' in Dictionary of the History of Ideas' 
Vol. 3 (New York# Scribner, 1973), and Maurice 
Cranston, 'Liberalism' in The Encyclo2Edia of 
PhilOsO2hy Vol. 4 (London, Collier-macmillan, 1967) 
D. J. Manningi Liberalism (London, Dents 1976)j Robert 
Eccleshall, British Liberalism (Londone Longman, 1986) 
10. Isaiah Berlint 'Two Concepts of Liberty' in Isaiah 
Berlin,, Four Essays on Libert (oxford,, OUp, 1969) 
29 
pp. 118-172 
11. For a similar approach to the problem of identifying 
liberalism in the race policy area, see Michael 
Banton# Promoting Racial Harmony (Cambridge# CUP, 
1985) pp. 33-34 
12. See# for example, Sheila Patterson, Immigration and 
Race Relations in Britain 1960-7 (oxford, OUP, 1969). 
Paul Foot, Immigration and Race in British Politics 
(Harmondsworth# Penguin, 1965); J. B. Rose Op. cit.; 
Zig Layton-Henry op. cit. 
A comprehensive guide to works in this area is Zig 
Layton-Henry, Race and Politics in Britain: A Select 
Bibliography (2nd Edition) (London, Social Science 
Research Council, 1984). 
13. Chris Patten, The Tory Case (London, Longman, 1983) 
p. 53 
Francis Pym, The Politics of Consent (London, Hamish 
Hamilton, 1984) p-120; James Prior, A Balance of Power 
(London# Hamish Hamilton, 1986) p. 50-52; Peter Walker, 
The Ascent of Britain (London, Sidgwick and Jackson, 
1977) 
14. Since the Social Democratic Party was not in existence 
during the period of this study, its views on New 
Commonwealth immigration and race relations are not 
considered. 
30 
Chapter One : The Labour Party 
The Labour Party was the most important and influential 
body to espouse liberal values in the area of race politics 
in the period under consideration. As such, its views and 
opinions are of prime importance to the task of identifying 
these values. The Party's leadership tried to maintain 
liberal values however much it was subjected to pressures 
to deny them. Many of Labour's traditional supporterst as 
outlined in Chapter Five below, opposed New Commonwealth 
immigration and were ambivalent or hostile to race 
relations measures. These tensions and pressures led the 
Party leadership to act in ways that were commonly viewed 
as illiberal, as for example, in tightening immigration 
controls via the provisions of the 1965 White Paper# 
Immigration from the Commonwealth and the 1968 Commonwealth 
immigration Act. However, it is noteworthy that the 
justifications for such further controls, as will be shown 
in this chapter, were often phrased in the terms and values 
of the current liberal consensus. The Party leadership's 
opinions in the period 1961-81 provide therefore perhaps 
the best and most extensive guide to liberal values in 
British race politics. 
The leadership of the Labour Party, in common with other 
opinion formers, gave relatively little public attention to 
the issues raised by immigration to Britain from the New 
Commonwealth during the 1940s and 1950s. There is evidence 
that the 1945-50 Attlee Labour Government considered both 
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control of New Commonwealth immigration and race relations 
legislation, but this was not made public at the time. 1 
Racial disturbances in London and Nottingham in 1958 
brought the issues of immigration and race politics to the 
public's attention. The Labour Party's reaction to these 
disturbances appeared in a Labour Party Executive Policy 
Statement, which formed the basis of a pamphlet, Racial 
Discrimination. 2 The pamphlet declared that all 
Commonwealth citizens should have unconditional right of 
entry to Britain, and that any problems posed by this 
policy should be tackled with goodwill, education and 
greater social provision, by the government. 
The Conservative Government, under strong pressure from 
its right wing and local constituency parties, reluctantly 
introduced a bill in 1961 which became the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigration Act. The purpose of this Act was 
to restrict the number of New Commonwealth Immigrants into 
Britain. 3 The leadership of the Labour Party vehemently 
opposed the Bill# arguing that it introduced a colour bar 
into British legislation, and that the needs of the economy 
automatically regulated immigration, making legislative 
control unnecessary. The Times political correspondent 
suggested that the Labodr Cabinet was divided in its 
response to the Billt the majority being opposed in 
principle to immigration controls, but unwilling to let the 
Party appear to be in favour of unlimited immigration to 
Britain. Hugh Gaitskellt leader of the Partyt and George 
Brownt a leading member of the Shadow Cabinett presented 
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the issue as a matter of principle despite the warnings of 
their colleagues that opinion polls showed an overwhelming 
0 major ty in favour of controlling immigration. 4 Another 
commentator has suggested that Gaitskell's strong 
opposition to the Bill was part of a strategy to defend 
himself against the Party's left wing, from which he was 
under great pressure at the time. 5 
Patrick Gordon Walkerl Labour's Shadow Foreign Secretary, 
began the Labour attack at the Second reading of the Bill 
in the Commons. He suggested that the Conservative Home 
Secretary, R. A. Butler, who had introduced the Bill to the 
House: 
'is an advocate now of a Bill which contains bare-faced, 
open race discrimination. He advocates a Bill into which 
race discrimination is now written - not only into its 
spirit and its practice, but into its very letter'. 6 
Gordon Walker argued that the Government had the wrong 
approach: 
'of course there is a real problem, a problem of social 
relations, housing and overcrowding, which produces 
racial tension... there are two causes of the real 
problem. one is what I might call the clotting of the 
immigrant population, its gathering together in smallish 
areas of poor housing and high unemployment. The second 
cause of the problem is that, in these areas of clotting 
population, the creation of new jobs by the expanding 
economy is outrunning the provision of houses. '7 
Hugh Gaitskell concluded the Second Reading debate for the 
Labour Party. He made a scathing and bitter attack on the 
Billt indeed his biographer records that Gaitskell regarded 
his speech as the most important he ever made. 8 He argued 
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that the rate of immigration was linked to the state of the 
British economy and the availability of jobs and that 
immigrants were benefiting the economy: 'The immigrants are 
healthy, law-abiding and are at work. They are helping 
USQ19 The Government, he arguedt wanted to restrict 
coloured immigration because it feared racial -disorder and 
tension: 
'There is a real problem here. None of us has ever 
denied that. There are social problems and an appalling 
housing problem. We concede the existence of these 
problems, in certain areas, but we do not believe for one 
moment that this Bill is the best way to handle them. 110 
Immigration of people of a different colour and culture 
did, Gaitskell suggested, create problems# but: 
'Do the Government deal with it by seeking to combat 
social evils by building more houses and enforcing laws 
against overcrowding, by using every educational means at 
their disposal to create tolerance and mutual 
understanding, and by emphasising to our own people the 
value of these immigrants and setting their face firmly 
against all forms of racial intolerance and 
discrimination? That is what we believe and that is what 
I hope the Government believe, but it is not -what is 
implied by the Bill. Indeedl there is no shred of 
evidence that the Government have even seriously tried to 
go along this course and make a proper enquiry into the 
nature of this problem. They have yielded to the crudest 
clamour, 'Keep them out'. 111 
The Labour Party leadership strongly opposed controlling 
immigration at the Bill's Second Reading. Yet New 
Commonwealth immigrants 
. 
mainly settled in the big 
industrial cities in Britain, and had the most immediate 
effect on Labour's traditional supporters, the English 
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working class. Labour's policy, as the opinion polls 
revealed, and many MPs knew, was very unpopular with many 
voters. These pressures were acknowledged by. Denis Healey 
in a speech concluding the debate for Labour at the Commons 
Third Reading of the 1962 Act. 12 When asked what Labour 
would do about the Act if they were in power, Healey did 
not answer the question directly, except to say that the 
Party saw no reason for the Act at the present time. This 
move from outright opposition to controlling immigrations 
to opposition to controls at the present time was reflected 
in a Labour Party publication of 1963. The policy document 
Twelve Wasted Years reiterated many of the. points made by 
Gaitskell during the parliamentary debates on the 1962 Act. 
However, it no longer committed the Party to repealing the 
Act when it was next in power. 13 The document was clear, 
however, about the realities of the 1962 Act, and the 
existence of problems in the area of race relations. The 
Act: 
lesewas clearly a colour bar measure and is irrelevant to 
the real problems that exist. The faults of the 
Conservative Government's housing and unemployment policy 
have created conditions which are wrongly blamed on 
immigration. 114 
Shortly after the debates on the 1962 commonwealth 
Immigration Acts the Labour Party published a discussion 
document for Labour Party groups, The Integration of 
Immigrants. Whilst the pamphlet did not offer a definition 
of "integration", it was concerned with problems which 
would hinder such a process, One concern was for the 
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effect which organised anti-immigrant groups might have on 
the general public. Such groups were, it argued: 
I ... dangerous, because surveys and investigations have 
shown that, apart from the fanatically colour-prejudiced 
minorityl there are a large number of people who are 
slightly prejudiced or suspicious of newcomers, and this 
large group can be swayed into deeper prejudice - or into 
tolerance and acceptance if an effect is made on the 
other side. '15 
one major weapon, the pamphlet suggested, would be for the 
Government to adopt: 
'A sustained educational campaign to secure greater 
knowledge and understanding. Courses should be provided 
for working teachers and teachers' training courses 
should include the appropriate subjects (the sociology, 
social psychology and social anthropology of racial 
problems). ... This is a very important weapon against the 
development of prejudice and an important step in the 
long term towards good relations. 116 
Hugh Gaitskell died in January, 1963 and with him passed 
much of the very strong Labour opposit'ion to immigration 
controls. The Party leadership passed. to Harold Wilson, 
and under Wilson the Party won the 1964 General Election. 
For the first time, issues of race and immigration played 
an important role in British post-war electoral politics. 
Labour's policy on immigration at this time was that 
immigrant numbers should be agreed with the Commonwealth. 
Until this agreement was reached, the 1964 General Election 
Manifesto asserted, 'Labour accepts that the number of 
immigrants entering the United Kingdom must be limited. 117 
The constituency of Smethwick in the West Midlands 
attracted considerable attention during the election 
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campaign, Patrick Gordon Walker# the Shadow Foreign 
Secretary, losing the seat to Conservative Peter Griffiths# 
whose platform was opposition to New Commonwealth 
immigration. Gordon Walker had held the seat in'1950# 
1951,1955 and 1959, but was strongly identified in the 
public eye as being a keen supporter of New Commonwealth 
immigration. Indeed, the Midland correspondent of The 
Times was speculating as early as November 1963, whether 
Gordon Walker would lose his seat at the next general 
election over the immigration issue. 18 Gordon Walker also 
lost a safe Labour seat at a by-election in Leyton in early 
1965, especially called in order to secure his return to 
the House of Commons. These defeats were commonly seen to 
be the result of Gordon Walker's sympathy towards 
immigration from the New Commonwealth. Indeed, Harold 
Wilson said of the Smethwick result, 'it is completely 
contrary to the swing and all of us know why. '19 The 
Smethwick result of 1964 demonstrated clearly that a 
politician's views on immigration could markedly affect 
electoral support. The new 1964 Labour Government with a 
majority in single figures did, however, renew in November 
1964 those parts of the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act 
which required annual renewal. 
Richard Crossman reveals in his 1965 diary how powerful a 
force the immigration issue was at the time, suggesting 
that since the Smethwick result# immigration could be 'the 
gre, atest potential vote loser for the Labour Party'. 20 it 
is evident that the Labour Party was afraid that it would 
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lose electoral support to the Tories if it were popularly 
identified as being more in favour of Now Commonwealth 
immigration than the Conservatives. Consequently# Labour 
felt the necessity to move to a more popular and bipartisan 
policy, and did this through the provisions of the 1965 
White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth. 21 The White 
Paper instituted stiffer controls over coloured 
immigration, reducing the availability of entry vouchers to 
8,500 a year, one thousand of which were reserved for 
Malta. This it Justified by arguing that anxiety over 
coloured immigration was a threat to good race relations, 
and therefore controls were necessary. However, there can 
be little doubt that these controls were a move to appease 
popular opinion and prevent the Conservatives from using 
the issue as an election platform. 22 stricter controls 
were unpopular with many Labour Party activists and Barbara 
Castle has suggested that it was her idea to produce the 
1965 immigration controls at the same time as the 1965 Race 
Relations Act, in order to try to placate those supporters 
offended by tighter controls. 23 
Part III of the 1965 White Paper was entitled 
'Integration', and although it did not define the term, it 
outlined the Labour Government's philosophy and plans. The 
section began boldly: 
'The United Kingdom is already a multi-racial society and 
Commonwealth immigrants make a most valuable contribution 
to our economy... there can be no question of allowing 
them to be regarded as second-class citizens. At the 
same time it must be recognised that the presence in this 
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country of nearly one million immigrants from the 
Commonwealth with different social and cultural 
backgrounds raises a number of problems and creates 
various social tensions in those areas where they have 
concentrated. If we are to avoid the evil of racial 
strife and if harmonious relations between the different 
races who now form our community are to develop, these 
problems and tensions must be resolved and removed so 
that individual members of every racial group can mingle 
freely with all other citizens at school, at work and 
during their leisure time without any form of 
discrimination being exercised against them. 124 
The White Paper then outlined proposals for Government 
action in the areas of housing, education, employment and 
health, to improve provision in these areas and to stop the 
problems mentioned earlier from arising. However: 
'None of the difficulties referred to above will be 
resolved without a positive effort on the part of all 
concerned... (The Government was impressed by the work of 
local voluntary liaison committees in this respect, and 
felt that such committees) ... help to create a climate of 
mutual tolerance in which the stupidity of racial 
prejudice cannot survivel. 25 
Education of the public was viewed as being of major 
importance, since 'Many of the social tensions which exist 
arise from ignorance and a readiness to believe unfounded 
rumour. 126 The White Paper concluded that: 
'The good name of Britain, our relations with the other 
members of the Commonwealth, and, above all, justice and 
common humanity demand that Commonwealth immigrants in 
this country should be absorbed into our community 
without friction and with mutual understanding and 
tolerance. The Government believe that the good sense of 
the British people will prevail and that this will be 
achieved. 127 
The 1965 White Paperr marking as it did Labour's official 
39 
commitment to more stringent immigration controls, led to 
great division in the Party between supporters of this 
policy and those of more liberal sentiments. Labour's 1965 
Annual Conference saw a stormy debate on the principles at 
issue; a motion asking the Government to withdraw the White 
Paper becauýe it was an I ... expression of' surrender, 
however disguised# to the currents of illiberal opinion', 
was defeated. 28 Harold Wilson, Prime Minister, resisted 
charges that the White Paper was a colour bar: 'I repudiate 
the libel that Government policy is based either on colour 
or racial prejudice. We repudiate, indeed I resent, the 
accusation of illiberality... 129 
The other main policy initiative in the area of race 
legislation in 1965 was the introduction by the Labour 
Party of what became the 1965 Race Relations Act. The aim 
of this Act was to forbid racial discrimination in public 
places and to forbid the incitement of racial hatre*d. Sir 
Frank Soskice, as Labour's Home Secretary, introduced the 
Bill at the Second Reading in the Commons, and affirmed 
that the Government believed that the Bill was in the 
public interest, since: 
'It would be a tragedy of the first order if our country, 
with its unrivalled tradition of tolerance and fair play 
as between one man or woman and another and perfect 
respect for the rights and personal worth and dignity of 
the individual, should see the beginnings of the 
development of a distinction between first and second 
class citizens and the disfigurement which can arise from inequality of treatment and incitement to feelings of 
hatred directed towards the origins of particular 
citizens, something for which they are not 
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responsible. '30 
The Government's policy at this time, as Soskice outlined, 
was twofold: effective control of immigration together with 
measures to help the settlement of black Britons already in 
Britain. Labour's policy was: 
I ... directed to achieving the task of settling the new 
arrivals into our community as in every sense first-class 
citizens. It is to the achievement of this task that the 
Bill is directed. Basically, the Bill is concerned with 
public order. overt acts of discrimination in public 
places, intensely wounding to the feelings of those 
against whom these acts are practised... breed the ill- 
will which, as the accumulative result of several such 
actions over a period, may disturb the peace. ' 31 
When the Conservative Party opposed the 1965 Race Relations 
Bill# tabling an amendment to itl Soskice agreed that they 
had the right to do so, but that he was sure that all MPs 
would agree ... that we would all be sorry to see a major 
party issue develop on the question of how we treat the 
coloured minority of our fellow citizenst or indeed any 
minority, coloured or not'. 32 Soskice concluded his speech 
by asserting: 
'The new arrivals are harmless, friendly people and 
should be so treated. They have brought us their skills 
and labour, which we badly need in the building up of our 
economy and the development of our own national life. '33 
Sir Frank Soskice was replaced as Home secretary by Roy 
Jenkins in December 1965. * Jenkins had a reputation for 
being a strongly committed liberal in matters of 
immigration and race relations, and he presided over 
British race relations between 1965 and 1967, a period 
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which has been characterised as 'the liberal hour'. 34 
During this period there was a broad consensus amongst 
established opinion formers on the issues of race, and by 
1965 the Labour, Conservative and Liberal parties, together 
with the churches, trades unions and much of the 'quality 
press' were in accord. Strict control of immigrant numbers 
together with the Government's efforts to promote racial 
harmony was the agreed solution. The 1966 General Election, 
where issues of race played little significant part in 
public political debate, seemed to set the seal on this 
bipartisan consensus. 35 The 1967 debate in the House of 
Commons on the renewal of parts of the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act clearly illustrates this consensus. The 
debate was notable for the agreement- displayed between 
Quentin Hogg (later Lord Hailsham) speaking for the 
Conservatives and Roy Jenkins respresenting Labour. The 
consensual opinion was for control of immigration together 
with assistance for black Britons already living in 
Britain. 36 Debate between the leadership of the main 
parties was largely over the form and degree of help 
considered desirable for black Britons. 
Roy Jenkins, as Home Secretary, made a noteworthy and 
influential speech in 1966 setting out his views on race 
relations and future policy. 37 This speech became 
something of a benchmark of liberal policy in the area of 
race relations. Jenkins was not, howevere in favour of 
integration policies which led to everyone becoming the 
same, and stated that, 'I define integration, therefore, 
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not as a flattening process of assimilation but as equal 
opportunity# accompanied by cultural diversity, in an 
atmosphere of mutual tolerance. This is the goal. 138 He 
suggested that New Commonwealth immigration was helping the 
British economy with many of the more unpleasant jobs being 
performed by immigrants: 
'There is therefore no overall rational basis for 
resentment of the coloured immigrant population in our 
midst. Far from hindering our successful national 
development, they positively help it. But resentment 
does not always spring from rational causes, particularly 
when, as is the case with coloured immigrants, their skin 
and their cultural differences make them natural targets 
for those who are looking for scapegoats. A few people, 
whether out of political opportunism or personal 
inadequacy, have deliberately whipped up racial 
prejudice, playing on fear and ignorance and blaming the 
immigrants for problems which were not of their making- 
but which stemmed from previous parsimony in housing, 
schools and welfare services. 139 
The role of government, as Jenkins made clear, was to give 
leadership in the area of immigration and race relations. 
American experience supported the view, he argued# that 
'... this is not a problem which solves itself without 
positive action'. 40 Jenkins affirmed that the Government 
strongly supported the work of race relations bodiest known 
as voluntary liaison committees: 
'The only way in which we shall overcome prejudice 
against Commonwealth immigrants in this country and 
foster mutual understanding and tolerance is by bringing 
together the local authorities, the voluntary 
organisations and the immigrant leaders in each of the 
areas where immigrants have settled so that they can 
tackle between them the various problems which have 
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arisen. 141 
This period of calm agreement, the 'liberal hour'l was 
shaken in late 1967 and early 1968 by an increase in 
immigration of Kenyan Asians from Kenya. The Asians had 
British passports and were under pressure to leave Africa 
as Kenya pursued policies of Africanisation. Many 
politicians were in disagreement whether the 1959-64 
Conservative Government, which had given the Asians British 
passports, had actually intended that they should ever be 
used to qualify for settlement in Britain. Conservative MP 
Duncan Sandys (who had been responsible for the 1963 Kenyan 
Independence Act which enabled Kenyan Asians to claim 
British passports) argued, as did Enoch Powell, that this 
had been an oversight. Conservative MPs on the liberal 
wing of the Party argued that the Asians' right to settle 
in Britain had been deliberately created and that such a 
right could not be revoked. Whatever the motivation of the 
Kenyan Independence Act, Asian immigration from Kenya 
revealed that the bipartisan consensus on race politics had 
not dealt successfully with the issues involved. 
Conservative MPs, notably Enoch Powell and Duncan Sandyst 
led a campaign to stop this new influx of immigrants-42 
The Labour Government# afr6id of the electoral consequence 
of seeming to be unenthusiastic about immigration control# 
rushed a Bill through the Commons in three days to limit 
further immigration. 43 
James Callaghan, the Home Secretary, introduced the 1968 
Commonwealth Immigration Bill to the House at its Second 
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Reading. He suggested that: 
'The Governmentl Parliament, all parties in the country, 
are fully committed to the development of a multi-racial 
society in Britain -a society which will be diverse in 
culture and will be equal before the law, a society in 
which all communities will have respect for each otherl a 
society in which there will be unity in purpose and 
common allegiance. But this ideal of a multi-racial 
society, to which all of us except the extremists are 
committed, will not happen of its own accord. It is 
something that has to be worked for. our policies must 
establish the ends that we will. 44 
one of the ways to create such a multi-racial society, he 
argued, was to limit the number of New Commonwealth 
immigrants entering Britain, for if all those entitled to 
do so actually did, it could result in# 'the services of 
the country being placed under far greater strain than they 
are at present'. 45 Callaghan rejected the charge that the 
Bill was racialist and aiming to exclude coloured 
immigrants but not whites, by saying that, 'the test that 
is adopted is geographical, not racial... It is a wild 
exaggeration to refer to this legislation as racialist. '46 
David Ennals, a minister at the Home office, concluding the 
Second Reading debate for the Labour Party, said that he 
was glad that the House had shown a good measure of unity 
towards the Bill: 'The debate has not been on party 
divisions, thank heavens that it has not. 147 He emphasised 
that Britain had gained much from the new immigrants: 
'These new citizens have made a significant contribution 
to the British way of lifer economically and socially. 
Most honourable members on both sides of the House have 
no time for those who decry the contribution made to our 
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country's wealth by citizens of Commonwealth origin. 
Over the centuries our country has been enriched by the 
flow of successive waves of immigrants. 148 
He believed, however, that -immigrants who came to Britain 
at short notice and in large numbers created I ... real 
problems. Those who live in areas of Commonwealth 
immigrant concentration are fully aware of those 
problems. '49 Ennals did not elucidate what these problems 
were. He suggested that the major point about the Bill was 
that it arose not out of a desire to practise racial 
discrimination in immigration control, but on the contraryl 
to: 
spromote good race relations in Britain. We are 
determined, as an article of faith, that all citizens in 
Britain shall have equality, not only before the law, but 
in opportunities for educationt housing, employment# 
social security and the rest. We are determined to avoid 
the situation which has developed in the United States, 
where patterns of prejudice and discrimination have 
created an under-privileged indigenous minority, many of 
whom react violently against what they conceive to be 
second-class citizenship. 150 
Depite the new controls imposed by the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act, both Duncan Sandys and Enoch Powell 
continued to lead a campaign against New commonwealth 
immigration. Powell made his highly-publicised 'rivers of 
blood' speech in April 1968, prophesying that disaster 
loomed if large-scale coloured immigration continued and 
repatriation was not begun: 'As I look ahead, I am filled 
with foreboding. Like the Romano I seem to see "the River 
Tiber running with much blood". 151 Powell's views, whilst 
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supported by much of the electorate, horrified liberal 
opinion and broke the consensus previously constructed on 
race issues. Labour politicians viewed Powell's speech as 
profoundly unhelpful to good race relations, and Barbara 
Castle, having watched Powell on television, records that: 
'As we listened to his relentless words - "I see the 
Tiber running with blood" - intense depression gripped 
use I knew he had taken the lid off Pandora's-box and 
that race relations in Britain would never be the same 
again. This is certainly an historic turning point, but 
in which direction? I believe he has helped to make a 
race war, not only in Britain, but perhaps in the world# 
inevitable. 152 
James Callaghan, Home Secretary at the time and later Prime 
minister, interpreted Powell's speech in a similar manner. 
In his memoirs, Callaghan wrote that, 'Enoch Powell fanned 
prejudice to fever heat with his speech in April 1968'. 53 
Only days after Powell's speech, the Labour Government was 
defending at its Second Reading the Bill which was to 
become the 1968 Race Relations Act. James Callaghan, 
whilst not mentioning Powell by name, began his speech: 
'We are discussing a subject which is heavily charged 
with emotion, in which there is nothing easier than to 
fan the flames of suspicion and resentment or of 
fear ... we are called upon to lead the country and our fellow men and women away from a prospect of strife and 
enmity and towards a society in which we shall live in 
freedom and in peace with each other, no matter what may 
be our race or our colour. 154 
David Ennals, Callaghan's deputy at the Home office# 
concluded the Second Reading debate, and did not hesitate 
to mention Powell by name: 'The damage done by that one 
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speech can hardly be overestimated. There has been set 
loose a torrent of feeling, maybe sincerely held but 
extremely damaging to good community relations. 155 
Labour, Conservative and Liberal leaders were anxious to 
restore the political consensus on race which Powell's 
speech had broken. James Callaghan appealed for unity of 
purpose with the Conservatives: 'Let us see how far we 
(can) move together in this matter. 156 David Ennals said, 
'None of us want these questions to be party issues-'57 
This appeal to keep immigration and race issues out of 
politics was largely successful amongst established 
political opinion. 58 
The 1968 Race Relations Act extended the powers of the 
1965 Race Relations Act, notably iin making racial 
discrimination illegal in the areas of housing and 
employment. James Callaghan outlined Labour's 
justification for the new proposals; the response of the 
House to racism, he argued, should be 'effective social 
policies'l but these required the support of legislation. 59 
There was a need for greater research, for: 
'In matters of race, so much of our prejudice springs 
from ignorance and from fear. Knowledge and 
understanding are the essential prerequisites and are, 
therefore, the enemies of prejudice. 60 
He denied that the Bill would introduce special privileges 
for coloured people: 
'The legislation which I am proposing does not seek to 
put any group in a privileged position. There is 
evidence that coloured people suffer from grave disadvantages on matters like housing and jobs. To 
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remove these disadvantages and place them on the same 
footing as their fellows is not to create a privileged 
class. What the Bill is concerned with is equal rights, 
equal responsibilities and equal opportunities and it is, 
therefore, a Bill for the whole nation and not just for 
minority groups. Its purpose is to protect society as a 
whole against actions which will lead to social 
disruption, and to prevent the emergence of a class of 
second-class citizens. '61 
David Ennals affirmed that Britain benefited from New 
Commonwealth immigrants: 
I ... the great majority of immigrants from the Common- 
wealth are law-abiding and hardworking people# who are 
anxious mainly for security and a higher standard of 
living. That is why they have come. They have made a 
significant contribution to our economy. '62 
James Callaghan's assurance that the Bill would not create 
a privileged minority was also repeated by David Ennals: 
'The Bill seeks to ensure that, so far as the law can 
provide, all men and women shall have equal oportunity- 
nothing more and nothing less. At presentj many coloured 
people undoubtedly have unequal opportunities .... The Bill 
will give no special rights to anyone. It will apply to 
the whole population... '63 
Harold Wilson received some criticism for not responding 
to Powell's 'rivers of blood' speech with a prompt 
rebuttal; it was not until May 1968 that he made a major 
public speech attacking Powell. Wilson's record of these 
events in his memoirs reflects his recognition of how 
popular Powell's views were and included a plea to take the 
race issue out of politics. 64 Part of Wilson's speech 
contained a promise of aid to areas of social need through 
the setting up of a special initiative, the Urban Aid 
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Programme. This, Wilson said, was to be a programme to 
alleviate problems of welfare, health, housing and 
education. Whilst race was always implicit in the 
programme's rationale, strong attempts were made not to 
present the new initiative as being specifically directed 
towards black Britons. 65 In his speech, Wilson suggested 
that, 'expenditure should be on the basis of need and the 
immigration problem is only one factor in the assessment of 
social need. 166 
James Callaghan introduced the measure to the House, 
which implemented the proposals in Wilson's speech, and 
which became the Local Government Grants (Social Need) Bill 
of 1969. Callaghan said: 
'The purpose of the Bill is to provide for the care of 
our citizens who live in the poorest or most overcrowded 
parts of our cities and towns. It is intended to arrestj 
insofar as it is possible by financial means# and reverse 
the downward spiral which afflicts so many of these 
areas. There is a deadly quagmire of need and apathy.. -I 
think that we have all seen in public life the way in 
which unmet needs, when they are felt by citizens 
incapable of matching the situation, create apathy and 
the apathy then gives rise to further needs which are not 
met. 167 
The proposals were not simply directed at areas of high 
immigrant concentration: 'It is a programme designed to 
meet the needs of the poorestr whatever their colour. They 
are all citizens of this country. 168 Callaghan concluded: 
'We are embarking, in this programme, on another modest but 
important step in trying to ensure that every citizen in 
this country has a fair start in life and a fair 
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opportunity for living out his life. '69 
At the end of a difficult decade for Labour over issues 
of race politics, the Party had developed several strands 
of policy. Labour's stance on immigration at this time# 
reflecting a resolution passed at the 1968 Annual 
Conference, was that immigration should be 'based not on 
colour but on the social and economic needs of the 
country'. 70 Labour's broad policy on race relations, as 
revealed in its 1970 General Election Manifesto# was that: 
'society should not discriminate against minorities on 
grounds of religion or race or colourl that all should 
have equal protection under the law and equal opportunity 
for advancement in and service to the community. '71 
The Party's attitude to Enoch Powell and those who 
supported his views on immigration and repatriation was 
well expressed in a resolution passed at the 1970 Annual 
Conference: 
'This Conference... is concerned that the pernicious and 
reactionary ideology of Powellism has, with the help of 
the Tory Party and press, gained a hold with many 
electors who have been frightened into support through 
not having enough facts to counter the argument. '72 
The Urban Programme and other initiativest the Conference 
suggested, 'are benefiting the whole community, residents 
and newcomers alike# in... areas of social nood'. 73 
In 1970, the General Election was won by the Conservative 
Party in a campaign where all the major parties wore 
anxious to minimiso the race issue. Under the liberal 
conservatism of Edward Hoath# Conservative policy was not 
to exploit racial issues for electoral gain. Labour 
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politicians, after the bruising they had received over the 
1968 Immigration Control Actj and Powell's speeches# were 
largely happy to let sleeping dogs lie. Liberal 
politicians had had their own problems with elements in the 
Party who supported the Powellite position (see Chapter Two 
below). Powýll himself attained great publicity during the 
campaign for his views that immigration should be halted 
and repatriation introduced. Indeed, he may have 
contributed to the Conservative victory and to his rival, 
Edward Heath's success, by associating the Conservatives 
with a strong immigration control policy. The degree of 
influence Powell had on the 1970 General Electlon has been 
widely debated; the balance of the argument suggests that 
Powell may indeed have won the election for the 
Conservatives. 74 
The 1971 Commonwealth Immigration Act was the outcome of 
a pledge in the Tories' 1970 General Election Manifesto to 
control immigration from the New Commonwealth even further. 
The Act was strongly opposed by the Labour Party and most 
established political opinion. The Party's opposition to 
the Act was, however, somewhat weakened since the 'patriall 
provisions in the legislation built on the principles of 
Labour's 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act. 75 There is 
also evidence that# as in 1962,1965 and 1968, the Labour 
Party was divided over immigration controls. The Times' 
political correspondent noted that at a meeting of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party to discuss the 1971 Bill# twelve 
back-benchers spoke in favour of the legislation. The same 
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correspondent suggested that all twelve MPs were middle- 
class intellectuals; working-class trades union MPs (who 
could have been expected to be most aware of their 
constituents' views), remained silent. 76 
James Callaghan led the Labour Party at the Second 
Reading debate in the Commons. He affirmed that he and the 
Party must oppose the Bill, although he was very aware of: 
I ... the inflammatory tinder that lies around, both in immigration control and race relations. I have always 
tried to proceed on the basis that this was not a fit 
subject for party controversy if it could be avoided, and 
that neither the community of immigrants nor the home 
community would be helped by party divisions on this 
issue. 177 
It was Callaghan's belief that the Bill would treat black 
Britons and future immigrants differently and adversely to 
white Britons. 78 The correct way ahead, he said, was to 
strengthen the work of the Urban Programme: 
'I must express my objection to the complete imbalance 
caused by failure to concentrate on the urban 
rehabilitation programme... decent housing, decent 
schooling, good amenities in the areas where the coloured 
immigrants have settled. In my view, this is the way* 
rather than a Bill like this.. -in which we should deal 
with the problem of the immigrant, if indeed it is a 
problem of the immigrant and not a problem of the white 
population. The cries of the underprivileged are not 
stifled by a shabby bill like this. one merely gives a 
badge of respectability to prejudice by a bill of this 
nature. 179 
Roy Jenkins concluded the Second Reading debate for the 
Labour Party. His first reason for opposing the Bill was 
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that it would harm community relations: 
I ... it is in my view liable to make.... every new 
coloured immigrant or every existing coloured immigrant 
born in this country less secure, less wanted and less 
belonging, thus inevitably exacerbating community 
relations. 180 
The Act would, he suggested, be unfair and treat immigrants 
arbitrarily, giving them fewer rights than the indigenous 
population. 81 Jenkins rejected Enoch Powell's view that 
the immigrants would form unassimilable concentrations in 
English cities: 
'I believe that attitude to be based on an extraordinary 
view of British history. For centuries past, this and 
every other country which has played a major part in the 
mainstream of world events has benefited greatly from its 
immigrants... we have constantly been stimulated and 
jolted out of our natural island lethargy by a whole 
series of immigration ... They rarely failed to make a contribution out of proportion to their numbers. if 
anyone doubts that, let him look at British business 
today... This is not merely a matter of business; where in 
the world is there a university which could preserve its 
fame, a cultural centre which could keep its eminence, or 
a metropolis which could hold its drawing power, if it 
were to turn inwards and to serve only its hinterland and 
its own racial group? 182 
A Green Paper published by the Labour Party in 1972 
outlined Labour's policy in race politics. The General 
Secretary of the Party# Sir Harry Nicholas# in an 
introduction to the paper, suggested that: 
'Possibly no subjects in the past decade have evoked a 
more emotional response than immigration and race 
relations. Regrettably, on many occasions attitudes have 
been struck which resound more with this emotion than 
with reason, and this has resulted in major problems 
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which could and should have been avoided. on the basis 
of the proposals in this report, howeverl we are offered 
new opportunities essentially founded on criteria which 
are rational and non-discriminatory. 183 
The Green Paper intended to 'devise a coherent and 
acceptable immigration policy which is not based on the 
colour or race of the prospective migrant'. 84 It also 
affirmed that $none of us objects in principle to 
immigration control, but the criteria must be rational and 
non-racial and must be seen to be so. 185 Under the Paper's 
proposals, work vouchers would be issued to new immigrantst 
and allocated: 
'***without regard to race or colour ... The admission of 
applicants for entry should be based on the date of 
application for entry, Job skills, labour shortagest 
family considerations or other appropriate non-racial 
criterial. 86 
Integration was supported by the Paper and Roy Jenkins' 
1966 definition of it as 'equal opportunity accompanied by 
cultural diversity, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance' 
was accepted as its meaning. 87 In order to achieve 
integration# Government aid should be directed towards 
urban areas of high immigrant concentration, but: 
'We believe that aid to these areas must be greatly 
extended but that the emphasis must be on social need 
generally, not merely or primarily on "welfare for 
immigrants". The idea of integration as "welfare" is 
obsolete and condescending and should be got rid of; we 
may be able to learn as much from the newcomers as they 
from us. 188 
The report concluded: 
'As socialists, we are committed to the view that every 
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human being, whatever his colour, ethnic background or 
religion, has a right to equal opportunity in economic, 
in social and in political life. 189 
A policy document written for a wide readership, Labour's 
Programme 1973, reiterated many of the arguments of the 
Green Paper. The current immigration laws, it suggested, 
were unhelpful: 
'Racial intolerance has been aggravated by the structure 
of our citizenship and immigration laws ... There is now a 
need for a rational framework of citizenship law and for 
immigration laws which are truly flexible... 190 
The document asserted that poor social conditions led to 
racial prejudice: 
'Britain is a multi-racial society with a rich variety of 
people of different ethnic, religious and cultural 
traditions. Discrimination and intolerance is not only 
wrong in itself but can cause grave damage to all people 
in a community... (Labour when next in office would take 
further steps towards integration, but) ... These measures 
will not be effective whilst poor housing, unemployment 
and educational deprivation provide the breeding ground 
for prejudice and distrust among black and white and deny 
equal opportunity to those who suffer them'. 91 
The Labour Party won the October 1974 General Election, 
and issues of immigration and race played little part in 
either that or the February 1974 General Election. This 
was mainly because of the concentration on the government's 
confrontation with the miners and the resulting three-day 
week. However, the political consensus on race and 
immigration had been largely rebuilt after Enoch Powell's 
rupture of it in the late 1960s and early 1970s. All major 
parties were now committed to immigration control and 
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measures to promote better race relations. The 
Conservatives were perhaps most keen on controls and less 
keen on race relations initiatives, whilst the Labour and 
Liberal Parties believed that the priority lay in race 
relations measures rather than tighter immigration laws. 
Nevertheless, it appears that voters found it difficult, or 
impossible, to distinguish between the major political 
parties' policies on immigration and race. 92 The October 
1974 Labour Government saw Roy Jenkins as Home Secretary 
again. He took several initiatives which increased 
immigrant numbers during his term of office, and the third 
race relations act, that of 1976, was passed. 93 
The 1976 Race Relations Act was based on ideas outlined 
in a 1975 White Paper, Racial Discrimination. One of the 
major concerns of this paper was the poor conditions in 
which some coloured immigrants and their descendants were 
living: 
'The possibility has to be faced that there is at work in 
this country, as elsewhere in the world, the familiar 
cycle of cumulative disadvantage by which relatively low- 
paid or low-status jobs for the first generation of 
immigrants go hand in hand with poor and overcrowded 
living conditions and a depressed environment. If, for 
example, job opportunities, education facilities, housing 
and environmental conditions are all poor, the next 
generation will grow up less well equipped to deal with 
the difficulties facing them. The wheel then comes full 
circle, as the second geheration find themselves trapped 
in poor jobs and poor housing. If, at each stage of this 
process, an element of racial discrimination enters in, 
then an entire group of people are launched on a vicious downward spiral of deprivation. 194 
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The Government was not completely convinced that there was 
enough evidence to support this view conclusively, but was 
determined to increase thpir efforts to combat "racial 
disadvantage". The White Paper used this term but did not 
define it; the context suggests that it refers to the above 
argument. Gývernment must act,, the White Paper argued, 
for: 
'beyond the problems of cultural alien-nessr there are 
the problems of low status, of material and environmental 
deprivation, which coloured immigrants, and increasingly, 
their children experience. To the extent that they share 
all or some of these problems with other groups in 
society, a general attack on deprivation will be relevant 
to their problems. But there may be a special dimension 
to their problems to the extent that the factor of racial 
discrimination multiplies and accentuates the 
disadvantages which are shared in part with others-'95 
A resolution carried at the 1976 Annual Labour Conference 
also contained similar sentiments. The Conference called 
upon the Government to 'put forward a socialist alternative 
to the conditions - unemployment, bad housing etc. # which 
give rise to racialism' and pledged -that the Labour 
movement would actively oppose racialism in all its formst 
wherever it might exist'. 96 
A rise in electoral support for the National Front in the 
mid-1970s led to considerable concern amongst liberal 
political opinion, especially since the Front's main appeal 
arose from its racial stance. The Labour Party published a 
pamphlet Labour Against Racism. in 1976, which outlined 
Party policy towards race politics at this time. The 
pamphlet stressed the benefits immigrants had brought to 
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Britain: 
'The immigrant population has made a very positive 
contribution to Britain. Without their support we would 
not have been able to run some of our public 
services... buses, trains and National Health Service .... 
on another level, newcomers to Britain have added a 
welcome variety to our standards of i 
entertainment. All 
over the country reasonably priced restaurants have been 
opened. A minor point perhaps - but it certainly makes 
for greater interest and convenience. 197 
The pamphlet concluded that: 
'Equality of opportunity and freedom for every man and 
woman to choose how they want to live their lives and use 
their opportunities is crucial to our Labour 
philosophy' . 98 
more detailed policy document, also published in 1976t 
argued for separate provision for immigrant groups: 
'For a wide variety of social needs for example, child 
minding or counselling of adole8cents the kind of need 
felt by immigrant groups is so different from that of the 
indigenous community that special provision is required 
from the government. 199 
The document stated that the Labour Party 'believes that 
schools have a duty to educate children towards an 
awareness of Britain's multi-cultural and multi-racial 
society'. 100 
The 1976 Race Relations Act strengthened and extended the 
existing legislation regarding racial discrimination and 
incitement to racial hatred. In particular, it outlawed 
"indirect racial discrimination", practices which whilst 
perhaps neutral in themselves, bore heavily and adversely 
on black Britons. Roy Jenkins introduced the Bill at its 
Second Reading in the Co=ons. 
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He affirmed that: 
'members of Britain's racial minorities are entitled to 
full and equal treatment regardless of their colourl race 
or national origins. Racial discrimination and the 
disadvantages experienced by sections of the community 
are morally repugnant to a civilised and democratic 
society. These evils are a form of economic and social 
waste which a society with any sense of enlightenment and 
far sighted self-interest cannot afford. 1101 
Action was needed, Jenkins argued, to fight racial 
disadvantage as well as racial discrimination. 102 A new 
policy initiative in the 1976 Bill was a provision to allow 
black Britons special privileged access to training schemes 
and the like. Jenkins said: 
'It would be wrong to adhere so blindly to the principle 
of formal legal equality as to ignore the handicaps 
preventing many black and brown workers from obtaining 
equal employment opportunities. Clauses 37 and 38 
therefore permit - they do not require - training bodies, 
trades unions and employers' associ , ations 
to provide 
training and encouragement to people in a particular 
racial group to help them to take up jobs or enjoy other 
opportunities from which they have previously been 
excluded or in which they have been significantly under- 
represented. 1103 
Jenkins concluded by saying: 
'It is almost ten years since I had my first opportunity 
as Home Secretary to state my attitude towards racial 
discrimination and the problems of integration. I then 
set out what I believed, and still believe, to be the 
central objective of Government policy: the promotion of 
equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity, in 
an atmosphere of mutual tolerance. 1104 
Alex Lyon, Jenkins' deputy at the Home Officel concluded 
the Second Reading debate for the Labour party. He 
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congratulated the House on the way in which the issues 
involved in the Act had been debated: 'With one or two 
exceptions... we have discussed them in a serious, informed 
and responsible manner... '105 Lyon argued, 'our society is 
now multi-racial, whether Honourable Members opposite like 
it or not. It is multi-racial and multi-cultural for the 
rest of our future history. These people who are here are 
our citizens and must be treated like any other 
citizens. 1106 He answered Conservative critics who argued 
that all civilised people discriminate in their social 
relationships and that therefore prohibition of 
discrimination was misplaced, by saying: 
'If we make a judgement about someone else because of his 
racial background or his colour and then treat him 
differently and worse than we treat those in the majority 
group, that involves serious disadvantages for the person 
concerned. 1107 
During the Second Reading of the Bill, MPs had asked about 
the measures granting coloured people special access to 
training places. Lyon replied: 
'I was asked about positive discrimination. i dislike 
that term intensely. When I refer to this problem# I 
refer to correcting the disadvantages of our black 
citizens. Clauses 35,37 and 38 relate to training and 
welfare provision for particular racial groups. 1108 
Alex Lyon concluded: 
'There are two parts to solving the problem of ensuring 
satisfactory race relations in this country. one is to 
eliminate racial discrimination... The other is to 
eliminate racial disadvantage and we have not begun to 
tackle the whole area yet'. 109 
The Conservative Party was elected to government in 1979 
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and set about trying to define legally the nature of 
British citizenship, in what became the 1981 British 
Nationality Act. The Act, despite its concern with 
nationality and citizenship, was rejected by much liberal 
opinion and interpreted as a furthert if disguisedt measure 
to control immigration further. 110 The Labour Party 
strongly opposed the Bill as it went through Parliament, 
arguing that it was indeed an immigration control act. 
Howeverr Labour's position was weakened somewhat since the 
Government's proposals were similar to some which Labour 
had previously supported in a Green Paper discussion 
document. Roy Hattersley, Shadow Home Secretary, led the 
Labour Party at the Second Reading# arguing that the Bill 
was going to discriminate against black people to their 
disadvantage. 111 He added: 
'I have spent the past 15 years telling my black 
constituents that they were equal before the law. I must 
now tell them that, if the Bill is passedt the law will 
discriminate against them. 1112 
Hattersley offered instead Labour's policy: 
'It is simply a nationality policy that is completely 
free from racial bias, and the immigration policy that 
flows from that. If, by enunciating that as clearly as 
we can, we lose some votes, so be it. 1113 
Mr Tilley concluded the debate for the Labour Party. He 
suggested that the Bill w6uld 'do severe damage to the 
cause of racial harmony in this country'. 114 He criticised 
the Government's policy further: 
'The Tories pretend to find justification by claiming 
that only rigid control of the entry of black immigrants 
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will enable racial harmony to develop in Britain. They 
do not realise that by institutionalising racism in our 
immigration system they are sanctioning the views of 
those who want to entrench it in all our other 
institutions. It is impossible for lasting progress on 
eliminating discrimination to be made within Britsh 
society if the rules for admission -to that society are 
based on the racial origins of the applicants'. 115 
It was a mistake, Tilley argued, to view the issues in this 
area simply in terms of immigration control: 'We must stop 
playing the numbers game. We believe that racial tension 
in this country is not caused . by the number of black faces, 
it is caused by the number of racists'. 116 He suggested 
that the Conservative proposals were fundamentally 
misconceived: 
'The Bill represents a tragically missed opportunity. It 
could have provided the basis for a newly-found British 
unity, in which differences of race were seen not as a 
problem to be swept under the carpet, but as a strength 
of British society, in which the variety of cultures and 
ethnic origins was seen for what it is -a great national 
asset to be shared by all and to be used for the good of 
all. A good nationality bill could be the foundation of 
a successful and united British society, yet the 
Government have chosen to lay that foundation on the 
treacherous quicksand of racism and sexism instead of on 
the bedrock of equality. 1117 
The riots in Brixton and elsewhere in 1981 provoked much 
political controversy, not least over Lord Scarman's report 
on the disturbances. The Labour Party Conference in 1981 
was deeply concerned by the riots, and passed a resolution 
that the Conference: 
',. considers that the Government's policies of mass 
unemployment, industrial dereliction and the virtual 
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collapse of education, healthi housing and other public 
services have created conditions which ensure anger and 
deprivation on the part of ethnic minorities in our major 
cities. '118 
Conference called for more public spending in inner cities 
and @positive action programmes to ensure equal 
opportunities for ethnic minorities... ' 119 These policies 
were necessary, for 'the only alternative to urgent 
remedial action is a rising tide of violence... '120 
Similar sentiments were expressed by Labour leaders in the 
Parliamentary debate on Lord Scarman' s report and 
recommendations. Leading the debate for the Labour Party# 
Roy Hattersley said: 
'There can be no doubt in the minds of opposition members 
that the problems of inner cities will not be resolved 
until adequate resources are spent on inner cities ... 
Until the prospect for unemployment in such areas 
improves, the despair that breeds violence is bound to 
increase ... nothing will so dispel the despair and desperation that turn into riot and disorder than an 
economic policy that offers the real prospect of jobs for 
young blacks. '121 
Hattersley supported Lord Scarman's recommendations for 
positive action programmes, and added: 
'I wish to make it absolutely clear that I have no doubt 
whatsoever that these special programmes must include 
what has come to be called "affirmative action" or 
"positive discrimination", especially for the promotion 
of employment prospects for ethnic minorities. I ask for 
special and specific action. I do not ask for young 
black workers to be given better employment prospects 
than their white contemporaries. I simply ask that they 
be given the same prospects and opportunities. I 
recognise that unless special action is taken they will 
not enjoy the same prospects and opportunities. We need 
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special measures so they will achieve the level that is 
theirs by right - the level they are currently being 
denied. '122 
Conclusion 
The Labour Party has had considerable difficulty in the 
area of race policies. From a position of outright 
opposition to immigration control in 1962 it had moved by 
1965 to implement stronger controls than the Conservatives 
had done. The Party was fiercely divided between those who 
felt the need to respond to electoral pressures, and those 
who insisted on continued support for liberal values. The 
Party was on much stronger ground when dealing with 
initiatives to help the black Britons already settled in 
Britain. It has consistently supported such measures and 
urged that greater emphasis be placed upon them. The 
features which were identified in the Introduction to this 
study as being central to liberal values are all evident in 
the responses of the Labour leadership during this period. 
There is more evidence for some of these features than 
othersp but throughout a distinct set of values can be 
discerned. 
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Chapter Two: The Liberal Party 
In spite of its small size, the Liberal Party is important 
to any study of liberal values in British race politics, 
its leaders, policies and values laying as they do a direct 
claim to being at the centre of the liberal tradition. The 
Party has not enjoyed success in government during the 
period in question, but this has allowed it considerable 
freedom from the influence of electoral pressure on the 
issue of race -a freedom not permitted to either the 
Labour or Conservative Parties. Statements of Liberal 
policy in race politics, therefore, often have a 
commendable frankness in preference to political 
expediency. As a consequence, their value. as a guide to 
the liberal tradition's response to issues of race is 
great. Furthermorel the record of the Liberal Party in 
this area has been substantially neglected in published 
works on race and politics in Britain. 1 
The Liberal Party was a keen supporter in the post-war 
era of the newly emerging Commonwealth# which it saw as an 
instrument for good in an unstable world. Liberals viewed 
Britain as 'the mother country' to a family of young 
nations which required protection and moral leadership and 
guidance. 2 Throughout the 1950s, Liberals were active in 
condemning the existence of the colour bar in South Africa# 
and by 1955 they were concerned lest one existed in 
Britain; the 1955 Liberal Party General Election Manifesto 
asserted the individual's rights to be free whatever his 
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colour. 3 However, in common with much established elite 
political opinion, the leaders of the Liberal Party 
expressed little public concern about New Commonwealth 
immigration in the 1950s. A major statement of Liberal 
beliefs published in 1957 did not concern itself with the 
issue. 4 Two years later, the author of a popular study of 
Liberal policies again failed to make mention of 
immigration, in spite of his claim to be writing about the 
important issues of the day. 5 Jo Grimondl a leading figure 
in the Party, writing in 1959" briefly mentioned 
immigration and argued that there might just be a case for 
a country to limit immigration, bearing in mind the current 
conditions of the world, but that free movement of people 
had usually produced the most beneficial results in the 
past. 6 
The racial disturbances of 1958 in Notting Hill and 
Nottingham were the events which concentrated the Party 
leaders' minds on the issues of race and immigration. The 
Party Executive passed an emergency reolution denouncing 
the racial violence and rejecting any proposals to control 
immigration. 7 The 1958 Liberal Party Assembly met shortly 
afterwards at Torquay and agreed a detailed resolution 
which put the blame for racial disturbances squarely on the 
inadequacy of social provision in the areas concerned-8 
Holding such views, it was never likely that the leaders 
of the Liberal Party would welcome the Conservatives' 1962 
Commonwealth Immigration Act. JO Grimond set the tone of 
the Party's attack on the Bill during the debate on the 
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Queen's speech, saying that it 
particularly poor housing, which lay 
matter. He added: 
was social problems, 
at the root of the 
'I disagree primarily because their proposed measure is 
irrelevant to the main problem which faces us concerning 
immigration ... What the Government have made no proposal 
about is housing. It is the consistent overcrowding that 
is the problem... their proposals are totally irrelevant 
to the only problem raised by immigration. 19 
During the Second Reading debate on the Billt Clement 
Davies, leader of the Liberal Party at the timet strongly 
criticised it. It was, he argued, racially discriminatory: 
'The Right Honourable gentlemen and other members of the 
Government may assert and reassert until they are black 
in the face that this is not intended as a colour bar, 
but nobody will believe them. 110 
There was no need, he asserted, for immigration control in 
Britain, since the country benefited from the influx of 
immigrants: 'I know of no occasion when this country has 
proved the loser through immigrants coming here. it has 
always gained through that. 'll Despite such opposition to 
immigration controls by the Party leadership* Liberals were 
aware of what they perceived as being great support among 
the electorate for control of New commonwealth 
immigration. 12 This produced among Liberals, as it did 
among members of the Labour Partyp an acute dilemma: their 
principles led them in one direction whilst political 
expediency was leading in another. 
A surge of support for the Liberals in 1962 saw the Party 
win a by-election at Orpington. In a 'commuter' 
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constituency, a Conservative majority in 1959 of 14,760 was 
replaced by a Liberal majority of 7,855. Immediately after 
the Orpington by-election, national opinion polls indicated 
greater electoral support for the Liberals than for either 
of the other major parties. 13 This obviously encouraged 
the Liberals and gave them confidence in their stance on 
the issue of immigration. 14 This confidence was well 
illustrated by an article in The Sunday Post entitled 
'Survey of the Liberal Party post Orpington'. The 
Orpington result suggested that at some future time, a 
Liberal government might become a possibility; an unnamed 
spokesman reaffirmed the Party's opposition to the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigration Act, and when asked whether a 
Liberal Government would keep or repeal the Immigration 
Bill, the spokesman replied that they would repeal It-15 
Despite such opposition to immigration controls it was 
becoming clear to Liberal Party leaders, from opinion 
polls, that a large majority of the electorate favoured 
such control. By late 1962, the Orpington victory had 
paled into insignificance, and the opinion polls showed a 
large drop in support for the Liberal Party. It became 
evident that the Party's policy on race was unpopulari and 
there is evidence that the Party was divided on this issue. 
Some Party members, notably in the West Midlands and West 
Yorkshire, both areas of high immigrant concentration, were 
arguing for a much tougher stance on immigration. Indeed, 
the West Midlands Liberals were, in the mid-1960s, to take 
a Powellite stance on race politics. Wallace Lawler, a 
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leading Liberal in the West Midlands, became well known for 
his views on race, which were at times difficult to 
distinguish from Enoch Powell's. 16 one indication of the 
dilemma in which the Party found itself was that the 1963 
Liberal Party Assembly rejected a motion to seek the 
immediate rdpeal of the 1962 Commonwealth -Immigration 
Act. 17 The Assembly called instead for consultation and 
mutual agreement between member states of the Commonwealth 
on levels of immigration. 18 This was very similar, if not 
identical, to the policy which the Labour Party was 
developing towards immigration controlsl as it too moved 
away from outright opposition to controls. 
The Liberal Party's 1964 General Election Manifesto only 
briefly mentioned immigration and repeated the new policy 
of controls achieved by consultation. 19 The Smethwick 
result in the 1964 election, where Labour's Shadow Home 
Secretary, Patrick Gordon Walker, was defeated- by a 
Conservative campaigning on an anti-immigration platform, 
shook the Liberal Party considerably. Such a victory was 
clearly a serious challenge to liberal values on 
immigration. A report published in 1965 by a Liberal 
working party represented a major attempt to produce a 
detailed policy document on the subject of New commonwealth 
immigration and race politics. 20 The report's authors were 
deeply critical of the Smethwick campaign: 
'No single incident in recent years has done more to 
damage the reputation of Britain, not only in the eyes of 
the newly-independent Commonwealth nations, but 
throughout Asia and Africa, than the shabby electoral 
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tactics used to win the seat of Smethwick for the Tory 
cause. 121 
The report was clear about the real reasons for the result 
in Smethwick: 'Smethwick's problem has arisen from 
inadequate social conditions, lack of accommodation, and 
the low economic position of the immigrant community'. 22 
The arguments of the Report provide a clear insight into 
Liberal Party policy at this time. The Report suggested an 
annual immigration rate of 50-70,000 persons a year. 23 The 
justification for this was that Britain's 'failure to 
improve social conditions to meet twentieth century needs 
makes some control necessary'. 24 The benefits of 
immigration were also emphasised, however: , 
'Immigrants have provided a valuable element in our 
society in the past and if we are to develop and maintain 
a dynamic, outward-looking society in the future we need 
the knowledge and experience of the immigrant doctors, 
nurses, teachers and engineers ... Our present economic 
need is to increase the number of skilled workers, not 
reduce it. The effect of shutting our doors to 
immigrants, rejecting the contribution they can make to 
our life and closing ourselves inside a static community, 
would be detrimental to our development as a nation. '25 
opposition to immigrants was foolish and irrational$ the 
Report argued: 
'Many people in Britain have been shocked and dismayed by 
the recent demonstrations of hostility towards immigrants... Every society contains a number of 
prejudiced people who hold irrationali rigid views and 
are not open to reason, but we do not believe that the 
majority of English people belong to this group. They 
may hold unfavourable opinions... but these attitudes are 
not based on doctrines of racial superiority and they are 
susceptible to reason and an appeal to a sense of fair 
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play. 126 
The Report discussed the need to absorb the immigrants, but 
its sympathy lay mainly with the ideal of integration, 
although this word was not defined: 
'We do not believe that the immigrants should be called 
upon to integrate completely if they do not wish to, but 
mutual respect and tolerance are essential and so is an 
end to racial discrimination. The immigrants must be 
helped and advised and both they and the host community 
must be educated to liberalise their views and increase 
their understanding of each other's background and 
problems. '27 
The Report concluded by calling for government action to 
publicise the real facts about immigration: 
'Much racial tension and discrimination has sprung from 
ignorance of foreign cultures allied with social 
conflicts caused by poor conditions. It goes without 
saying that the Government must press ahead with 
energetic policies to improve social conditions. We 
consider that it is also the Government's duty to make an 
effort to dispel this ignorance, emphasise * 
the true facts 
about immigration and immigrants and unequivocally 
discredit prejudice and discrimination. This will require 
a national educational programme through the mass media, 
supported by anti-discrimination legislation. '28 
Such action should be taken soon# the Report asserted# or 
$relationships and conditions are more likely to 
deteriorate than to improve if action on a wide front is 
delayed'. 29 Jeremy Thorpe made a major speech on 
immigration at the September 1965 Annual Conference. He 
supported the recommendation of the Liberal Working Party 
on Immigrationj that Britain was capable of absorbing SO- 
70pOOO immigrants per year. 30 Thorpe argued that the Party 
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had opposed the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act because 
of the way it was introduced, for 'no-one... advocates 
completely free entry'. 31 He was clear about the social 
reasons for racial problems: 
'Housing unquestionably presents the greatest social 
problem and cause of racial friction'. 32 'We recognise 
the real social problems which cause friction in Britaint 
such as housing, health and education. These we believe 
can be overcome. In short, the way to end racial 
prejudice is to remove its causes. 133 
Thorpe was anxious throughout his speech to argue that the 
Party's policy had not changed; the normally sympathetic 
Guardian noticed certain changes, however. An editorial 
reminded Liberals that in 1962 they had been totally 
opposed to controlling New Commonwealth immigrationg and 
suggested that, 'We have all yielded a little to the 
pressures which made themselves felt at Smethwick'. 34 
The 1965 Liberal Party Assembly agreed a resolution about 
immigration which reflected the sentiments of Jeremy 
Thorpe's speech. The resolution beganr 'This Assembly 
recognises that immigrants have played a vital role in the 
political, economic and artistic life in this country 
throughout our whole history... ' and proposed that: 
'financial assistance from central Government sources be 
granted to help with housing in areas where there is an 
acute housing shortage, thus enabling local authorities 
to enforce their statutory powers to prevent 
overcrowding' and that 'special provisions be made to 
care for the health of the immigrants'. The conference 
'deplored the restrictions on the issue of vouchers 
contained in the Government's White Paper on Immigration 
as retrograde and cowardly' and hoped that 'the granting 
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of vouchers to Commonwealth citizens shall continue to be 
regulated by the availability of jobs or possession of 
skills'. 35 
The Liberal Party warmly supported Labour's 1965 Race 
Relations Actt although it argued that the Act was not 
sufficiently powerful or comprehensive. Jeremy Thorpe spoke 
for the Liberals during the Second Reading of the Bill. He 
argued that the first object of the Bill should be to act 
as a symbol of education and persuasiont and that 'it 
should... indicate the view that we as a nation take of 
racial discrimination'. 36 
The Liberal 1966 General Election Manifesto reflected the 
policies of the 1965 Liberal Immigration Group Report and 
the 1965 Annual Conference resolution on immigration. 
Headlined as 'A Non Racialist Approach to Immigration'l the 
section set out Liberal policy in some detail: 
'We believe that immigrant entry to this country should 
be regulated by the availability of jobs or the 
possession of skills and not fixed at an arbitrary figure 
bearing no relation to vacancies. 
The problems connected with immigration have aroused 
tremendous emotion. No-one should minimise the social 
problems created. But clearly anyone who reflects upon 
the work of doctors and nurses in our hospitals, 
employees in our transport services, and many other 
industries, will recognise the significant contribution 
which immigrants are making to our society. 
We appreciate that integration is not always easy and, in 
order that the full contribution of the immigration may 
be realised, more steps must be taken at national and 
local level to provide facilities for non-English 
speaking immigrants to improve their knowledge of English 
86 
and the British way of life. There must be a closer co- 
ordination of action at national and local level to 
promote racial harmony. 
Above all, the 'immigrant problem' is a problem of 
housing. Special subsidies must be made available to 
local authorities in areas of acute housing shortage. '37 
The Liberal Party reacted strongly to Labour's proposal 
to limit further immigration, particularly Asian 
immigration from East Africa, through the provisions of 
what became the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act. This 
was the first occasion in the race debate when the Labour 
and Liberal Parties were seriously at odds over race 
policies. In 1962 they had both opposed the Conservative 
1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act. By 1965 both parties 
had changed their policies and were in favour of 
immigration controls. Dispute in 1965 between Labour and 
the Liberals was over the number of immigrants to be 
allowed into Britain rather than over the principle of 
controls as such. 
The Labour Party's move via the 1968 commonwealth 
Immigration Act to limit immigration further was bitterly 
attacked by leading Liberals, who tried to uphold 
traditional liberal values on the matter. Liberal Party 
opposition to the Bill became a rallying point for bodies 
such as the churches and voluntary agencies. 38 However, 
Liberal Party leaders were helped by the fact that they 
were not in office and did not have the reponsibility of 
government, Had they bean in officep it is likely that 
they also would have been subjected to the same electoral 
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pressures as the Labour Party. Alone among the three major 
parties, Liberal Party leaders spoke out against the new 
immigration controls. However, this opposition was not 
popular with many rank and file Liberals. There were 
severe tensions in the Party between the London leadership 
and the constituency associations, particularly in the West 
Midlands. On immigration control, the policy of the West 
Midlands' Liberals was virtually indistinguishable from 
that of the Conservative Party. 39 
The Liberal Party Council passed a resolution condemning 
the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Bill, and stated that: 
'This Liberal Party Council condemns and disassociates 
itself from the hysteria which has arisen over the 
arrival of Kenyan Asians in this country. It condemns 
the Conservative Party politicians who have aroused the 
hysteria... it condemns the Government for taking panic 
measures under Conservative pressure, for taking a purely 
racialist line, and for breaking faith with British 
citizens. 140 
In Parliament, David Steel led the Liberal attack on the 
Bill. He argued that it was changing the law retro- 
spectively and that Kenyan Asians were not receiving equal 
treatment before the law. 41 He lamented the: 
'lack of any positive immigration policy over many years. 
Every time that we have immigration legislation in this 
House... it is always negative legislation... there is no 
positive legislation'. 42 
This, Steel argued, compared badly with Holland, where a 
"positive social programme" 43 had helped immigrants to 
settle. 
'we have never done any of that. We have built up a 
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series of disasters for ourselves which not be solved by 
legislation against racial discrimination. I am all in 
favour of that - it will help - but unless we tackle the 
serious social problems we will not dispel the racial 
feelings which are beginning to grow in this country-'44 
Every time a social problem occurred, Steel suggestedo 
'... we increase racial feeling and tension and we build up 
the problems'. 45 The Government must act, he said, to 
tackle the social problems: 'I recognise that a serious 
social problem has been built up through lack of policy and 
that we must tackle it'. 46 
Liberal Party leaders were at one with the Labour Party 
and much other political opinion in condemning Enoch 
Powell's 1968 "rivers of blood" speech. - Powell's views 
expressed in this and other speeches on immigration appear 
to have been perceived as a major threat to liberal values 
as they stood. The Liberal Party rose to this challenge 
and condemned Powell's views most forcefully. The Party 
Council passed a resolution 'deploring the hysteria caused 
by Enoch Powell's speech... (and) ... reaffirms its 
determination to overcome racialism'. 47 And yet the 
Liberal Party was rent with divisions similar to those in 
the Labour and Conservative Parties over Powell's views. 48 
Put bluntly, Powell's views were very popular, as Jeremy 
Thorpe acknowledged, writing in Liberal News about Powell: 
'The fact that many people appear to share his views 
makes it all the more reprehensible that a responsible 
Tory spokesman should inflame racial prejudice in the way 
he has. 149 
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Dr Michael Winstanley, the Liberal parliamentary spokesman 
on Home office affairs, in a speech in May 1968 said# 'The 
Liberal Party support the present strict controls on 
immigration'. 50 The Party had travelled a long way since 
its stance in 1962, in response to the unpopularity of 
uncontrolled immigration from the New Commonwealth. 
The Liberal Party was on happier ground on issues of race 
relations, and it warmly welcomed Labour's 1968 Race 
Relations Bill. Dr Michael Winstanley spoke for the Liberal 
Party at the Second Reading in the commons, and was clear 
about the purpose of the Bill: 'We are discussing what can 
be done by the use of the law to ensure that they (black 
Britons) have equal rights and equal opportunities as equal 
citizens'. 51 Politicians must, he said., be firm in this 
area: 
'There are certain areas of politics in which it is 
essential to give a clear lead. When we are in this kind 
of territory, and we are with this Bill ... (we must 
get) ... what is often objected to, a concensus.. -the 
racial problem is one upon which we cannot afford to 
equivocate. It is a problem which must be solved-'52 
Winstanley strongly supported the need for moral persuasion 
and education of the populace: 'I believe it absolutely 
essential in this crucial field of human activitY that the 
Government, the State, Parliament, this House, should give 
a lead and set a good example'. 53 He concluded his speech 
by expressing his hope that successful race relations 
measures would produce a strong, diverse community in the 
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future: 
'I hope that the Bill will get a Second Reading and, 
having got it, I hope that things will settle down in the 
country. I think they will and that people will slowly 
learn to work together. I hope that we shall not try to 
slide the problem under the carpet. Part of the strength 
of this nation lies in the diversity of the communities 
which make it up, and the richness of the world lies in 
the diversity of its peoples. Each has his or her 
particular contribution to make. Let us enrich our 
community by absorbing these many different types of 
people and by seeing that all enjoy equal rights. '54 
The Liberal Party supported Labour's 1969 legislation to 
provide help for areas of social need, in some of which 
immigrants were concentrated. Labour's policy initiative 
stemmed from Harold Wilson's speech in reply to Powell's 
'rivers of blood' speech. Just as Labour were anxious to 
stress that areas of social need were to get helpi rather 
than immigrants per se, so Liberals agreed with them. 
Michael Winstanley again spoke for the Liberal Party on the 
Bill, affirming that the Party supported the proposals, but 
with some reservations: 
'We, on this bench, support the Bill, but we regret its 
necessity. We regret that there are areas Of special 
need that require special help. . That there are these 
areas of special need is, in a way, a criticism of both 
the local and central government systems'. 55 
The Liberal Party, he stated, were anxious that New 
Commonwealth immigrants should not be seen as problem 
people: 
$,,, we regret most of all the wide and automatic 
assumption that an area is an area of special need purely 
because of the presence of immigrants. I agree that in 
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an area of special need the presence of immigrants causes 
tensions and anxieties to be exaggerated, especially if 
shortages exist in housing and employment. I hope that 
nobody outside the House will assume that special help 
needs to be given to areas because immigrants are in some 
way doing damage to them. It is necessary to comment, as 
other Honourable Members haver upon the contribution that 
these immigrants have made. 156 
Winstanley concluded his speech by quoting from a letter 
the Bishop of Stepney had written to The Times. The 
sentiments of the letter had touched Winstanley deeply, and 
he wanted it widely publicised, particularly the Bishop's 
argument that Britain's colonial history and involvement in 
the slave trade left her in a morally vulnerable position, 
so that Britain 
'has a massive debt to repay; and it will take her 
generations to repay it. In place of our arrogant 
assumptions let us turn in penitence and very swiftly to 
the task of reparation'. 57 
Winstanley then added: 
'This measure, giving special help to certain areas, will 
help these people and thus go some way to repay the debt. 
It is in that spirit that my Honourable friends and I 
support it. 158 
It is evident that popular feeling, Enoch Powell and 
internal divisions within the Liberal Party had pushed its 
policy from desiring no controls on New Commonwealth 
immigration in 1962, to support for "strict controls" and 
measures to improve race relations by 1968. A 
comprehensive Liberal policy document published in 1969 
provides a good guide to its values at the end of a 
turbulent decade in this area of politics: in Liberals Look 
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Ahead, the Party outlined its ideas for the coming decade. 
It contained an implicit rejection of Powell's views and 
emphasised the manner in which the subject of immigration 
should be approached: 
'The issue must be approached calmly and sympathetically. 
The responsible citizen has to find the courage to say 
what he thinks to be right, even though it may be 
politically unpopular... We have now to deal with the 
situation as we find it. That requires first of all a 
dispassionate examination of the facts. 159 
The arrival in Britain of immigrants had, the Report 
acknowledged, created a challenge to British society, and 
'the task of meeting that challenge is made more 
difficult by speeches which have played on emotions and 
fears. That they have had this effect cannot be 
doubted... At the same time, the endless public discussion 
about immigration, carried on as if those who came to 
live here have no human feelings, or alternatively, are 
all blind and deaf, has had the effect of retarding the 
process of integration. 160 
The Report indicated the role of the Liberal Party in this: 
'It is clearly up to the Liberals to stand firm against 
displays of illogical and irrational emotion and to work 
for the speedy integration of this latest immigrant 
addition to our population. '61 
Equality was seen as an essential in race relations: 
'It is a hallmark of a Liberal 
be discriminated against on 
colour, creed or sex. Liberals 
in a society which denies 
treatment on individual merits 
employment, financial credit 
treatment before the law 
participation. 162 
society that no one should 
account of their raceo 
cannot be content to live 
to some citizens equal 
in education, training, 
and, of course, equal 
and in demographic 
The Report believed that future policy should be based on 
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the ideal of integration rather than assimilation: 
'We do not expect or require assimilation. Those who 
come to this country have every right to maintain their 
culture and religion if they so wish, and we must respect 
their wishes and they should respect ourSe The 
maintenance and development of national and group 
cultures reassures both the newcomers and the natives. 
The aim is not to make everyone alike, but to ensure that 
there is the maximum of tolerance and the minimum of 
discrimination. '63 
The challenge of ensuring good community relations lay 
ahead, the Report stated, but was nevertheless optimistic: 
'If, however, we can make a success of community relations 
in this country the respect that we shall gain will greatly 
enhance Britain's role in the world. We cannot opt out Of 
this challenge'. 64 Whilst this Liberal policy document 
reveals a number of liberal values of the time, it was less 
clear about a definite limit on immigrant numbers. it 
preferred instead to allow the available amount of social 
services and provision to limit numbers. The Times, in a 
leading article, noted the lack of reference to controlling 
numbers and concluded, 'Hard headed it is not'. 65 
In common with the other major parties, the Liberal 
leadership made little of race issues during the 1970 
General Election campaign. 66 The Liberal Party Manifesto 
did not mention immigration, probably because the issue was 
so controversial and had threatened the Party's unity in 
the 1960s. However, the Conservatives' proposal to limit 
immigration further, foreshadowed in their election 
manifesto, stung the Liberal Party into action. David 
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Steel, commenting on the 1971 Commonwealth immigration 
Bill, said that it was 'blatantly racialist' and 'quite 
unacceptable to all Liberals'. 67 Jeremy Thorpe said of the 
Bill. 'This blatantly racialist Bill is a flagrant 
concession to Powellism, an insult to the Commonwealth and 
an attack on human rights'. 68 Together with the Labour 
Party# the churches and the race relations bodies, the 
Liberal Party opposed the Conservatives' 1971 Commonwealth 
Immigration Control Act. The Party Council passed a 
resolution that: 
'This Council of the Liberal Party condemns the 
Government's Immigration Control Bill as a concession to 
prejudice, a stimulus to bad race relations and an attack 
on individual freedom. in particular, Liberals are 
totally opposed to Clause 2, which confers a "right of 
abode" based implicitly on a racial classification and to 
the whole tone of the Bill which implies that immigration 
is bad for the host country ... This Bill ... will exacerbate the feelings that provoke political and social tension 
and breakdowns in law and order. 169 
In the House of Commons, David Steel spoke strongly against 
the Billi which he considered to be 'clearly racialist'. 70 
Its effect would be to treat immigrants differently from 
the indigenous population: 'The fact is that once they are 
here these people will not under this legislation be 
treated as equals before the law, but quite differently'. 71 
Steel saw the Bill as a sop to anti-immigrant sentiments: 
'This is a naked attempt to assuage passions which are, I hope only temporarily, aroused in the country and among 
certain elements in the House. We# and by that I mean 
Honourable Members of all parties, should fight against 
them. 172 
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Liberal opposition to the Bill was particularly fierce in 
the House of Lords. More than fifty amendments to the Bill 
were tabled, resulting in several changes supporting the 
rights of immigrants in Britain. 
Two Liberal Party publications in 1973 and 1974 reveal 
the direction in which Party policy was moving at the time. 
Forward with the Liberals in 1973 emphasised that the 
nature of debate and discussion about immigration and race 
issues should be changed: 
'We emphasise that the first step towards any 
satisfactory policies is to banish the false logic which 
sees immigration as a threat to be controlled and thus 
allowing the issue to be manipulated by populist 
politicians. If we do not change the nature of the 
discussion which has held sway for the last ten or twelve 
years, there is a great risk that we shall be faced with 
yet another slide towards irrationality and inhumanity, 
and a new measure of control to "cut back the numbers of 
immigrants"... We must establish the serious economic and 
social questions as the real area of debate. 173 
This policy document also revealed the Liberal attitude 
towards race relations: 
'As a long term goal for a nation of multi-racial 
communities, our aim should be to create a society based 
on Cultural 
- 
Pluralism (italics in the original) where 
groups can maTn-tain their own traditions so long as they 
do not dislocate the common functioning of society. Such 
a society is based on a recognition that, by the exchange 
of insights, not only can different cultures exist, 
together, but they can also interact positively to create 
a richer# more tolerant and understanding society. '74 
In 1974 the Liberal Party's Panel on Immigration and Race 
and Community Relations published its second report, and 
David Steel wrote a supportive introduction to it. 75 Since 
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this report was only the second major policy document the 
Liberals had produced in this area# it is worth reviewing 
it in some detail. The Report called for regulation of 
immigration rather than its control; "regulation", as the 
Report suggested, had more positive connotations than 
"control". 76 Immigration should be regulated by the needs 
of the economy and the availability of social provision 
rather than arbitrary numerical control. The Report 
reaffirmed the benefits which immigrants brought to 
Britain: 
'We believe that, on balance, immigration is beneficial 
and that immigrants have made a valuable contribution in 
our past. If we are to develop and maintain a dynamic, 
outward looking society in the future# we need the 
knowledge, experience and diversity of our immigrant 
communities. The effect of shutting our doors to 
immigrants, rejecting the contribution they can make to 
our life, and closing ourselves inside a static society, 
would be detrimental to our own development as a 
nation, 177 
The Report was also noteworthy for the detailed way in 
which it outlined the Liberal ideal of the multi-racial 
society. Under the heading "Long Term Goal"# it set out 
Liberal policy: 
'Pervading all these very specific concerns is the basic 
question of what kind of a society we are trying to 
create for a national or multi-racial communities. ' 
In general terms, the alternatives in our society are 
seen to be: 
Assimilation, where everybody is expected to behave 
in the same way 
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Cultural pluralismo where groups can maintain their 
own traditions, as long as they do not dislocate the 
common functioning of the society, and 
(iii)Structural separation, where groups lead completely 
independent lives other than at a basic economic 
level. 
We firmly believe that only the second possibility- 
cultural pluralism - offers an acceptable basis for 
British policy. This means that the immigrant must be 
free to choose what degree of integration he wishes to 
achieve with the host society and what links he wishes to 
retain with the culture of his own ethnic group. A truly 
free choice means that he must have the technical ability 
to communicate and move in British society but also that 
the survival of the ethnic cultures must be ensured. 
This is not to say that those wishing and having the 
capacity to become assimilated should not be able to do 
so, it is rather to recognise that cultural roots are not 
easily cut, and a healthy society is not created when 
this is done by compulsion. It also recognises that by 
the exchange of insights not only can different cultures 
exist togetherg they can interact positively to create a 
richer, more tolerant and understanding society. It is 
important that the concept of pluralism should be 
accepted as widely as possible by people in Britain and 
particularly by groups having close contact with 
immigrant groups and mixed communities, such as school 
teachers, welfare workers and police. The future 
direction of policies designed to facilitate cultural 
pluralism and improve community relations will have a 
crucial bearing on whether we succeed in this task-'78 
The rise in support for the National Front in the mid- 
1970s saw the Liberals, along with the Labour Partyt the 
churches and race relations bodiest very active in trying 
to counter the Front's views and activities. The Liberals, 
as the small third party in British politics# were 
particularly vulnerable to the National Front's successes. 
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For example, in Bradford's 1976 Metropolitan election, the 
National Front fielded 22 candidatest who in most wards 
polled more votes than the Liberal candidates. 79 The 1976 
Liberal Party Assembly condemned the . National Front and 
other similar organisations, and stated that: 
'This Assembly... condemns the Government for its failure 
to tackle the problem of urban deprivation, particularly 
severe for ethnic minorities living in inner city areas, 
and presses Her Majesty's Government to initiate a 
massive programme of urban. aid and renewal to eradicate 
the factors which lead to racialism. We support the aims 
of the Race Relations Bill 1976 with particular emphasis 
on the need to end racial discrimination at work# which 
deprives many of the opportunity to use to the full their 
skills and talents to the community benefit... Assembly 
supports attempts to liberalise religious education in 
schools, especially primary schools, in a way which 
acknowledges the existence of a multi-faith society'. 80 
The Assembly was anxious about the reporting of race 
matters by the media: 
'This Assembly is concerned by the tendency of sections 
of the media to disseminate sensational and inflammatory 
material on racial issues and endorses the NUJ's campaign 
for fairer and more accurate reporting. 181 
The Liberal Party supported Labour's 1976 Race Relations 
Act and Alan Beith was the Party's main spokesman during 
the debate on the Bill in the Commons. He said that the 
Party welcomed the Bill, but believed that it did not go 
far enough. Liberals wanted more action to correct the 
racial disadvantage which the Government had identified in 
its 1975 White Paper, Racial Discrimination: 
'Action must be taken to combat the disadvantage 
experienced by many people in minority communities - real 
99 
disadvantage, not merely discrimination. 182 
Unless more money was spent on the Urban Aid Programme, 
Beith argued, this disadvantage was unlikely to be reduced. 
He concluded his speech by arguing that the Government 
should work particularly in this area, since: 
I... a tim6 of national economic crisis is a-testing time 
for the whole community. It puts severe pressures on 
minorities and their relationships with the majority 
community. It is very important at this time that the 
black citizen, particularly the young black citizen 
growing up, should have a feeling that this is his 
country -a country to which he can owe allegiance, for 
which he is prepared to fight, if necessary, and whose 
future he is prepared to build. If he does not have that 
confidence, it is not he alone who suffers but the whole 
community of the United Kingdom. 183 
A 1978 policy document, Your Future with 'the Liberals 
repeated the Liberals' concern over the living conditions 
of many black Britons: 
'Ethnic minorities are often concentrated in the deprived 
inner city areas and many do low paid, low status jobs 
and live in sub-standard housing. The prime need is to 
tackle the disadvantage and discrimination which minority 
communities suffer. The lack of employment opportunities 
has caused people to seek scapegoats for our economic 
failures. We should expand our urban aid programme and 
employ many local people to revitalise decayed urban 
areas and give hope to the community. 184 
The Party's general policy in this area was clear from this 
publication: 'Liberals are opposed to any form of racial 
discrimination in immigration policy'# and I ... believe in 
the continuance of a multi-racial society, with equal 
opportunity for all'. 85 
The 1979 Liberal Party General Election manifesto 
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attacked the Conservative Party's stand on immigration. 
The Conservatives were committed to implementing 
legislation, if they were electedo to codify Britain's 
nationality practice, and many opponents of such 
legislation saw these proposals as disguised measures for 
immigration control. Mrs Thatcher had gained some 
notoriety in 1978 by inferring that Britain was in danger 
of being "swamped" by immigrants, but opinion polls showed 
a large and immediate gain in support for the Conservatives 
following this speech (see Chapter Five below). With these 
events only recently in the past, it was no accident that 
the Liberal Party's manifesto affirmed that 'Liberals 
deplore the Tory policy of inflaming people's fears about 
unrestricted immigration'. 86 The manifesto also reaffirmed 
the Liberals' belief in the value of a diverse and plural 
society. Under the heading 'Minority Rights', the 
manifesto stated that: 
'Britain is a diverse and multi-cultural society and 
Liberals rejoice in its richness, which owes much to the 
peoples of many different ethnic origins and cultures who 
have chosen to live here. We defend their right to 
maintain and develop their own traditions. Minority 
groups must be allowed to practise and advocate their 
beliefs, provided this does not reduce the freedom of 
others. We will protect and defend the rights of 
minorities... 187 
The editorial 'opinion' column in Liberal News, the Party's 
newspaper, showed similar sentiments: black Britons, 'Far 
from being a burden... are essential to the nation's 
survival. That's what the public must be told again and 
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again'. 88 In common with the Labour Partyl the churches 
and race relations bodies, the Liberals strongly opposed 
the Conservative 1981 British Nationality Bill. David 
Steel, speaking in the Commons, argued that the Bills- 
'is the latest in a long line of rather shabby measures 
which are reducing the basic rights of and discriminating 
against ethnic minorities, from the 1968 Act through the 
1971 Act and various rules and regulations... it is racist 
in its efect and in the implementation of its terms. The 
people discriminated against are overwhelmingly from 
ethnic minorities. The Bill is an attempt to massage our 
nationality legislation to suit immigration policy. '89 
The other major debate over racial issues in 1981 concerned 
the Brixton riots. The Liberal Party welcomed Lord 
Scarman's report following the riots, William Pitt speaking 
for the Party during the Commons debate on the Report. He 
said that the riots were a practical problem, for which 
there were three solutions: 
'The first is cash. There are no stresses such as those 
in Railton Road, in prosperous areas. The leafier 
suburbs of my constituency, for example, have never faced 
the tensions of Brixton. We have to have a programme 
from the Government of positive investment in and 
encouragement of employment and house building across the 
spectrum and in education and health. That is the first 
part of the programme. 190 
The second solution was to improve policing in these areas# 
and the third-, 
$perhaps the most important factor in the equation is 
that we must have a moral commitment from the Government 
to a multi-racial society. This must be shown in more 
than mixed cricket teams or ethnic concerts with music 
and dancing, or in saying how much the influx of 
Commonwealth immigrants has enhanced our culinary 
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achievements. We must give the people who have come from 
our former colonies to become British citizens a sense of 
justice. We must give them the feeling that they can 
have faith in the police force and in the forces of 
justice and order. They must know that their questions 
will be answered, their complaints dealt with and their 
problems looked into on absolutely the same ba6is as 
their white brethren. '91 
Conclusion 
Although it was never the major party of government 
during the period of study, the Liberal Party has been 
active in stating its views on immigration and race 
relations issues. The Liberals moved with the Labour 
Party, the churches and race relations bodies from 
opposition to control on immigration in 19621 to support 
for controls in 1965. Its policy on race relations had 
been to support the various race relations Acts and to 
favour the creation of a multi-racial society. Together, 
these policies can be seen as central to the liberal 
tradition's response in the politics of race. 
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Chapter Three: Race Relations Bodies 
The purpose of this chapter is to outline the attitudes 
and values which have been supported by government- 
inspired initiatives to create racial harmony. The 
response of successive British governmentsp both 
Conservative and Socialist, to large-scale New 
Commonwealth immigration took two forms: immigration 
control, and measures to promote racial harmony. 
Immigration control was the easier task of the two, since 
policy could be expressed in a numerical form, and success 
or failure could be measured against that standard. In 
spite of allegations of widespread illegal immigration and 
controversy about the numbers of immigrants who could be 
allowed into Britain, the principle of immigration control 
was fairly easily handled by central government. The 
creation of racial harmony was more complex. One major 
problem, as this chapter indicates, was that the 
indigenous population was largely perceived to be hostile 
both to New Commonwealth immigration and to good race 
relations. In addition, the concept of "good race 
relations" was far from clear: was it merely an absence of 
hostility or riots, or a presence of carnivals and ethnic 
entertainments, or a ready mixing of groups from all 
cultures? Attempts to quantify good race relations 
centred around ideas of equality; 1 unequal performance of 
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minority racial group members was often seen as a product 
of poor race relations. However, the evidence is unclear 
as to whether equality was envisaged as equality of 
outcome of all racial group members, or whether it meant 
equality in housing and employment opportunities. 
Difficulties with race relations led to the promotion 
of racial harmony being delegated in the main to 
governmental bodies such as the Race Relations Board and 
the Commission for Racial Equality. These organisations 
were created with particular purposes in mind, and these 
purposes are discernible from the legislation, and the 
debates on legislation, which created these bodies. Once 
established, these bodies produced annual reports of their 
activities and made policy recommendations; such reports 
naturally reveal the values upon which they were founded. 
A special case in this area, since it was a single 
enquiry, is Lord Scarman's report on the Brixton riots of 
1981. This report is considered here because its policies 
and recommendations appear to fit closely with the 
tradition of the government-sponsored institutions and 
prevailing attitudes of the time. 
The policies and values evident in these reports fall 
clearly into the liberal tradition identified in this 
study. Naturally, since the aims of these groups has been 
mainly to help black Britons, a liberal stance was a 
prerequisite for their policy and philosophy. 
ill 
Conservative values of race politics would have been 
unlikely to foster the same policies. These race relations 
institutions were initiatives taken mainly by Labour 
governments, and became strongly associated with liberal 
views on racial matters. This association was reflected 
in appointments to these bodies: Mark Bonham Carter, for 
example, an ex-Liberal MP and publisher of books by Labour 
Home Secretary Roy Jenkins (himself known as a strong 
liberal on racial issues), was at different times head of 
both the community Relations commission and the Race 
Relations Board; whilst the first head of the commission 
for Racial Equality was David Lane, well known as a 
liberal conservative. Lord Scarman was also known for his 
liberal views before undertaking the 1981 Enquiry. 
During the 1950s, when large-scale immigration first 
began from the New Commonwealth, governments did little or 
nothing to help the newcomers settle- This task*was left 
to any voluntary bodies which cared to concern themselves; 
government-created institutions did not exist-1 In 1962 a 
pattern was begun which was to be repeated in 1965 and 
1968: an immigration control measure was enacted, and at 
the same time, a body was created to work towards better 
race relations. Government policy in the race area became 
one of support, both for tighter immigration control, and 
race relations measures. The two policies were seen as 
being interlinked, and good race relations as being 
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impossible unless immigration was controlled. 2 In 
1962, this pattern took the f orm of the 1962 commonwealth 
Immigration Act and the Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory 
Council (CIAC) was formed. 3 The CIAC's annual reports 
cover the period 1962-5 and provide a useful insight into 
how policy and ideas about race relations and immigration 
were developing at this time. The CIAC's terms of 
reference included advising the Home Secretary how best to 
provide for the 'integration into the community' of the 
immigrants. 4 At the same time, the CIAC was to 
investigate the efforts of local authorities 'to assist 
immigrants to adapt themselves to British habits and 
customst. 5 In view of the way in which race policies 
moved from aims of assimilation, through integration to 
pluralism, such terms of reference are significant. The 
CIAC's first report concerned housing, poor housing 
conditions being seen as the root of many of the problems 
in this area: 
'We would again emphasise the importance we attach to 
improving the housing conditions of immigrants. Bad 
conditions and the exploitation that can go with them, 
provide an obvious source of social tension. Their 
improvement is essential in the interests of the whole 
community quite as much as in the interests of 
immigrants. Moreover, we have been increasingly 
struck by the fact that so many other problems which 
have come to our notice stem from the housing 
problem. 16 
Central government and local authorities had an 
obligation, the report argued, to do more than they were: 
'They should try to influence the public attitude 
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towards immigrants to reduce the misunderstanding and 
hostility, which undoubtedly exists on both sides, to 
a greater degree than appears obvious on the surface. 
The problem of the public attitude to immigrants is 
one of great seriousness which will not be solved 
merely by the improvement of living conditions, 
however desirable this may be. There is a need f or 
wider education of both the indigenous and immi 5 rant 
groups in learning tolerance towards each other. ' 
The CIAC's second report was largely concerned with 
education and information, though some of its general 
comments are also revealing. On the subject of education, 
the CIAC stated: 
'A national system of education must aim at producing 
citizens who can take their place in society properly 
equipped to exercise and perform duties which are the 
same as other citizens ... a national system cannot 
be 
expected to peqetuate the different values of 
immigrant groups. ' 
- Again, the CIAC emphasised the social problems produced by 
immigration: 
'An inf lux of this size and type with this degree of 
concentration, could hardly have failed to produce 
social problems, and thesejroblems are acute in 
certain fairly limited areas. 
The Committee believed that many people did not realise 
that Britain was in the process of becoming a multi-racial 
society: 
'The presence of these citizens (black Britons) here 
means that British society is increasingly becoming a 
multi-racial society. This fact may seem obvious but 
it needs stating, for we suspect that many people have 
not yet realised all the implications. 110 
The CIAC's third report, published in 1964, dealt with 
immigrant school-leavers and their employment. The 
Council reiterated its argument that many of the new 
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immigrants were permanently settled in Britain, and that 
they should be treated equally. This would be to the 
benefit of everyone, the Council maintained: 
'It is to the advantage of the community as well as a 
matter of justice to the individual that the talents 
and abilities of all citizens should be used to the 
full-'11 The Council did not favour policies of 
special 
preference, or 'positive' discrimination towards immigrant 
school-leavers: 
'We do not suggest that entry standards should be 
lowered in f avour of immigrants; but when immigrant 
boys and girls have the same qualif ications as other 
school leavers, and are as well fitted for the job 
they are seeking, they are entitled to equal 
opportunities so they can make an equal contribution 
to society., 12 
The CIAC's fourth and final report returned to the subject 
of housing. It dismissed the policy of giving government 
money to provide housing f or immigrants in areas of high 
immigrant concentration. Such a policy would, in the 
Council's view, lead to resentment in the indigenous 
population. However, citing the recommendation of the 
Milner Holland Report, the Council suggested that if an 
area was seen as having poor housing, action should be 
taken to improve it. If there happened to be a large 
concentration of immigrants in the area, the committee 
suggested that this should not inhibit action being 
taken. 13 The annual reports of the CIAC provide a 
valuable insight into how government-inspired race 
relations philosophy was evolving in the early 1960s, a 
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period when race relations initiatives were in their 
infancy in British politics. 
The Labour Party, which opposed control of New 
Commonwealth Immigration in 1962, came to realise how 
unpopular this was with the electorate as a whole. The 
result, once Labour had gained office in 1964, was a 
flurry of activity in race politics. In late 1964, those 
parts of the 1962 Immigration Act which required annual 
approval by parliament, were supported by the Labour 
Party. The 1965 White Paper, immigration from the 
Commonwealth heralded further restrictions on immigration 
from the Commonwealth. As in 1962, these restrictions 
were accompanied by measures for improved race relations: 
a new committee was formed, the National committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants. This legislation, the 1965 Race 
Relations Act, was the first to promote race relationsi 
and the Race Relations Board was formed to administer the 
new Act. 
The National Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants 
(NCCI) was a more ambitious descendant of the commonwealth 
Immigrants Advisory Council. The 1965 white Paper 
suggested that the aim of the NCCI should be to 'build up 
a comprehensive body of doctrine which can be flexibly 
applied to a variety of local situations'. 14 The Labour 
Party, as suggested in Chapter one, was pursuing at this 
time a policy of taking racial issues out of politics- It 
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aimed to create a bipartisan consensus with the 
Conservatives'so that the issues involved in race politics 
could not be exploited for electoral gain. The 
appointment of the Archbishop of Canterbury, a non- 
partisan political figurej as chairman of the NCCIP 
clearly reflected these political ambitions. 15 
The various reports of the NCCI illustrate its 
political preferences at a time when Government was only 
beginning to tackle race relations issues, and its desire 
for moral persuasion, education and action by political 
leaders to create racial harmony. The NCCI's first report 
included the Committee's terms of reference, stating that 
it, 'shall be required to promote and co-ordinate on a 
national basis efforts directed towards the integration of 
the Commonwealth immigrants into the community., 16 
The NCCI emphasised that the arrival of identifiable 
newcomers to any society created tensions, but that 'what 
happens subsequently is directly related to the kind of 
lead given by authority and the amount of effort put into 
educating and assisting both the newcomers and the host 
society'. 17 The Committee's report noted that hostility 
to New Commonwealth immigration was considerable, and 
urged the need for action by political leaders: 
'A considerable measure of antipathy, prejudice and 
resistance has shown itself and it was (by September 
19651 becoming clear that without some positive action 
on the part of the Government and local authorities, 
the voluntary initiatives o promote race relations] 
Would prove insufficient. lAt 
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The NCCI saw itself as-. a central agent involved, in shaping 
and moulding society into a more co-operative and 
harmonious community: 
'The important work of assessing national policiest 
bringing new ideas to bear on new situations, changing 
attitudes and infusing a new spirit into the community 
life of a country cannot-be carried out by a group of 
individuals alone, however wide their skills and 
experience may be. The National Committee has from 
the beginning seen itself as a focal point. from which 
ideas, information and the involvement of others could 
be generated. 119 
The NCCI was not simply a poodle of the Government: it 
soon began to generate its own ideas and, as with race 
relations bodies since, it was critical of Government 
policies which it deemed to be illiberal. The Labour 
Government's action to control New Commonwealth 
immigration further in 1965 was viewed by the Committee as 
a hindrance to good race relations. The Committee 
suggested that its work had been hampered by the emotions 
raised by these control measures. 20 The first report 
of the NCCI concluded with the admission that British 
society was troubled by New Commonwealth immigration, but 
that given the correct policy this would be replaced by 
recognition of the benefits brought by the new arrivals. 
The Committee suggested that its work 
'should result in policies which will transform the 
present negative picture of a troubled society. unable 
to cope with the concept of heterogeneity to the 
positive one of a society well-equipped to embrace and 
benefit from the new elements in it., 21 
The! NCCJ's second report repeated the argument that 
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Britain was deriving benefits from New Commonwealth 
immigration: 'The newcomers have made and are making an 
important and valuable contribution to Britain's economic 
life and have enriched her cultural life'. 22 Labour Home 
Secretary, Roy Jenkins' definition of integration as, 
"equal opportunity, accompanied by cultural diversity# in 
an atmosphere of mutual tolerance" was supported by the 
NCCI. The term "integration" led to certain ambiguities, 
noted by the NCCI; it wrote of itself that: 
'the Committee's task, that of "promoting 
integration" , is dif f icult to def ine and there are no short answers. Its work in 1966 has been a matter of 
moving forward on a number of different fronts: ... of helping newcomers to settle into an alien and 
sometimes hostile society; of educating the host 
community away from its prejudices; of watching for 
injustices and taking action against them. In short, 
the task is one of shaping. a new society enriched 
rather than disturbed by the new elements in it .... If it were necessary to sum up in one word the 
complicated task in hand, that word would undoubtedly 
be education, in its widest sense., 23 
In a later report , the NcCI acknowledged that it received 
criticism from several quarters: some critics wanted it to 
be a radical voice of black Britons, whilst others wanted 
it to treat the difficult problems of race policies in a 
gentle and undisturbing manner. The committee's defence 
was that its function was 'the monumental task of 
persuading a society which has become multi-racial in fact 
that it must also become so in spirit and indeed cannot be 
tackled by one method alone'. 24 
The Race Relations Board was established in February 
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1966, to administer the 1965 Race Relations Act. The 
Board emphasised, that its work and the original 
legislation were in the common interest and for the common 
good: 
'The law for which we are responsible was passed by 
Parliament, with the support of members of all parties, 
because it was considered to be in the interests of 
society as a whole. If racial discrimination is allowed 
to become part of the British was of lif e, so that two 
classes of citizen emerge, distinguishable by their 
race, colour or ethnic origin, the whole of our society 
will be injured. The work of the Board is, theref ore 
for the protection of the public interest as a whole., 2t 
Like the NCCI, the Race Relations Board was committed to 
a philosophy of moral persuasion, education and change in 
society; in this case, however, the Board was empowered by 
law. The Board wrote of its support for this philosophy: 
'Our belief in the ef f icacy of the law in the f ield of 
race relations, both as a means of changing behaviour 
and attitudes, and as a stimulant to other activities, 
is to some extent based on the belief that. ours is not a 
racist society, that attitudes are by no means rigid and 
that, given a firm and positive lead by the Government, 
a law that is speedy, simple and credible can make a 
real contribution to handling a problem that is not 
confined to this country, but is world-wide in its 
implications. 126 
In common with the NCCI, the Race Relations Board 
supported integration as defined by Roy Jenkins, and 
pressed the need for further action to achieve this goal. 
In the Board's view, the American experience of race 
relations should alert Britain that failure to act 
positively would create greater problems: 
Ie. where colour is an element, race relations if left 
to themselves deteriorate.... inertia and inaction in this 
field solve no problems and merely create greater 
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problems in the future'. 27 
The NCCI and the Race Relations Board had been working, 
in the years 1965-67, during what has been called "the 
liberal hour". 28 This period was a time of broad 
consensus, created largely by Labour's attempt to defuse 
the electoral consequences of hostility to New 
Commonwealth immigration, and this bipartisan approach had 
enjoyed some success. In such a political climate, race 
relations bodies did not need to struggle in order to 
promote liberal values; their recommendations fell on 
largely fertile ground. However, the events of 1968, the 
speeches of Enoch Powell and the 1968 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act, brought this liberal consensus to an 
abrupt halt, causing inevitable dismay to both the NCCI 
and Race Relations Board. The NCCI strongly opposed the 
1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act, and sent a deputation 
to the Prime Minister, Harold Wilson; some members of the 
NCCI resigned in protest against the new control measures. 
The Archbishop of Canterbury, Chairman of the NCCI, issued 
a statement in which he said that the Act would lead to 
distrust and ham good race relations. 29 An officer of 
the NCCI was quoted by The Times as saying, 'The Act has 
put race relations work in Britain back by ten years' . 
30 
Nadine Peppard, Secretary to the NCCI, said of New 
Commonwealth immigrants and immigration control# 'The 
problem is not having these people here ... the problem 
is 
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that we cannot adapt to it well enough or quickly 
enough'. 31 
The Race Relations Board welcomed, as did the NCCI, the 
extension of the powers of the 1965 Race Relations Act by 
the introduction of the 1968 Race Relations Act. 32 The 
1968 Act also established a new body, the community 
Relations Commission (CRC) , to replace the NCCI - The 
Act 
provided that the major part of the CRC's brief was: 
'to encourage the establishment of and assist others to 
take steps to secure the establishment of. harmonious 
community relations and to co-ordinate on a national 
basis the measures adopted for that purpose by 
others... Q3 
Section 28 of the 1968 Act def ined community relations as 
'.., relations within the community between people of 
different colour, race or ethnic or national origin' . 
34 
The CRC's philosophy was very much in the same tradition 
of the NCCI. The response of the CRC, for example, to the 
1968 Commonwealth immigration Act was that it had 
seriously harmed community relations: 
'... the strong feelings aroused among the immigrant 
communities and in circles sympathetic to their 
interests by the enactment of the commonwealth 
Immigration Act have lef t behind a legacy of suspicion 
and mistrust which can only add to the dif f iculty Of 
promoting harmony in community relations., 35 
Enoch Powell's entrance in the race debate, particularly 
his 'rivers of blood' speech of April 1968g together with 
the speeches of other Conservative MPs opposed to New 
Commonwealth immigration, were vigorously attacked by the 
race relations bodies. Powell had broken the liberal 
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consensus on the subject of immigration and race 
relations. This consensus had supported the idea of some 
control of immigration, and race relations measures to 
help black Britons, and emphasised that Britain was 
irreversibly a multi-racial society, from which status it 
derived much benefit. Powell argued that immigration 
should be halted and that the trend towards a multi-racial 
society should be stopped by repatriation of immigrants; 
implicit in his views was the rejection of any idea that 
being a multi-racial society could benefit Britain. The 
CRC's Report in 1968 did not mention Powell by name, but 
no-one could have doubted its references as being to him: 
'Certainly also much-publicised statements which were 
made during the year suggesting that coloured immigrants 
were an undesirable and burdensome element in the 
population, and the reaction which these statements 
inevitably provoke among both the host community and the 
minority ethnic groups did incalculable harm to the 
cause of good community relations., 36 
Likewise, the Race Relations Board's Report of 1968-9 
rejected the Powellite analysis of race politics. As in 
the CRC's report, Powell was not named, but in the 
political climate of 1969, the- implications of the 
following argument are clear: 
'It is only too easy to play upon the fears of the 
prejudiced and of those who feel threatened. The task of 
our society is to identify the real problems associated 
with migration, to tackle them, and to distinguish from 
the real problem the m 
profoundly damaging. 0 7yths 
and stereotypes which are so 
Understandably, the CRC viewed 1968 as being a 
disappointing year for race relations: the 1968 
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Commonwealth Immigration Act and the type and quality of 
debate about racial matters had been detrimental to 
hamony. The CRC noted that: 
'Perhaps the worst feature was that for the first time, 
opinion in this country appeared to accept as socially 
acceptable the use of blatantly hostile language in 
public utterances on the subject of race and minority 
ethnic groups. o38 
Whilst the-race relations bodies strongly disagreed with 
Powellite views and saw them as harming community 
relations, they did not see the situation as being 
irremediable. It is of interest that in the same report 
in which the CRC wrote of its despair at the effect of 
Powell's vocal opposition, it also formulated new analyses 
of community relations. Previously, conce3ýn had been 
towards "immigrants", but now it was to be towards all 
members of the community, regardless of their colour. 
Whilst this change was always likely to occur as New 
Commonwealth immigrants and their descendants became black 
Britons, it is hard not to interpret the CRC's analysis at 
this time as being any other than a further rebuttal of 
Powellite views. The CRC, by emphasising the existence of 
a multi-racial society and of black Britons within it, was 
implicitly rejecting notions of repatriation. Moreover, 
by presenting its work as being for the whole community, 
the CRC was bestowing legitimacy on black Britons as 
citizens of that community. The CRC wrote of its new 
policy: 
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'A further positive development during 1968 was a 
growing awareness and recognition both in Government 
circles and among the public at large of the need for a 
broader approach to the whole subject of the relations 
between different racial groups and communities in this 
country. Inevitably, the tendency in earlier years had 
been to look on this subject primarily in terms of the 
problems encountered by immigrants trying to settle into 
a not altogether welcoming society. With the 
development of knowledge and experience in this field 
the idea gained ground that what was. at issue was not 
merely the relations of the minority groups with the 
host community, but even more the inter-relation of all 
communities in an already existing multi-racial society. 
Seen from this angle the attitude of the host community 
and the need for the host community from its side to 
come to terms with the minority elements in its midst 
are of crucial importance. This development of the 
concept of community relations has taken place 
progressively over the past two or three years. The 
change in title from National Committee for commonwealth 
Immigrants to Community Relations Council symbolised the 
culmination of a process that had started some time 
back. The National Committee was itself well aware of 
the unduly restrictive implications of its title and in 
practice had had no choice but to extend. its activities 
beyond the problems of immigrants to those of the 
community at large. o39 
Implicit in this new policy was a move away from 
integration as the basis of community relations towards 
the notion of a group-based plural society. This 
developing policy was even more evident in the CRC's next 
annual report which suggested that: 
'the Commission recognises that in any society, multi- 
racial or not, there will be a development of social 
groupings, on the basis of common interests or ideas. 
Where the society is multi-racial, many groups will be 
focused on nationality and culture and this is the 
situation in Britain today. Such groupings are natural 
and nobody would wish to see some kind of monolithic 
society established in the interests of theoretical "integration". In the view of the commission, 
integration means the opportunity for all of people of 
this country to live and work side by side in an 
atmosphere of mutual trust and tolerance. The 
Commission therefore hopes that the immigrants and their 
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children will come to play an increasing role in British 
public and social life, rather than withdraw into 
enclosed communities. This country has in the past 
welcomed people of many diverse nationalities and 
cultures and its social life has been broadened and 
enriched thereby. This applies equally to the intro- 
duction of coloured citizens from the Commonwealth-140 
An emphasis on the need to change society in Britain is 
evident in several examples of arguments supported by the 
race relations bodies. The CRC, for example, saw the 
education of public opinion about race politics as a major 
role: 
'The education of public opinion holds the key to the 
improvement of community and race relations in Britain. 
In this sense, the Commission's major role lies in 
spreading factual information about immigrantsl 
dispelling the myths that arise from time to time, and 
interpreting the backgrounds and cultures of the various 
ethnic groups to the host community, and vice versa. 
This is a continuing task and the Commission, with its 
limited financial and manpower resources, has to rely 
very much on the ef forts that are being made by others 
as on the co-operation of the mass media. i4l 
The Race Relations Board believed that British society was 
preventing black Britons f rom enjoying an equal share of 
social resources, and predicted that serious consequences 
would result: 
'If, therefore, racial tension in the future is to be 
avoided it is of the greatest importance to prevent the 
growth of ghettoes and to ensure that coloured people 
should be able to work in all sectors of the economy for 
which they are qualified ... If prejudice and discrimination excludes the second generation from 
employment and decent housing on equal terms with their 
white contemporaries, it will not only mean the waste of 
a precious economic asset, it will also create major 
social problems which experience abroad has shown to be 
of a peculiarly intractable nature. 142 
The Board's duty was to administer the 1968 Race Relations 
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Act and it saw the Act's purpose as producing a major 
change in society: 
'The fundamental purpose of the Act is to eliminate 
racial discrimination or, put positively, to create 
throughout our society a situation in which colour, race 
or ethnic or national origins present no barrier to 
equal opportunity. 143 
In similar vein, the CRC welcomed Labour's Urban 
Programme, aimed at deprived areas, for the help it might 
give to black Britons: 
'Many of these socially deprived localities have a high 
concentration of immigrants and the Commission has 
consequently maintained the closest possible association 
with the Programme ... It likewise welcomed the present Government's decision to continue to expand the 
Programme, as a contribution towards alleviating social 
distress and benefitting the entire community in areas 
of need. 144 
A recurrent, theme in this area of policy was dislike of 
the nature of public debate about race politics, and 
dislike of criticism of the role of the race relations 
bodies. The CRC, since it interpreted its role very much 
as a persuasive and educative body, repeatedly mentioned 
in its reports the effects upon society which it believed 
certain kinds of debate achieved. The 1970 Report of the 
CRCI for example, commented on its work of spreading 
information and assessed this as a valuable step towards 
creating a more tolerant society. It added, however: 
'While this is of course encouraging, nevertheless the 
increase in publicity and in public awareness produced 
its disadvantages as well as its advantages and to some 
extent tended to have a boomerang effect. The fact that 
the spotlight was continually focused on immigrant 
groups made the Commission's task more difficult. 
Despite the Act, manifestations of hostility towards 
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coloured. people in certain quarters became more evident 
and were encouraged by the attitudes of a few 
politicians. Even if the impact of some of the most 
reactionary speeches became dimmed through constant 
repetition, the views expressed attracted considerable 
support among some sections of the public. They tended to engender among many immigrant groups a deep sense of 
resentment and mistrust which will not easily be dispelled. All this contributed to the difficulties of 
promoting harmony and understanding within the 
community. 145 
Mark Bonham Carter, an ex-Liberal MPp as mentioned above, 
was appointed Chairman of the CRC on January 1st 1971, in 
succession to Frank Cousins, an ex-Labour MP and leading 
trade unionist. Bonham Carter, in a foreword to the first 
CRC report for which he was responsible, also commented on 
the role of public discussion and debate: 
'It is useless to deny thatj since the early sixties, 
race relations and hence community relations has become 
a matter of public debate. As a consequence, the 
Commission has found itself increasingly drawn into 
matters of political controversy# frequently to our 
embarrassment. We are by definition a body without 
party affiliation; our practical work demands the co- 
operation of bodies and individuals of all political 
persuasions, but we cannot ignore measures such as, for 
example, the Commonwealth Immigrants Act, 1968, or the 
Immigration Bill, 1971, both of which were bound to 
affect community relations. The commission has frequently been attacked for saying too much or too little on matters of this kind. We cannot avoid this invidious position when issues affecting our work become 
matters of political controversy. But in responding to 
situations of this kind we can only be guided by our own definition of our reponsibilities. The same situation 
confronts community relations councils. They, too, find that political controversy makes their work more difficult because it diverts energy and attention from the practical work on which they are daily engaged. o46 
The Conservative Government's 1970 General Election 
Manifesto commitment to restrict further immigration from 
the New commonwealth resulted in the 1971 commonwealth 
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Immigration Act. This Act was opposed by both the Race 
Relations Board and the Community Relations commission, 
who believed that black Britons would feel less secure in 
this country as a result of the Act and that good 
community relations would be harder to achieve. 47 By the 
early to middle 1970s, the race relations bodies were 
growing impatient with what they regarded as their 
inadequate powers to improve race relations. There was 
growing evidence that black Britons were the subject of 
racial discrimination and were not achieving equal social 
facilities or equal provision in housing or employment. 
48 
This growing impatience can be seen, for example, in the 
Race Relations Board's call for what it termed 
"affirmative action". Three features of this required 
affirmative action were: 
'A clear statement of intent that equal opportunity will 
be pursued, regardless of colour or origin, the 
effective communication of the policy to all who will be 
involved in its implementation and measures that will 
allow the im3lementation of the policy to be effectively 
monitored. 14 
The Board discussed possible objections to policies of 
affirmative action, chief amongst which was its awareness 
that such policies of favouring minority groups could 
easily create hostility from the majority. The Board 
justified its position thus: 
'Very often, however, this belief rests on the 
assumption that special measures give the minority 
something more than equality, when their objective 
should be to secure the same rights and opportunities as the majority already enjoy. 150 
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A second objection anticipated by the Race Relations Board 
was that affirmative action would lead to favoured 
treatment for black Britons, and this was similarly 
dismissed: 
'This objection ignores 
. 
the fact that the special 
measures are undertaken to avoid a more serious and 
obnoxious form of discrimination: that of treating a 
person 
I 
less favourably on grounds of his colour or 
origin. 51 
The Report also suggested that: 
'the responses of too many people are irrational - To regard a man as inferior because of the colour of his 
skin, f or example, is plainly irrational. Unless our 
society is prepared to recognise the existence of the 
consequences of such irrationality, and to take steps 
beyond the enactment of laws to counteract them, the damage to society itself will be great. #52 
Again and again, the CRC stressed that more emphasis 
should be placed upon community relations; it felt that 
much was lacking in this area: 
'The Commission has still to attain a position where it 
is expected to speak to and be listened to by those who 
exercise power; it has still to persuade the majority to 
do what they ought to be doing in any case; it has still 
to get community relations in a multi-racial spciety 
higher on the agenda. 153 
The CRC clearly believed that trouble might be brewing for 
community relations in some city areas: 
'It is difficult to assess the trends for better or for 
worse in our multi-racial society, but most certainly 
there is no room for complacency or for any confidence 
that time is on our side. The symptoms of alienation 
among some young members of minority groups in certain 
urban areas are there to be seen. Unless positive 
action is taken quickly the progress is likely to gather 
momentum. 154 
It was evident that the CRC feared that matters might be 
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left to right themselves: 
'The history of immigration in this country is proving inexorably that - like the decaying city centres- 
community relations do not take care of themselves. Urgent and positive policies are needed in all sections 
of British life. o55 
The CRC had some difficulties in interpreting its own 
function and promoting better community relations when the 
term itself was imperfectly understoodi and said of itself 
that 'its general function - to encourage the 
establishment of harmonious community relations has never 
been satisfactorily defined'. 56 Elsewhere in the same 
report were remarks indicating that community relations 
were not rigid, and could even be fragile: 'community 
relations depend on public opinion and to a great extent 
on the way in which this may be shaped by the news'. 57 
The CRCIs requirements from society were often very 
fundamental: 
'The only "assistance" [to minority groups] required from the majority is a climate of opinion in which 
equality of opportunity is a genuine possibility; and 
the Commission sees as an important part of its function 
support for the creation of a framework in which 
minority groups can achieve equal participation for 
themselves in every field. ' 58 
The CRC's dissatisfaction with its lack of power was 
clearly evident at this time, together with a fear that 
cosmetic measures might be taken by governments, which 
would not lead to equal opportunity as a 'genuine 
possibility', but merely be a sop to liberal values. What 
was necessary, in the CRCIs view, was an attempt to 
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'remove some of the tangible inequalities which sour 
relationships'. 59 Where these inequalities were great, 
the community itself was under threat: 
'The more tangible part of our work centres around inner 
city areas. Many, although not all, new immigrants are forced with the poorest of the host community into a 
cycle of deprivation which constantly arises in the grim 
surroundings of old city centres - so many that they are in danger of becoming identified with the hardships imposed on them. It is impossible in this field clearly 
to distinguish between obstacles facing immigrant groups 
alone, and the problems of the disadvantaged generally; 
and, without detailed research, to discover the scale of low educational achievement, homelessness, under- 
employment and unemployment, and possible anti-social behaviour which these circumstances foster. 16O 
The Race Relations Board was also greatly concerned about 
the effects of inequality and racial discrimination on 
black Britons. Government was not, in the Board's view, 
doing enough to alleviate these problems: 
'The most critical issue is whether discrimination and 
unequal treatment are still so widespread in our society that coloured people can never be certain whether they 
will be treated on their merits as individuals or 
according to some preconceived prejudices about the 
groups to which they belong. Much remains to be done to 
remove such uncertainties... We consider that the 
Government and local authorities should be more ready to 
consult with minority group respresentatives about 
matters affecting their communities. Government 
policies should give more positive support to efforts to 
promote equality of opportunity; and public statements 
should place more emphasis on the benefits brought by immigrants. Positive leadership by Government is likely 
to -influence public opinion in the right direction and to increase the confidence of minority groups that equal 
status can be attained, '61 
By the mid-1970s, some moves were afoot to strengthen the 
1968 Race Relations Act and to grant the Race Relations 
bodies more power. The Parliamentary Select committee on 
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Race and Immigration, formed in 1969, and a bastion of 
liberal values on race within parliament, criticised the 
race relations bodies for their lack of effect on race 
relations. 62 The Committee suggested that the Race 
Relations Board and Community Relations commission be 
replaced by a single, more powerful, body. The Labour 
Government was also committed to stronger race relations 
legislation, and the result was the 1976 Race Relations 
Act, which both the Race Relations Board and the community 
Relations Commission supported. 63 
The last annual reports of both the Race Relations Board 
and the CRC were somewhat in the nature of valedictory 
statements on race relations in Britain, and are therefore 
worth citing in some detail. The Race Relations Board 
argued the need for strong leadership from the Government 
in racial matters: 
'First a counter-attack on the racist elements in 
society who will not be appeased by what are regarded as 
the right noises on the coloured immigration issue ... The 
doctrine of repatriation should... be condemned 
... Obviously many people regret, resent and fear changes in the character of their neighbourhoods which are 
inevitable when people of different cultures and customs 
enter, but hostility towards the minorities will 
increase and strengthen their propensity to remain apart 
and different. Measures to provide equal opportunity 
and to facilitate adaptation will have the opposite 
effect. 
Secondly, the widely held myth that the minorities 
constitute a privileged section of society should be 
strongly attacked by Government, and not left, as in the 
past, to be dealt with almost exclusively by the 
statutory agencies. No matter how much we endeavour to 
present the arguments rationally and objectively, we are 
bound by the nature of our purposes to appear to the 
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public as partisan.,,. in view of the abundant evidence of 
the underprivileged position of the minorities... the 
assertion that they enjoy special advantages is 
ludicrous. 
Part of the strength of the myth arises f rom a genuine 
but erroneous belief that steps taken to remove the 
special disadvantages of the minorities give them 
benefits not available to others. Anti-discrimination 
legislation and measures to provide equal opportunity, 
whether in employment or in housing, have raised 
opposition on these grounds. There is not always a 
clear appreciation of the distinction between different 
treatment, to secure equal opportunityl and prfVI-leqeU 
treatment. As it becomes more widely recognised that 
special steps are needed to reduce the special 
disadvantages of minorities, misapprehensions in this 
area could well increase. Whatever the underlying 
reasons for the extent and tenacity of the myths, it is 
clear that they are held by many who by no stretch of 
the imagination can be regarded as racists. it is to 
these that the Government should direct a special 
education effort. t64 
Likewise, the Community Relations Commission called for 
positive action by government to aid community relations. 
The CRC argued that racial disadvantage should be fought 
against, particularly 'those disadvantages that stem from 
discrimination, intolerance and less equal treatment' . 
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The eradication of this disadvantage required, the CRC 
suggested: 
ý changes in public policy generally - unemployment, 
ousing, education, youth and social services; in each 
of these fields central and local government's position 
should be the explicit eradication of inequalities based 
upon colour, race or ethnic or national origins, not 
only in the legalistic sense, but in terms of positive 
policies of resource, re-allocation by authorities and 
special efforts by practitioners., 66 
Combatting this racial disadvantage led the Commission to 
support, if only temporarily, positive discrimination 
based on racial criteria: 
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'We therefore support the Home Secretary's Advisory 
Committee on Race Relations Research, which 
writes... until adequate indications of deprivation 
become available there remains on linguistic and 
cultural grounds a prima facie case for giving some 
weight to racial origin in identifying grounds for 
positive discrimination. 167 
This idea was a developing theme in the CRC's philosophy: 
two years earlier, the CRc had argued that help should be 
directed at the special needs of black Britons per se. 
These special needs raised: 
'the question of whether needs, which are shown by 
greater numbers of the indigenous community, but which 
are proportionally concentrated - by various factors, 
including discrimination - to a special degree in 
minority communities, can be met at all adequately 
through national programmes for the "under-privileged". 
Unless the special degree of these needs is accepted and 
catered for, they may simply be swamped in overall 
policies ... we regard as particularly urgent an enquiry into the extent to which the needs of the ethnic 
minority communities differ from those of the rest of 
the Population in areas of urban deprivation., 68 
The new body which, as a result of the 1976 Race 
Relations Act, replaced the Race Relations Board and the 
Community Relations commission, was called the commission 
for Racial Equality (CRE). The new body was to advise the 
Government on the performance of the 1976 Act, as the Act 
itself defined its tems of referencet to: N 
(a) work towards the elimination of racial 
discrimination 
(b) promote equality of opportunity and good relations 
between persons of different racial groups. 69 
The CRE supported policies which were similar to and in 
the same tradition as its predecessors. For example, it 
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too was concerned about the type of discussion which 
occurred on race issues, and in its 1978 Annual Report# 
took issue with the way these issues were publicised: 
'During the year, too, there was a certain f renzy in 
public and political debate encouraged by spasms of 
sensationalism in the media. Renewed controversy over 
immigration was conducted in extravagant and insensitive 
terms. Talk about immigrants as if they constituted 
some kind of plague or threat to the British way of life 
served to arouse irrational anxieties, made harder the tasks of individuals and organisations trying to do 
constructive work, and created an attitude of mind leading people to think about colour with hostility. In 
our First Annual Report we called for a civilisedp calm 
and rational approach to public discussion about immigration because we are aware of its relevance to 
race relations in Britain. During 1978 other 
organisations joined us in urging this. It remains a 
matter of great concern. 00 
The CRE also viewed the solutions to good race relations 
in similar terms as their predecessors: 
'It is a central and obvious principle of our strategy 
that good race relations can only be achieved if there is effective action against those factors which 
contribute to bad race relations, e. g. racial discrimination in employment, housing and service or, 
worse still, attitudes to racial minorities which amount 
to condescension or contempt. Apart from racial discrimination and racially discriminatory attitudes, 
there are areas of public policy which are also vitally important in the work f or better race relations. These 
include the Government's immigration policy, the determination to deal with the disadvantage in the 
conurbations where a large proportion of ethnic 
minorities live, and the vigour with which local 
authorities carry out their res onsibility under Section 71 of the Race Relations Act., 
R 
The CRC's report for 1979 reflected upon the coming 
decade, and found it hard to be optimistic about race 
relations: 
'We would like to believe that in twelve months' time 
our next report will indicate a positive improvement in 
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race relations, a society united in the task of 
eradicating the evils of racialism, recognising that all 
our citizens are entitled to equality of opportunity and 
that social and racial justice under the law is the 
right of everyone. As we enter this new decade it is 
difficult to be optimistic. '72 
Prophetically, in the light of the inner city riots which 
were to occur in 1981, the Report stated: 
'If extra public funds cannot be expeditiously diverted 
into those areas such as unemployment, housing and 
social services where the black minorities f orm, such a 
large proportion of the disadvantaged population, small 
incidents may well lead to further outbreaks of 
violence, particularly on the part of frustrated black 
youngsters. It is hardly necessary to point out the 
detrimental effect which such outbreaks will have on 
race relations in this country. '73 
The CRE reported in 1980 that race relations had 
continued, despite some good signs, to be a source of 
concern during the year, since: 
'there was new evidence that discrimination in 
employment, so far from being eliminated# was actually 
increasing in some areas, and it is clear that many 
whites still do not accept blacks, even young blacks who 
were born here,. as members of the community in the same 
way as themselves. 04 
The Conservatives' proposed British Nationality Act was 
seen by the CRE as having a negative effect on race 
relations, and the CRE desired a greater commitment from 
the Government to race relations initiatives. 75 
The 1981 disturbances in Brixton and elsewhere were the 
subject of a special enquiry led by Lord Scarman. The 
philosophy and underlying assumptions of Lord Scarman's 
report place it within the tradition of liberal values 
identified in this study. 76 Lord Scarman placed great 
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emphasis on the social conditions which existed in 
Brixton, but believed that 
'the social conditions in Brixton - many of which are to 
be f ound in other inner city areas - do not provide an 
excuse for disorder... they are no reason f or releasing 
young black people from the responsibility for public 
order which they share with the rest of us - and with 
the police. #77 
He maintained, however, that at the same time, 'the 
disorders in Brixton cannot be fully understood unless 
they are seen in the context of the complex political, 
social and economic factors to which I have briefly 
referred'. 78 Lord Scarman said that the experience of 
black Britons living in Brixton could not be seen as a 
"cause'! of the riots, but that, 'taken together they 
provide a set of social conditions which create a 
predisposition towards violent protest'679 
Later in the report, discussing policing. techniques, 
he 
suggested: 
I ,, while good policing can help diminish tension and avoid disorder it cannot remove the causes of social 
stress where these are to be found, as those in Brixton 
and elsewhere are, deeply embedded in the fundamental 
economic and social conditions. 180 
Lord Scarman quoted with approval from President Johnson's 
Address to the Nation which prefaced the 1968 US Report of 
the National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder: 
'... "the only genuine, long range solution for what has happened lies in an attack - mounted at every level- 
upon the conditions that breed despair and violence. 
All of us know what those conditions are: ignoranpej discrimination, slums, poverty, disease, not enough 
Jobs. We should attack these conditions - not because 
we are frightened by conflict, but because we are fired 
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by conscience. We should attack them because there is 
simply no other way to achieve a decent and orderly society in America"... ' 
Lord Scarman added that 'These words are as true of 
Britain today as they have been proved by subsequent 
events to be true of Americal. 81 He was in favour of 
"positive action" to counter the racial disadvantage which 
he agreed that black Britons were suffering: 
'Given the special problems of the ethnic minorities, 
exposed in evidence, justice requires that special 
programmes be adopted in areas of acute deprivation. In 
this respect, the ethnic minorities can be compared with 
any other group with special needs, such as the elderly, 
or one-parent families.. Certainly special programmes for ethnic minority groups should only be instituted 
where the need for them is clearly made out. But need 
must be the criterion, and no other. The principle has 
already been recognised by Parliament (sections 351 37 
and 38 of the Race Relations Act 1976), and must be made 
effective., 82 
Fighting racial disadvantage, Lord scarman stated, 
justified such special help: 
'On the social front, I find myself broadly in agreement 
with the House of Commons Select committee. The attack 
on racial disadvantage must be more direct than it has been ... A policy of direct coordinated attack on racial disadvantage inevitably means that the ethnic minorities 
will enjoy for a time a positive discrimination in their favour. But it is a price worth paying if it 
accelerates the elimination of the unsettling factor of 
racial disadvantage from the social fabric of the United Kingdom. 183 
He believed that such special action should be 'based on 
an acceptance of them as full and equal members of a 
culturally diverse society'. 84 In Lord Scarman Is view, 
'If the social conditions which underlay the disorders in 
Brixton and elsewhere are to be corrected', it would be 
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necessary to: 
'involve not just black people, but all the community. both nationally and locally, in a better directed 
response to these problems. It is essential that people 
are encouraged to secure a stake in, feel a pride in, 
and have a sense of responsibility for their own 
areat. 85 
Government should, in his view, be urged to take 
'recognition of and action to meet the special problems 
and needs of the ethnic minorities'. 86 Lord Scarman also 
voiced concern, as other race relations bodies had, over 
the role of the media, and the quality and content of 
public debate on the subject of race relations. There 
was, he argued, 
'a need for newspaper editorst television and radio 
producers and journalists to give continuous attention 
to the social implications of their awesome power to 
influence the minds, the attitudes and the behaviour, 
not only of the reading, viewing and listening public, 
but also of those whose unlawful behaviour they 
report'. 87 
The CRE's reactions to the Brixton riots and Lord 
Scarman's recommendations were evident in its 1981 Report: 
'Above all, we believe, Lord Scarman's recommendations 
need to be implemented in toto and with a greater urgency 
than has so far been apparent'. 88 On the riots 
themselves, the CRE said: 
'Our reactions to these riots have been straightforward. 
We have strongly condemned the violence... Much more 
needs to be done to tackle the underlying causes and to 
meet the needs of young pepýlet particularly young 
blacks, in the inner cities. 18 
The CRE welcomed Lord Scarman's emphasis on new policing 
methods, and believed that: 
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'No less important is Lord Scarman's plea for a more 
effective attack on inner-city problems and the various 
social and economic causes of the disturbances which he 
identified. Here too a more vigorous response by 
Government and others is called for. '90 
The CRE Report concluded by outlining its priorities f or 
1982 and beyond and added: 
'Racial discrimination and disadvantage still afflict 
individuals and debilitate Britain's national life. The 
urgency of eliminating them, if our society is not to be 
riven by strife and disorder, was a central message of 
Lord Scarman's report. This is wholly within Britain's 
capacity. If we fail in that task or if we are seen to 
be tackling it too slowly, the modest progress of the 
last few years could be swept away. '91 
Conclusion 
A review of the official reports of the various 
government- sponsored race relations bodies in the period 
1961-81 reveals a broadly developed consensus on New 
Commonwealth immigration and race relations similar to 
that held by the leadership of the Labour and Liberal 
Parties and the churches. At times when, for example, the 
Labour Government introduced immigration controls, the 
race relations bodies perceived them to be acting at 
variance with liberal values, and did not hesitate to 
attack the Government. In spite of this, it is possible 
during this period to identify the growth and development 
of a consensus liberal view towards the politics of race. 
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Chapter Four: The Churches 
Attempts to examine the response of the British churches 
to any policy are open to at least one major criticism, 
namely that the churches are disparate and doctrinally 
divided organisations which often incorporate substantial 
internal divisions. Generalisation about the churches' 
response to Commonwealth immigration and race relations 
initiatives may thus be misplaced. It will be argued 
here, however, that the churches have been in substantial 
agreement on policies relating to race. 
The churches' consensus over policy and attitudes in 
the area of race politics can be seen to exhibit many 
features typical of the liberal political tradition's 
response to the subject. The argument that the political 
views of the churches' leadership have reflected and been 
part of a secular political consensus and tradition has 
caused much controversy. 1 It is not intended to discuss 
this controversy here; rather the purpose of this study is 
to trace values and attitudes towards the politics Of 
race. 
The immigration and race debate, naturally, has not 
been the major concern of the churches, nevertheless there 
is material available for study on the churches' thinking 
on these matters. This study concentrates on the 
reactions of the Church of England and the British council 
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of Churches, assuming that these views are typical of the 
British churches. During the period under consideration, 
the Roman Catholic Church was not a full member of the 
British Council of Churches, but it did send observers to 
Council meetings. The Council's members included the 
Church of England and many non-conformist churches such as 
the Methodist and Baptist, hence this assumption is 
justifiable. 
In common with much other established political 
opinion in the 1950s, Chur ch leaders were strongly 
attached to the Commonwealth. They viewed it as a 
Christian institution, an organisation which was truly co- 
operative, a brotherhood of mixed races and religions. 
Church leaders had a special affinity with the Empire and 
Commonwealth since it had long been the focus of 
missionary endeavour. There were many sister and daughter 
churches of the Anglican communion in scattered places 
around the Empire/Commonwealth. in earlier years parts of 
the Empire were annexed at the behest of missionaries who 
wished to stamp out the slave trade in East and Central 
Africa. 2 Lecturing in 1956 to a Christian audience, 
Phillip Mason, later to be Director of the influential and 
liberal-minded Institute for Race Relations, and at the 
time a high church Anglican, rejected almost completely 
any control of Commonwealth immigration on grounds of 
race. He argued: 'This is a Commonwealth of many races 
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and to exclude British subjects on grounds of race would 
be the death of that ideal. It would give the lie to all 
we stand for..., 3 immigration control did not seem to be 
a likely prospect, for I ... the need has not yet arisen, 
nor is it anywhere near'. 4 
The 1958 racial disturbances in Nottingham and London 
saw the British Council of Churches clearly s. tating its 
views about race matters. The Council released a 
statement which condemned the disturbances, called for 
integration of the immigrants and suggested that 'the 
churches could not consent to limitation of immigration on 
grounds of colour'. 5 
Very similar sentiments were revealed in churchmen's 
reactions to the bill which was to become the 1962 
Commonwealth Immigration Act. Along with the leaders of 
the Labour Party and the Liberal Party, many church 
leaders strongly opposed the Bill. When the Bill was 
debated in the House of Lords, the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, spoke strongly against it; 
calling it 'lamentable' and 'deplorable', he said he 
viewed it with Irepugnance'. 6 He believed that some 
colour prejudice did exist in Britain and he laid 
responsibility for it, and the need for the Bill# on poor 
housing and lack of social provision. The correct way 
ahead, he argued. was: 
'Not that we should attack her Majesty's Government, 
still less that we should allow the colour question to 
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be a matter of Party politics - that would indeed be lamentable - but that as a country we should set about 
attacking with far greater vigour those conditions 
which have created any case whatever for this proposal 
of restriction. I think it is the ambition of all Of 
us that our country should be one where the 
restrictions imposed by this Bill could not be 
conceivably necessary. 17 
Chief among these conditions, the Archbishop argued, was 
poor and inadequate housing, and 'Had the colour problem 
in housing not loomed so large, I do not believe that the 
demand for this Bill would have seemed nearly so 
insistent'. 8 He saw the need f or 'a long term attack on 
the background of circumstances which have created the 
arguments for the Bill'. 9 
Other churchmen offered much the same analysis: the 
Rev. Kenneth Greet, secretary of the Methodist Church's 
Department of Christian Citizenship; argued that the Bill 
was aimed at the wrong target . It did not help overcome 
the social problems which existed in Britain, nor did it 
help the social problems of the immigrants' countries of 
origin. 10 The British Council of Churches, it is clear, 
did not really approve of controlling immigrant numbers. 
This emerges from, for example, the following minutes of 
the Council: 
1ee *although the Department was in no doubt that it would like to recommend on the restriction of 
immigration, there were many practical matters which had to be weighed, as for example, the purely physical difficulty of housing'. 11 
The Council's Department for Social Responsibility wrote 
in a report to the council that, whilst not denying that 
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countries had a right to control immigration, 'We believe 
that migration within the Commonwealth ought to be the 
subject of positive planning by the whole commonwealth, 
together with economic development'. 12 
Unlike the political parties, the churches usually 
only gave racial matters public attention when legislation 
was imminent, or when racial incidents had received 
substantial publicity. The 1964 General Election result 
at Smethwick, where the Conservative candidate won the 
seat through a sustained campaign against immigration, 
suggested a rejection of liberal values in British race 
politics. The churches' leadership accordingly attacked 
this threat to liberal values. In the December 1964 
debate in the House of Lords on the annual renewal of 
parts of the 1962 Commonwealth immigration Act# the Bishop 
of Liverpool spoke for the church of England'. He stressed 
that no social problem should be allowed to become a 
racial one and because of this it was probably the case 
that immigration still needed to be controlled. The 
Bishop did not mention Smethwick by name, but he did urge 
the need for calm: 
'It is however of first rate importance to prevent any 
social issue from becoming a racial issue, for once 
passions of this kind are aroused they become 
uncontrollably cruel and irrational. The temperature 
must be kept down even if the number of immigrants has 
to be controlled to gain time and experience of how to 
do it... 113 
The Bishop was convinced, however, that Britain needed the 
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immigrants: 'Our own economic necessities demand 
immigration'. 14 He also noted with approval that 
'Liverpool already seems geared into an acceptance of the 
fact that a multi-racial Britain may be necessary if we 
are to be the centre of a multi-racial Commonwealth' 0 
15 
Whilst correct policies were devised to stop social 
problems from becoming racial ones, the Bishop suggested: 
'... it will be the duty of each responsible agency in 
the country dealing with social conditions to decide 
and state clearly what we mean by integration and by a 
multi-racial society; and more than that to persuade 
people of the virtue of the meaning we proclaim. That 
is the central concern of the situation as it is 
today. '16 
Such policies, he argued, must 'be made acceptable to the 
very large numbers of unreflective people who must be 
helped to understand the situation as'it really is, *17 
By late 1964 and mid-1965, the churches' leadership 
had changed its policy from strong opposition to controls 
of New Commonwealth immigration and begun to favour 
controlled immigration, as long as it could be justified 
as a moral policy, designed to aid good race relations. 
As a Church of England publication put it in 1965: 
'Control of entry is essential but the objective must be 
the integration of those who stay' . 
18 This Move Of the 
church leadership, from opposition to restrictions on 
immigration in the late 1950s and early 1960s, to 
acceptance of controls in 1964 and 1965# paralleled 
exactly a similar movement in the Labour and Liberal 
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Parties. 
The source of policy briefings for Bishops' political 
speeches in this area was the Church of England's Board 
for Social Responsibility. A paper by Edwin Barker, its 
secretary, in March 1965 is illuminating. Barker was 
concerned about race relations in the Midlands, following 
the 1964 General Election campaign in Smethwick, and said: 
'The political situation is rapidly deteriorating and 
needs very careful attention. Local situations can, 
through Local Government politics, rapidly become 
national political issues. Smethwick is only one 
example of this. The whole of the Midlands could, 
with a modicum of unscrupulousness, change its 
political allegiances through "a colour campai n". The 
reason is irrational fear not coloured votes-'79 
Barker argued that the whole nature of the political 
debate about immigration required a change: 
'It is absolutely essential to get the political 
debate on to a neýF basis -in which "colour" and 
"immigrant" and "race" are not regarded as socially 
dirty and dangerous words. To attempt this at the 
present time is itself a dangerous occupation., 20 
[Italics in original] 
He suggested that there was little need to view the 
immigrants in a jaundiced light, for: 
'immigration presents problems of opportunity the most 
important of which is that of creating a vigorous 
multi-racial society. The creation of such a society is a laudable objective which now requires a strong 
re-affirmation if we are to move away from reluctant 
toleration of small numbers of coloured immigrants 
into a positive welcome. 121 
Very similar sentiments were apparent in a letter to The 
Timer. signed by the Archbishop of Canterbury, the 
Moderator of the Church of Scotland and the Moderator of 
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the Free Church Federal Council. They argued the need for 
practical action to help immigrants and the necessity of 
removing the immigration issue from the sphere of 
political party controversy. 22 
The Church of England supported such positive policies 
and so also did the British council of Churches; the 
Council published a document# immigrants in Britain which 
contained a very similar philosophy to the Church of 
England's. 23 It noted that there was now agreement 
amongst the major parties on the need for control of 
immigration and measures to improve race relations. This 
meant that: 
'there is now enough common ground for the parties to 
undertake reasoned discussion. The Churches should 
welcome such realistic debate, provided that a 
deliberate effort is made to expose and eradicate the 
irrational and prejudiced. Any hints of appeal to 
prejudice, or an unapproval of discrimination based on 
colour, however discreetly worded, should be plainly 
and vigorously condemned by the Churches., 24 
Immigrants were benefiting Britain, the document argued, 
and this should always be emphasised: 
'The deeply-rooted irrational f ear that the immigrant 
is prospering at the expense - of the host community 
must be exposed. The f act is that the immigrant has 
contributed substantially to the general economic 
welf are of Britain. Factual analysis is needed to 
destroy such myths., 25 
The document noted that many of the immigrants would 
settle permanently in Britain and that little clear 
thought had been given to the f ull. implications of this: 
'Should the objective of policy be the eventual 
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assimilation of all immigrant groups# or the integration 
of culturally distinct but not socially separate 
communities? o26 
The Church of England leadership welcomed the Bill 
that was to become the 1965 Race Relations Act; the Bishop 
of Coventry spoke for the Church in the House of Lords and 
greeted it warmly. He saw education as the key to 
problems in this area, and that good relations between the 
host and immigrant groups I ... are, I am sure we all must 
realise, dependent upon a long-term, patient and 
widespread process of education, which removes certain 
misconceptions ... 127 One of these misconceptions, 
the 
Bishop argued, was that the host community suffered as a 
result of immigrants, where in fact the immigrants 
'contributed substantially to the general economic welfare 
of this country'. 28 He was clear also about the way 
ahead: 
'The long-term way to peaceful racial integration is 
through education, removal of prejudice, the s6tting 
Up of local conciliatory boards, the strengthening- 
and I underline this - of voluntary welfare agencies, 
such as the Citizens' Advice Bureaux.. 0129 
The Bishop reminded the House that: 
'... this country should be perfectly capable of 
absorbing a well-planned annual immigration of 
coloured people, as the result of wise education and a 
warm welcome, and a freedom from, 3ýrejudice, 
of 
benefiting greatly by their advent... 
The churches' commitment to Government policies in 
this area can be seen in the appointment of the Archbishop 
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of Canterbury, Michael Ramsey, as Chairman of the Labour 
Government's race relations body, the National committee 
for Commonwealth immigrants. The committee's aim was to 
encourage efforts towards integration and good race 
relations. The choice of the Archbishop of Canterbury as 
the Committee's chairman was perhaps a surprising one, 
explained possibly by the desire of the Government to 
depoliticise immigration and race issues. The Archbishop 
was viewed as an overtly non-political establishment 
figure with the moral weight of the churches behind him. 
At the same time, the Archbishop's acceptance of the 
chairmanship indicated his broad approval of Government 
policy in this area; in his foreword to the committee's 
1966 Report, for instance, the Archbishop sýated that: 
'The year 1966 has seen an increase in general 
awareness that harmonious relationships in a 
culturally diverse society cannot be taken for 
granted. They can only be achieved if there is a 
commitment at all levels to the principles of justice 
and equality irrespective of ethnic origin. 
Commonwealth citizens in Britain are making a full 
contribution to our society and we must ensure not 
only that their contribution is recognised but that 
they stand as equals in all spheres with their fellow- 
citizens of the host community., 31 
Such sentiments were in the same vein as the briefing 
papers prepared by the Board f or Social Responsibility 
cited earlier. The Archbishop of Canterbury's views can 
also be seen in some of his public statements at this 
time. In May 1966 the Archbishop suggested that people 
should realise that the British economy would be much 
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weaker without the contribution of Commonwealth 
immigrants. More education was required in order to 
eradicate the racial prejudice and discrimination whicho 
reluctantly, he had to admit existed in some people. 32 
Later in the same year, he was reported as saying that: 
'There is a case for limiting numbers [of immigrants] 
until society learns the art of integration, but not to enable this problem to be avoided. Perhaps the time has come to drop the word "problem" and replace it by "opportunity"J3 
The Archbishop's views were also revealed in a 
response to an editorial in The Times. The Times had 
vigorously opposed the control of Commonwealth immigration 
in 1962, but in common with many opinion-formers, had 
adopted the view that controls were now necessary in order 
to reduce racial tension and encourage integration. An 
editorial admitted this in early 1967, and declared that 
such measures were needed not because of problems of poor 
housing, welfare or employment, but' because of the 
indigenous population's hostility towards coloured 
immigration. The editorial called for 'vigorous 
restrictions on coloured immigration', together with as 
much effort as possible to integrate the immigrants 
already settled in Britain. 34 This editorial drew a 
strong rebuke from the Archbishop of Canterbury: writing 
to The Times, he acknowledged the need for controls, but 
stressed that integration was not helped by controls if 
those controls were based on colour as The Times argued 
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that they were. 35 
in 1967 there was a debate in the Church Assembly 
(forerunner of the General Synod) on immigration and race. 
A discussion document published prior to the debate is 
illuminating. It stated baldly that 'if they (colopred 
people] are considered as a problem as distinct from an 
oPportunityO the chances of their ever feeling at home in 
Britain are remote' . 
36 The Bishop of Durham's 
contribution to the debate was representative of its 
general feeling: 
'We must never think of immigrants as problems. We 
ought to see them as possible fellow-workers in 
building ua mul ý ti-racial and multi-religious 
community. 3 
The resolution carried at this debate included support for 
the Labour Government's intention to w. iden the scope of 
the 1965 Race Relations Act to include discrimination in 
the areas of housing and employment. 38 
Church reaction to Labour's proposal to limit Kenyan 
Asian immigration from East Africa by the 1968 common- 
wealth Immigration Act was predictably hostile. The 
Bishop of Woolwich, John Robinson , resigned 
from the 
Labour Party as a result, and applied to join the Liberal 
Party instead, largely because he believed the Liberals' 
policies on immigration were more principled. 
39 A 
Staffordshire vicar tore up his British passport during a 
sermon and threw the pieces from the pulpit; he was quoted 
as saying, 'The whole thing stinks and nobody can any 
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longer be proud of being British'. 40 In Birmingham 
cathedral, a lone bell tolled at midnight on 28 February 
1968. Pulling the bell was Bishop Sinker, Provost of 
Birmingham, and inside the Cathedral an hour-long vigil 
was held in sorrow at Britain's broken promises to the 
Kenyan Asians. 41 
During the Bill's debate in the House of Lords, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury spoke for the Established Church 
in opposition to the new i=igration controls. He argued 
that already the Bill: 
'has brought a 
who are working 
relations and a 
the i=igrant c 
are trying so 
work 1 .4 
good deal of dismay to many of those 
in this country for good community 
good deal of distrust not only among 
ommunities ... but also among those who hard to get on with this devoted 
The Bill, he said, 'virtually distinguishes United Kingdom 
citizens on the score of race' . 
43 Lord soper, the well 
known Methodist peer, also condemned the Bill; in his 
view,, policy must be aimed towards achieving Ia decent 
multi-racial society in these islands'. 44 Instead, the 
Bill was 'a racial measure', and as such, wrong. 
45 He 
rejected arguments that the British economy would suf f er 
unless immigration was limited further: ' ... we have no 
sufficient evidence that the problem which we face is pre- 
eminently an economic problem. 
eminently a social problem' . 
46 
I believe that it is pre- 
All the Bishops and non- 
conformist representatives voted against the Government on 
the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Bill. 47 
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If the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Bill was greeted 
with distaste by many of the churches' leadership, even 
greater distaste was evident in their reaction to Enoch 
Powell's "rivers of blood" speech, which called for an end 
to immigration and the introduction of repatriation of 
immigrants. Church leaders' dislike of Powell's views was 
sharpened by the fact that Powell was a practising 
Anglican. Powell not only rejected the church 
leadership's views on immigration and racial matters, he 
also rejected their assumption that their views 
represented "Christian" politics. Canon John Collins, 
Precentor of St Paul's Cathedral, roundly condemned Enoch 
Powell for his views on race which had, he argued, an evil 
influence on society, and also separated Christianity and 
politics. 48 A televised debate occurred in October 1969, 
between Powell and perhaps his most vociferous critic in 
the church, Tre'vor Huddleston, Bishop of Stepney. 49 
Powell argued that there was nothing particularly 
unchristian about his own views and that it was his duty 
to represent his constituents' opinions and point to 
dangers which he foresaw in society-50 Huddlestone's 
reply criticised Powell on various counts: 
'I quite understand from your [Powell's] point of view 
that you have got to take account of people's views 
and opinions. I believe you are mistaken. I believe 
that Britain today, as a matter of f act , has got 
f ar 
more tolerant people in it on this issue of race than 
You give reason to suppose, from your speeches, and I believe it to be the duty of a responsible politician to build on this tolerance and not to increase the 
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intolerance, which is certainly there. '51 
The British Council of Churches, at its 1969 meeting in 
Plymouth, issued a detailed statement of its views on 
immigration and race relations. 52 Recent public debate 
(i. e. Powell's speeches) was said to have 'considerably 
retarded' good race relations. 53 The statement attacked 
the Conservative Party and Powell's views in th, is area: 
'Speeches and statements such as these underline yet 
again the urgent necessity for developing a positive 
immigration policy in place of the piecemeal and often 
panic legislation that has been resorted to in the 
past to deal with so-called "crises" which need never 
have arisen had there been adequate forward planning. 
The development of such a policy should be a matter of 
concern to every citizen in Britain, especially since 
public discussion of these issues is likely to 
increase as the next general election approaches. 
There is a particular need to challenge the assumption 
that the presence of immigrants is in itself a 
"problem" and that the size of the problem is related 
to the size of the immigrant community. 
There are of course social problems. The presence of 
immigrants has highlighted such problems as housing, 
education and the shortage of hospital and transport 
staff. But these are not accurately described as 
immigrant problems., 54 
In contrast to the hostile reception given to Powell's 
views and the 1968 Commonwealth Immigration Act, the 
church leadership warmly welcomed the 1968 Race Relations 
Act. In the House of Lords, the Archbishop of Canterbury 
saw the Bill as one aspect of the fight to create good 
community relations, and he gave his support to Labour 
Home Secretary, Roy Jenkins' ideal of good race relations: 
'I see this Bill as a necessary item in the immense 
efforts that we need to be making to get good 
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community relations, which have been described as 
"equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity 
in an atmosphere of tolerance". if that is to be, it 
calls for a delicate balance between the readiness of 
newcomers in any community to adapt themselves to that 
community and the readiness of those already in the 
community to accept differences of outlook and to be 
very sympathetic and tolerant., 55 
He commended the work of the National committee for 
Commonwealth Immigrants (NCCI) , of which he was Chairman - 
The NCCI had heavily emphasised the need for education of 
the public, for which the Archbishop praised them, and 
added, 
'Of course, the work of education includes helping the 
immigrant communities to understand things about this 
country which they badly need to know and understand, 
and also helping our community generally to know what 
, ell a is the contribution that some immigrant communit es 
have been giving to our economy and culture-956 
He concluded: 'I believe that the help which this Bill 
gives to the building up of good community relations in 
this country will be a contribution which our country can 
57 make to racial harmony in the world at large'O 
Just as they opposed the 1968 Commonwealth immigration 
Act, so the churches strongly opposed the Bill which was 
to become the 1971 Commonwealth Immigration Act. The 
Archbishop of Canterbury spoke against the Bill in the 
House of Lords, and rejected the Government's claim that 
they had a popular mandate for it. 58 He said that he 
would vote against the Bill because it was unnecessary and 
damaging, and would ham community relations; he added: 
'And in recent years we have been discovering more and 
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more that good community relations do not entirely look 
after themselves'. 59 
The Archbishop cited with approval the views of the 
Chairman of the Community Relations commission, namely 
that the Bill would increase f ears and insecurity in the 
community. Ramsey added: 
'What are the fears, my Lords, which create bad 
relations? There is, on the one side, the fear of our 
own resident white population, that the influx of a 
large increase of Commonwealth immigrants will bring 
with it a proliferation of social problems ... There 
is, 
on the other side, the fear of minorities of finding 
themselves regarded as second class citizens; the fear 
of being regarded as a kind of "problem citizen"., 60 
The Bishop of Coventry also joined the debate, opposing 
the Bill with the argument that it was both unnecessary 
and harmful to community relations. He concluded by 
saying: 
'In closing, I cannot help feeling that there are in 
this country far too many people who still regard 
immigrants as an unhappy necessity; who treat them as 
second-class citizens, and who -I must put it bluntly 
- would not be at all unhappy if all of them were to 
be asked to go home within the course of the next few 
years ... This seems to me a total misunderstanding of what in past centuries has been one of the glories of 
this country - the ability to absorb other races and the people of other nations, using the particular 
contribution which they have brought with them to 
enrich our own, so that together we have formed a 
finer community than was in existence before they 
came. We must endeavour to take from people the 
purely negative attitude to immigration aýd supplant 
it with a positive concept of a multi-cultural, multi- 
racial family, vibrant with life and rich with many- 
sided culture. t6l 
OPposition to the 1971 Bill was also the British Council 
of Churches' stance; it also argued that the Bill was 
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unnecessary and would increase racial tension. 62 In 1973 
a joint delegation from the British Council of Churches 
and the church of England met David Lane, Home office 
Minister for Immigration Matters. The delegation told him 
that the Act was 'immoral and liable to produce a 
permanently damaging effect on relations with the 
immigrant communities'. 63 
In contrast to their reaction to the Conservatives' 
1971 immigration control act, the churches gave their 
blessing to Labour's 1976 Race Relations Act. The Act 
came at a time of rising success and publicity f or the 
National Front, and the church leaders saw this 
legislation as a valuable aid to fighting such activity. 
The churches warmly welcomed the 1976 Race Relations Act. 
The Bishop of Worcester, Robert Woods, spoke for the 
Established Church at the Second Reading of the Bill in 
the Lords. He welcomed the agreement between the major 
parties about the aim of policy in this area, but lamented 
the lack of Government effort put into welcoming 
immigrants to Britain: 
'... though we have a unity of approach, yet Government Ministries such as Housing, Employment and Education, have not produced programmes and resources to enable this new minority to find an equal and tolerable 
position in our society., 64 
The role of the churches, he said, was clear: 
'I find myself with my colleagues in the churches as 
we come to this new Bill, asking certain basic 
questions of it. Will the minority ethnic groups 
share equality of opportunity the better? Will the 
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new legislation enable the minorities to feel that 
they belong to the British community? Will the new 
instrument that is proposed aid in the development of 
a harmonious society? Basic questions such as t9 ese I 
believe that we in the churches have to ask... o6 
The Bishop hoped that the Bill would aid cultural values, 
for: 
'The cultural structures of many of the minority 
community among us are matters f or which we can be 
thankful. In a sense, the Festival of Islam has shown 
something of what can now become a cultural asset in 
this country; it is just one of the varieties of 
culture that can now bring more colour and interest to 
the otherwise rather drab and monotonous existence 
that is already the lot of so many. t66 
Similar sentiments were made by the Archbishop of 
Canterbury, Dr Donald Coggan, in his 1976 Christmas Day 
sermon, when he stressed how much black Britons brought to 
Britain: 
'... that man with a skin of a dif f erent colour f rom 
mine could be an enrichment to my life and that of MY 
neighbours, if I would not look upon him as a 
potential foe ... to look upon such people as sources 
of 
enrichment would lower the temperature of racial 
suspicion... 167 
Another important event f or the churches in 1976 was 
the publication by the British Council of Churches of a 
controversial report, The New Black Presence in Britain. 
The report was introduced in a foreword by David Sheppard, 
Anglican Bishop of Liverpool, who wanted the benefits and 
potential of immigrants to be emphasised, rather than the 
problems: 'I go along with the view that black people have 
not brought problems to Britain, but have revealed the 
problems our society already had'. 68 Sheppard argued that 
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the churches should support positive discrimination 
policies, for they reflected God's character: 
'We should argue consistently for the principle of 
positive discrimination and practise it whenever it is 
within our power to do so ... When we argue for positive discrimination in favour of groups in the greatest 
need, other groups will grumble that it's not fair. 
They want even-handed justice to be fair. This 
becomes very plain in times of economic cut-back; cuts 
"across the board" appear to be fair. But such cuts 
deny any concept of priority of needs. If we are to 
reflect the character of the living ... God, we should argue unashamedly for policies which will spend much 
more money, give much more resources to those inner- 
city areas where black people largely live., 69 
The report of the British Council of Churches contained 
similar views; in summarising problems the authors 
observed in the black communities, it noted that there was 
a: 
',,, co-opting of potential leaders [of the black 
communities) into organisations that are intended to 
control discontent and do ambulance welfare work, so 
that they are not available to engage more radically 
with the structures of society which are based on 
exploitation and which create the casualties in the 
first place'. 70 
The Report lamented the poor welcome that the British 
churches had given immigrants: 'Because British churches 
could not welcome these new members and adjust to allow 
their full participation, they themselves are now the 
losers'. 71 The Report was convinced that New commonwealth 
immigrants would be a benefit to Britain: 
'The black presence can offer a new awareness, out of 
its own rich understanding of man in society; it can bring insights and values that have long been eroded 
in the West ... This country has an opportunity for its national character to grow and be renewed on a 
scale such as it has not known for many centuries. 
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This opportunity impels us to repeat one of our basic 
opening questions: "What sort of Britain do we want? " 
Is it to stay as it is, or go backwards, as a society 
which pushes people on to the margins and condemns 
them to remain at the bottom of a heap? or can 
Britain take the opportunity to accept a further phase 
of change? 172 
The New Black Presence was generally welcomed by 
church leaders, although it was too extreme for some. The 
Church of England's Board for Social Responsibility was 
divided in its reaction to the British Council of 
Churches' Report, and published a report of its own: 
Britain as a Multi-Racial and multi-Cultural Soci2ty; it 
was published just prior to a General synod debate on the 
Council of Churches' Report. 73 A spokesman for the Board 
said that the major purpose of the debate on Synod was to 
identify the Church of England publicly with the ideal of 
a multi-racial and multi-cultural society, and to press 
the Government to adopt positive discrimination towards 
coloured immigrants and their dependants. The Synod 
agreed a motion commending these aims. 74 
Very similar views were apparent in a statement made 
by the British Council of Churches against racism and the 
National Front, issued in 1977. One of its points was: 
'We recognise that Britain is now a pluralist society 
of varied races, cultures and religions; we must 
respect those who practise different religions and 
adhere to different styles of life; a varied society 
offers new opportunities to us all., 75 
The churches were united in their opposition to the 
Conservative Government's 1981 British Nationality Act. 
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This opposition was first seen in a document from the 
Roman Catholic Bishops in England and Wales, whose 
proposals were later approved by the Church of England's 
Board for Social Responsibility and the British Council of 
Churches. The document stressed that Britain was now 
'irreversibly a multi-racial and multi-cultural 
society'. 76 The Archbishop of Canterbury, speaking in the 
House of Lords and, he suggested, for many British church 
leaders, strongly opposed the Bill. He argued that 'the 
Bill does not seem to spell out the securities of 
citizenship within the multi-racial society that this 
society has now become'. 77 He made clear what he believed 
the Act should do: 
'I recognise there are evil f orces ,*f rom lef t and 
right, ready to play on people's fears and to stir up 
divisions, but we must not present them with any 
material to do so. What is needed, above all, from a 
new British Nationality Act is reassurance; 
reassurance that could only be provided by a measure 
the basis of which is seen to be equality of respect 
and regard. '78 
Lord Scarman's report on the Brixton riots received 
enthusiastic backing f rom the churches; in the House of 
Lords, the Archbishop of Canterbury supported early 
implementation of Scarman's proposals. 79 The Archbishop 
questioned whether the blame for the riots could be 
explained by poor social conditions alone, and expressed 
his own feelings on the nature of society: 
'Unemployment and bad housing certainly play a major 
part in fuelling discontent which erupts into 
riot.. . [but] all societies are flawed by fundamental 
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failures, selfishness, aggression and the lust for 
power over others. 180 
He also supported Lord Scarman's recommendations of 
special help for black Britons: 
'Whatever may be the pros and cons of reverse 
discrimination, it is surely right that special effort 
should be made to give deprived sections of our 
community, whether black or white, the education and 
training opportunities which will enable them to 
compete on an equal level with young people in more 
prosperous areas. 181 
The Archbishop also noted the stress on "community" in 
discussion of Lord scarman's report and he emphasised the 
role the churches had to play in building such a 
community: 
'In the debate over this report the concept of "community" is constantly invoked. What precisely is 
this "community" which we are seeking to involve and 
represent? One of the difficulties of work in the 
inner cities is precisely that the sense of community 
has disintegrated... 
Now communities are not built of' sympathetic 
legislation. The scarman recommendations will act as 
scaffolding. We have to look for'ways of replacing 
the bricks and mortar of a community; the floors and 
walls we have allowed to crumble. A real community is 
not even built on better housing or more jobs; it is 
built on the way in which people treat each other. 
I regard the churches in Brixton and in other inner 
city areas as vital agents in this fundamental 
community building., 82 
conclusion 
Close examination of the values of church leaders evident 
in their response to events in British race politics 
reveals that these values are central to the secular 
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liberal response associated with the Labour and Liberal 
Parties and race relations bodies. 83 The record of the 
churches in this area of policy is therefore of 
considerable importance to a study of liberal values on 
immigration and race relations. 
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Chapter Five: The Indigenous_Population 
The values of the liberal tradition have led its supporters 
to welcome New Commonwealth immigration, to accept 
immigration control with great reluctance, and to give warm 
support to initiatives to foster good race relations and 
assist black Britons. The reactions of the majority of the 
white British population towards New commonwealth 
immigration have taken a quite different form. The 
majority of white Britons have viewed immigration as an 
unwelcome phenomenon from its conception, and have been 
unenthusiastically ambivalent towards measures forbidding 
racial discrimination and promoting race relations. 
The policies adopted on immigration and race relations 
during the period 1961-81 have therefore often seen a 
division between the majority of the white British 
population and many politicians and leaders of opinion. 
The variance between the opinions of ordinary citizens and 
political leaders has been widely commented upon. 1 Such a 
division of values has several implications for liberal 
policy and attitudes, and it is therefore important to 
review the evidence for such a divergence of opinion. 
Assessing the reactions of the population of a country 
towards certain events or an area of politics is rarely 
straightforward or simple. Unlike political leaders and 
opinion formers, the typical citizen does not make speeches 
or write pamphlets or books in order to broadcast his 
views. To assess the opinions of the general public, 
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recourse must be made to public opinion polls and to 
recognised political phenomena which bear closely on the 
matters involved. Public opinion polls provide very useful 
information as to the public's views of political isauesi 
poll results, however, are for a number of reasons unlikely 
to be entirely accurate. Factors such as the wording of 
questions, the representativeness of those polled within a 
region or between regions, the complexity of an issue and 
its recent political saliency are likely to affect the 
results obtained. 
Gallup, for example, in May 1977 asked the following 
question: 'The law on incitement to racial hatred used to 
require proof of intent to stir up racial hatred. Now it 
is an offence to use threatening, abusive or insulting 
language in circumstances where hatred against a racial 
group is likely to be stirred up. Do you think this is 
fair or unfair? '2 It would seem very unlikely that most 
people would have sufficient knowledge of the law* (the 
1936 Public order Act and the 1965 and 1976 Race Relations 
Acts)* principles of intent and public order to give a 
reasoned answer to such a question. 
Another complex issue is the degree to which opinions 
are, or can be, "manufactured". For example, a poll 
reviewed later in this chapter was conducted after a speech 
by Mrs Thatcher in which she appeared to support the need 
for repatriation; 59% of respondents favoured such a 
policy. However, this figure is capable of varying 
interpretation: it could be argued that Mrs Thatcher's 
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speech shaped public opinion and created this response. 
This type of argument is attractive to liberals, since they 
typically attach much importance to a view of people as 
having their ideas and behaviour shaped by their environ- 
ment. Conversely, it could be argued that the figure 
underestimatýd true support for repatriation policies. 
Since 1968 when Enoch Powell brought the idea of 
repatriation to public prominence, there has been an all- 
party consensus amongst established political opinion that 
repatriation as a policy is both immoral and impractical. 
Poll respondents may have reacted to this by believing that 
there was slight chance of repatriation policies being 
enacted, and therefore that there was little point in 
supporting them. Furthermore, some authorities suggest 
that opinion poll data underestimates genuine opinion on 
such "unrespectable" issues. 3 
For these and other reasons, poll results sh'ould be 
viewed with some caution. 4 Neverthelesst intelligently 
conducted opinion polls can be a very accurate indication 
of public opinion; this is perhaps especially the case if 
the evidence from a number of polls over several years 
points in the same direction. Above allt polls. provide 
information which it would be very difficult# perhaps 
impossible, to obtain in any other way. The reactions of 
white Britons to the issues raised in the race policy area 
can be assessed with varying degrees of confidence. Where 
the issue is relatively simple and easily understood, such 
as opinion on New Commonwealth immigration to Britain, poll 
180 
results are consistent over time and reveal clear and 
unambiguous opinions amongst those polled. When poll 
questions ask about how black Britons should be treated in 
various circumstances, results are less clear and appear to 
be affected by the form of questions, and key words 
employed in them. 
This chapter examines some of the evidence of the 
opinions of white Britons towards race issues. Topics such 
as immigration control, repatriation and racial 
discrimination are considered. A deliberate omission is 
any consideration of support for the National Fronte a 
party which has made its opposition to immigration and race 
relations measures most explicit. * The National Front has 
had some support, particularly in areas of high 
concentration of black Britons, but it has never attracted 
major public support. For this reason it is not included 
in this study. 5 
Immigration to Britain by members of the New Commonwealth 
began to gather momentum during the late 1940s and the 
1950s. As numbers of immigrants increased, so it seems 
that white Britons' reluctance to allow immigration also 
increased. 
The table below reproduces some poll results from the 
1950s. The 1951 poll asked, 'Provided there is plenty of 
work about, do you think that more people should be 
encouraged to come and work here? ' The 1956 poll asked a 
similar question, but the 1958 and 1961 polls asked whether 
immigration should be controlled or not, 6 
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The results were as follows: 
1951 1956 1958 1961 
(MayY 
'Yes' 38 37 21 21 
'Yes, provided there is work' etc. 8 35 
'No' /Immigration to be controlled 38 18 65 73 
other answers 10 9 
'Don't know' 6 1 14 6 
The results of the poll suggest that opposition to 
immigration increased through the 1950s. opposition appears 
to have hardened in 1958; it may be that the racial 
disturbances in Nottingham and London in that year acted as 
a catalyst for this opposition. The Daily Express 
published a poll at the time of the 1958 disturbances and 
the results indicated strong support. for controlling 
immigration$ with 79.1% of a national sample favouring 
immigration control and 81.5% of a London sample favouring 
control. 7 Another survey in 1960 found that over 80% of 
both Labour and Conservative supporters favoured 
restriction of New Commonwealth immigration. 8 
Donley Studlar has summarised the findings of various 
opinion polls on immigration control from the late 1950s to 
the early 1970s. 9 He suggests that two factors in 
particular are striking about the findings: firstly, the 
strength of the opinions expressed, and secondly, the 
consistency of the opinions expressed over the period 
concerned. There was some variation in the form of 
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questions used, but the basic form was, 'Do you approve or 
disapprove of Government controlling immigration? ' Figures 
favouring the control of immigration ranged from a high of 
87% in August 1965, to a low of 57% in September 197ý, the 
mean figure being 69.5%. 
Very similar findings were reported by Butler and Stokes 
in their survey. 10 The authors found that half their 
respondents felt "very strongly" about commonwealth 
immigration, while a third felt "fairly strongly". 
Respondents were asked, 'Do you think that too many 
immigrants have been let into this country or not? ' The 
question was asked five times in the period from the summer 
of 1963 until the summer of 1970, and the percentage of 
respondents answering "too many" varied from a low of 81% 
in the spring of 1966, to a high of 87% in the summer of 
1969. Butler and Stokes concluded that during the period 
of their survey, '... strong and overwhelmingly hostile 
attitudes towards immigrants were quite general in the 
country'. 11 
Ivor Crewe, drawing upon the material obtained by Butler 
and Stokes together with other later materiali presented 
the following table: 12 
Q. 'Do you think too many immigrants have been let into 
this country or not? 
If 'yes': 'How strongly do you feel about this? Very 
strongly, fairly strongly or not very strongly? ' 
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The results of these questions are below: 
column percentages 
1963 1964 1966 1970 1974 1979 
Feels very strongly 
that there are too 
many immigrants 45 46 46 43 40 
Feels fairlY strongly 
that there are too 
many immigrants 87 29 28 28 29 35 
Too many immigrants 
but doesn't feel 
very strongly 12 11 11 
Not too many 
immigrants 13 14 15 15 14 14 
Similar findings are available for the period in the late 
1970s. An extensive NOP survey in February 1978 of the 
indigenous population's views found 86% of respondents 
believing that too many immigrants had been allowed to 
enter Britain. 13 Majorities of over 75% were against the 
admission of parents, children over 18 years, fiance(e)s 
and brothers and sisters of black Britons already settled 
in Britain. 14 In 1978 Mrs Thatcher made a well-publicised 
speech about race issues, a speech which became known as 
her "swamping speech". The speech appeared to herald a 
new, tough Conservative Party policy on immigration in 
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which Mrs Thatcher hinted at repatriation. 15 In the month 
after the speech, the level of Conservative Party support 
as measured by opinion polls moved from being 2% behind the 
Labour Party to being, for a short timej 11% ahead-16 
A remarkable feature of this evidence of public opinion 
is its apparent consistency. A question asked repeatedly 
from May 1959 to September 1972 concerned respondents' 
feelings towards coloured immigrants; it asked# 'What about 
your own feelings? Are they more favourable, less 
favourable or the same? ' A majority of respondents 
answered that their feelings remained the same, ranging 
from a high of 64% in December 1964 to a low of 54% in May 
1959, with a mean figure of 59%. 17 
Donley Studlar suggests that the first national opinion 
poll to include a question about repatriation was conducted 
in March 1968, just prior to Enoch Powell's 'rivers of 
blood' speech. 18 At this time, 59% of respondents 
supported measures to encourage repatriation; the mean 
figure of those supporting repatriation in the period March 
1968 to September 1972 was 56.6%. 19 The 1978 NOP survey 
conducted shortly after Mrs Thatcher's "swamping" speech 
also tackled the question of repatriation, and asked 
repondents, 'Do you think coloured immigrants who are 
already here should be encouraged to go home or notV 59% 
1 
of a national sample of respondents answered "yes" to this 
question, 20 whilst 58% of respondents supported 
government-financed assistance to repatriate immigrants. 21 
No review of the indigenous population's opinions on 
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immigration and race would be complete without discussion 
of support for Enoch Powell. In April 1968 Powell# a 
member of the Conservative Shadow Cabinet, made his "rivers 
of blood" speech in which he called for an almost complete 
halt to New Commonwealth immigration together with measures 
to repatriatý black Britons. 22 The period '1966 to 1968 
has been characterised as the "liberal hour", a time when 
liberal policies in the area of race politics were widely 
accepted amongst members of the British political 
leadership. 23 There was an all-party consensus to the 
effect that the race issue had been successfully dealt with 
by the immigration control measures of 1962 and 1965 and 
the 1965 Race Relations Act. In his speech, Enoch Powell 
broke this consensus and spoke out, he saidl for the 
ordinary man in the street. 24 
The reaction to Powell's speech was astounding: from 
having been a relatively obscure Conservative politician, 
Powell shot to public prominence. A Gallup poll in March 
1968, prior to Powell's speech, found that only 1% of 
respondents saw Powell as the best man to lead the 
Conservative Party. After the speech, in April 1968j the 
number supporting Powell as the best person to lead the 
Conservative Party had risen to 24%. 25 Powell received 
over one hundred thousand letters of support after his 
"rivers of blood" speech, and about eight hundred of 
opposition. 26 The leader of the Conservative Partyl 
Edward Heath, also received many letters: around 71000, 
most of them in favour of Enoch Powell's views and against 
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Heath's having dismissed Powell from the Shadow Cabinet. 27 
Edward Heath's constituency agent was reported as saying 
that after Powell's speech and his dismissal# 'For several 
days the telephone rang in this office all day with people 
from all over the country shouting obscenities'. 28 Mps 
were treated to a mass demonstration outside the Houses Of 
Parliament by London dockers and market porters, in 
vociferous support of Powell's views on immigrationt and 
there were token strikes throughout the country in his 
support. 29 
Public reaction to Powell's speech, as measured by 
opinion polls, was very firmly in support of his views. 
Interviewees were asked whether they agreed or disagreed 
with what Powell had said about immigrants. Gallup found 
74% in agreement, ORC found 82%, NOP recorded 67% and the 
Daily Express found 79%. 30 Similar, but slightly lower, 
figures were recorded in support of the opinion that Edward 
Heath was wrong to dismiss Enoch Powell from the Shadow 
Cabinet. 31 Powell was MP for Wolverhampton South west at 
the time, and local reaction also appears to have been 
strongly in his favour. The local evening paper, the 
Wolverhampton Express and Star, received 51000 letters in 
support of Powell, and 300 against. A further postcard 
poll organised by the paper produced 35,000 cards in 
support of Powell and only a small number against. 32 
A particular feature of support for Enoch Powell was that 
it was based on a single issue, that of immigration, race 
relations and repatriation, and apparently oblivious to 
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Powell's opinions on any other political or economic 
issue. 33 There is a considerable amount of evidence 
regarding the sort of people who supported Powell's views 
on immigration. Spearman's largely impressionistic 
assessments from a survey of the letters in support of 
Powell have been confirmed by more detailed study. 34 As 
Schoen notes: 'Powellites are distinctive for their lack of 
dictinctiveness, they form a oe. national constituency'. 35 
Studlarr reviewing the poll data on the indigenous 
population's response to immigration argues similarly that 
there was no strong link between opinion on immigration and 
social circumstances, and that similar views were 
widespread among white Britons. 36 According to Spearman 
at least, Powellites were concerned not so much about the 
racial characteristics of the newcomers but about changes 
in British culture. Spearman quotes o. ne letter-writer as 
expressing typical views: 
'No Briton wants to see his traditional way of living, 
the country he has loved and fought forp lose its 
identity and particular character through the over great 
acceptance of too many peoples of quite different 
cultures and ways of life. '37 
Powell was very active during the 1970 General Election 
campaign, where his views on racial issues attracted much 
publicity. He argued for voluntary repatriation, an end to 
all coloured immigrationt and a new nationality law to 
identify 'British citizens. The Conservative Party's 
victory in 1970? which was somewhat unexpected, may have 
owed something to Powell's popularity. He was a leading 
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Conservative, chiefly associated with popular policies on 
race and immigration, and may well have led the 
Conservative Party to be publicly identified as the 
toughest party on the politics of race. For several years, 
owing to the bipartisan consensus on racial matters# many 
voters had found it hard to distinguish between the major 
parties' position on immigration control. 38 Powell's 
breach of this bipartisan consensus and widespread 
publicity may well have associated the Conservative Party 
with his views, in spite of Edward Heath's evident lack of 
support for Powell. The influence of Powell on the 1970 
General Election result has been a matter of some dispute; 
some have argued that Powell's activity had little 
effect. 39 However, an academic consensus appears to have 
been formed to support the view that Powell's view on 
immigration, undoubtedly popular, made a substantial 
contribution to the Conservative victory in 1970.40 
Evidence of the indigenous population's reactions to 
immigration from the New Commonwealth is reasonably 
straightforward; harder to assess are reactions to black 
Britons settled in Britain. Different polls have produced 
differing and sometimes conflicting results. There is also 
a dilemma in that some research finds tolerant and 
sympathetic attitudes amongst white Britons to their black 
counterparts, whilst other research yields evidence of 
extensive racial discrimination against black Britons. It 
seems likely that there is a distinction between people's 
attitudes, or professed attitudes, and their behaviour in 
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this area. 41 Just as a smoker may believe that smoking is 
harmful to health, but continue to smoket it seems that 
interviewees have been content to agree to principles of 
equal treatment for black Britons, and yet practise 
discrimination. 
Furthermore, those of a liberal background have sometimes 
emphasised tolerant attitudes which they have found to 
argue that whilst white Britons opposed coloured 
immigration, they were nevertheless sympathetic to black 
Britons settled in this country. There has been a 
reluctance to accept the argument that many white Britons 
are resentful of the presence of black Britons in Britain. 
As Professor Rose has remarked, 'English politicians have 
long prided themselves on their tolerance, and do not wish 
to admit that discrimination can occur in England'. 42 A 
good example of this phenomenon concerns the Community 
Relations Commission's 1974 and 1975 survey of opinions on 
racial matters. The survey was published shortly before 
the debates on what became the 1976 Race Relations Act, and 
the Commission wrote of their findings: 
'***we hoped to be able to show that the extremists do 
not speak for the silent majority, and that the bulk Of 
the population would be more than willing to support 
positive Government action than some politicians might 
suppose. 143 
It seems evident that opinion polls on attitudes to 
immigrants living in Britain met with greater technical 
problems than polls on immigration itself; other political 
issues often entered the arena. For example, a question 
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such as 'Do you favour measures to improve racial harmony? ' 
may produce many positive replies based on simple prudence; 
most people wish to live in a peaceful society. obviously 
the phrasing of questions is a matter of great 
significance. In Chapter Seven below it is suggested that 
some of the evidence and apparent discrepancies in this 
area can be explained in terms of the "free rider" problem. 
one of the best known surveys is contained in the major 
work Colour and Citizenship, published in 1969-44 A 
survey in this study had as one of its aims the measurement 
of colour prejudice in the indigenous population; its 
findings were that only 10% of white Britons were 
"prejudiced", 17% were "prejudice inclined"l 38% were 
"tolerant inclined" and 35% were "tolerant". 45 As a later 
chapter in the study noted: 
'the extent of tolerance in Britain cannot be stressed 
too often... what is needed in short is not an effort to 
make people unprejudiced, but rather to remind them that 
they are unprejudiced. '46 [Italics in original]. 
Despite the study's publication soon after the phenomenon 
of Powellism had arisen, it argued that the majority of the 
indigenous population were tolerant and favoured good race 
relations. Dilip Hiro notes that a survey by Political and 
Economic Planning at the same time found widespread 
discrimination against black Britons by the indigenous 
population. Hiro suggests: 
'Put together the two surveys were saying this: there is 
massive discrimination against coloured people by whites, 73 per cent of whom are "tolerant" or "tolerant inclined". 147 
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The conclusions of the Colour and Citizenshi12 survey have 
been seriously and convincingly challengedl largely on 
grounds of the methodology -used. The sociologist Daniel 
Lawrence has described the survey's conclusions as 
'completely discredited'. 48 Accurate measurement of 
abstract qualities of "prejudice" and "tolerance" is 
fraught with methodological difficulties. Lawrence 
suggests that the categories used in the colour and 
Citizenship survey were completely arbitrary; his re- 
examination of some of the original data upon which the 
survey was based has found very different results. For 
example# Lawrence found that 61.1% of respondents felt that 
Indians and Pakistanis took more out of Britain than they 
contributedl whilst 65.1% thought this about West Indians; 
only 38% of respondents felt this about Greek immigrants. 49 
Respondents were also asked whether they thought colour 
would ever become unimportant to the way people vievied each 
other; 62% of those interviewed thought that colour would 
always be important, and as few as 8% believed that colour 
would become unimportant at some time in the future-50 In 
view of these methodological problems, it is apparent that 
evidence on public opinion produced in this survey in 
Colour and Citizenship must be dismissed as being 
unreliable. 
Two surveys which indicate the difficulties involved in 
this area were published in 1976 and 1977. Alan Marsh 
published data which foundo he argued, that the indigenous 
population was very' hostile to black Britons. 51 The 
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Community Relations Commission responded with a survey of 
its own, with much more optimistic findings that many 
people were not particularly concerned about race relations 
and immigration. 52 
A survey conducted by NOP for the Community Relations 
Commission was carried out in 1974 and 1975# and published 
the following year, immediately prior to the introduction 
of the 1976 Race Relations Act# under the title, 'Some of 
My Best Friends... 153 The survey attempted to assess 
people's opinions on racial matters, and the results 
justified the conclusion of the Commission for Racial 
Equality# that measures to improve race relations were 
largely supported. 54 The survey concluded that white 
respondents distinguished clearly between the issues of 
immigration and race relations measures, immigration 
producing a hostile response from many, whilst race 
relations measures were given approval. 55 However, the 
survey did not include a specific question about 
respondents' views on immigration, other than asking 
interviewees how many coloured immigrants they believed had 
entered Britain the previous year. 56 It is apparent that 
the survey employed techniques which were likely to produce 
positive reactions to race relations measures. For 
examplel Table 23A of the survey lists respondents' 
spontaneous, unprompted suggestions of ways to improve race 
relations. 57 Arguments which the evidence cited earlier 
in this chapter suggests was important to many people, 
produced very low figures; for example, 7% of respondents 
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spontaneously suggested immigration control, and 4% 
suggested "sending immigrants back" as methods to improve 
race relations. Table 23B shows the numbers who reacted to 
prompted ideas to improve race relations; the suggestion of 
scentres to help immigrants with language problems' 
received 88% support, whilst the suggestion that 'the law 
should be strengthened to prevent discrimination on the 
basis of colourl received support of only 52%. 58 However , 
neither of the spontaneously-suggested $@stop 
immigration/send immigrants back" categories was included 
in the suggested methods of improving race relations. 
Differences between these figures suggest variances 
produced by prompted and unprompted questions# and 
seriously undermine the accuracy of the results of this 
survey. 59 A survey immediately after the 1979 General 
Election, for example, directly ask*ed respondents if 
stopping immigration was the best way to improve race 
relationsi and found 51% in agreement. 60 An NOP survey of 
1978 asked. respondents 'What would you say is the most 
important problem facing Britain today? ' and found that 50% 
of respondents named immigration and race relations. 61 
However, this poll was taken after Mrs Thatcher's 
it swamping" speech cited above, when she hinted at much 
tougher legislation on immigration. These issues were 
obviously'politically salient at the time. 
It seems best to conclude that an assessment of the 
indigenous population's reactions to black Britons is 
difficult to establishe and that much of the evidence 
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available is conflicting. It is cleart however, that there 
was a lack of consensus in the attitudes of white Britons 
to their black counterparts. Gallup asked respondents in 
1968, 'Do you think that on the whole this country has 
benefited or been harmed through immigrants coming to 
settle here from the Commonwealth? ' some 16% of 
respondents believed that Britain had benefitedl and 61% 
felt that it had been harmed by immigration. Four years 
later, in 1972,, the responses were 20% and 47% 
respectively-62 A NOP survey in 1976 found that white 
Britons, when asked what effects black Britons had upon 
Britain, replied as follows: 45% saw them as harmfult 23% 
saw them as making no difference, and 20% believed that 
they were beneficial. 63 
A number of studies have found evidence of extensive 
racial discrimination in Britain. Three surveys 
particularly of note have been carried out by political and 
Economic Planning (PEP)t and the body which succeeded it# 
the Policy Studies Institute (PSI). The first PEP survey 
centred on six English towns and sought to establish how 
much racial discrimination existed against New Commonwealth 
immigrants. Its findings were that extensive 
discrimination was in existence. 64 The second survey in 
1974 found that racial discrimination was not simply the 
result of intentional acts of discrimination, but often an 
unintentional result of certain practices in Britain 
against black immigrants. Such indirect discrimination 
sometimes derived, it was arguedr from social practices 
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which predated New Commonwealth immigration. 65 This report 
was influential in the drawing up of the Labour 
Government's Race Relations Act of 19761 which forbade 
indirect racial discrimination. 
The third survey conducted in 1982 by PEP, found that 
people of Asian and West Indian origin occupied a 
disproportionately low place in British society. The 
survey saw this as a result, amongst other things, of 
varying educational backgrounds amongst black workers, the 
difficulties of Asian workers with the English language, 
the concentration of coloured immigrants in certain areas, 
and direct and indirect racial discrimination. 66 The 
survey concluded that inequalities in this area were based 
on three problems: 
'First, it is clear that racialism and direct racial 
discrimination continue to have a powerful impact on the 
lives of black people. Second, the position of the black 
citizens of Britain largely remain, geographically and 
economically, that allocated to them as immigrant workers 
in the 1950s and 1960s. Third, it is still the case that 
the organisations and institutions of British society 
have policies and practices that additionally 
disadvantage black people because they frequently take no 
account of the cultural differences between groups with 
different ethnic origins. 167 
When white Britons are asked questions about laws 
forbidding racial discrimination, their answers tend to 
vary considerably with the phrasing the questions employ, 
and possibly, their interpretation of the answers expected. 
General questions about the value of law in this area often 
gain more support than specific questions asking whether 
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racial discrimination should be forbidden in certain 
areas. 68 For example, a 1967 ORC survey found 58% of the 
sample in favour of equal treatment for black Britons in 
housing and employment; when, however, the questions became 
more specific, only 44% thought that it should be made 
illegal to sell or rent a house on racial grounds, whilst 
48% believed it should be illegal to refuse employment on 
the same grounds. 69 
Some ORC polls have been revealing of the inconsistency 
of attitude by many respondents regarding racial matters. 
Several polls asked respondents whether 'coloured people 
settled in this country should be treated differently from 
white people or the same, when applying to join a club'. A 
poll in October 1974 found that 81% favoured equal 
treatment; in April 1976 this figure was 82%, and in 
October 1976,84%, representing a large, and rising, 
majority. However, ORC also asked, 'Do you think the law 
should be changed to make it illegal for [private clubs] to 
refuse membership to people because of their colour? l In 
both 1974 and 1976, only 50% of respondents believed that 
the law should be changed. 71 Respondents were apparently 
unaware of any contradition in their views. Questions 
appear to produce quite different results depending largely 
on the degree of specification mentioned, the more 
generalised the question, the more racially tolerant the 
answers. 
Since the formation in 1962 of the first race relations 
body sponsored by central governmentr the Commonwealth 
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Immigrants Advisory Committee, successive governments have 
put considerable effort into promoting race relations. 
Three Race Relations Acts, successive race relations 
bodies, together with substantial spending on the Urban 
Programme and similar initiatives, testify to this. There 
has been a persistent strand of thinking that race 
relations cannot look after themselves but require positive 
attention in finance, legislation and effort (see Chapter 
Ten below). The leaders of the Labour and Liberal Parties 
and the churches moved, within a period of a few years, 
from opposition to measures controlling immigration, to 
support for such measures and increasingly tight 
restrictions on eligibility. This move, between 1961 and 
1965, has been widely interpreted as a response to the 
strong feelings of the electorate over the issue; 
certainly, by 1965, policy was united in the belief that 
good race relations were dependent on the strength of 
immigration controls. 
Such race relations activity can be interpreted 
variously, but it is apparent that liberal opinion 
acknowledged that the majority of the indigenous population 
viewed immigrants from the New commonwealth with 
resentment. 
Conclusion 
Evidence of the reactions of the indigenous population to 
New Commonwealth immigration and the advent of black 
Britons has been reviewed in this chapter. For a number of 
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reasons this evidence is difficult to assess, but it is 
clear that a large majority consistently viewed immigration 
with hostility. Attitudes to black Britons and their 
treatment in Britain are more blurredt and sometimes 
ambivalent. Whilst there was substantial commitment to the 
principle of equal treatment for black Britons, this 
commitment weakened when specific issues were examined. 
The existence of Government-sponsored race relations 
initiatives supports these contentions, race relations 
measures clearly having been unnecessary if the indigenous 
population had welcomed immigrants wholeheartedly. 
Given the continuing and apparently deeply-felt hostility 
to New Commonwealth immigration 'by white Britons, it was 
unlikely that such attitudes would change once immigrants 
became black Britons. The attitude of the indigenous 
population has been described as 'antagonistic 
acceptance'72, whilst Professor Rose suggests that the 
newcomers are viewed as being 'British Blacks' rather than 
'Black Britons'. 73 
Three conclusions are drawn from this evidence: firstly, 
that the majority of the white British population during 
the period under consideration, wished that New 
Commonwealth immigration had not occurred. Secondly, and 
partly as a consequence of the first conclusiont that there 
was no commitment by the majority of the indigenous 
population to the existence or formation of a multi-racial, 
multi-cultural# and multi-religious community. Thirdly, 
this evidence of the attitudes of the indigenous population 
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towards coloured immigration makes it clear that during 
this period, there was between the opinion of the majority 
of the population, and the liberal values of the political 
leadership and established political opinion in Britain, a 
considerable gulf. 
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Summaryof Part One 
Close study of the reactions of the leaders of the Labour 
Party# Liberal Party, churches and government-sponsored 
race relations bodies reveals a broad consensus of opinion 
on the politics of race. This consensus at one level was a 
dislike of control of immigration from the New 
Commonwealth, together with support for policies to promote 
harmonious race relations. At a deeper level, other 
political attitudes, values and assumptions can be 
identified. 
The view of man contained in this consensus was a social 
determinist one: it saw the behaviour of people as being 
closely related to their social circumstances. The liberal 
consensus expressed much anxiety about the need for 
rational debate and a discussion of the issues raised in 
race politics. The lack of discussion - or presence of 
low-levell irrational discussion - led to much uninformed 
prejudice, which was evidently harmful to racial harmony. 
The remedy for thist the consensus believed, was to be a 
campaign of persuasion and education, to improve the level 
of debate. Part of this desire for improvement expressed 
itself in an appeal to self-interest to achieve rational 
policy. A persistent adherence to the principles of 
equality ran through the consensus, embracing equality 
before the law, equality of opportunity and policies of 
"positive" action. 
Much concern was also expressed about the form that 
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British society should take after the influx ofimmigrants 
from the New Commonwealth. one favoured approach was 
support for policies of a p1mral group-based societyt where 
group culture and membership took on some significance. 
Another favoured approach was that of appeals to the ideal 
of "community" and the existence of' harmonious 
relationships between all peopler particularly people of 
different racial origins. 
The evidence produced in Part One of this study has 
highlighted these ideas as they were demonstrated in race 
politics. Part Two examines these ideas in detail and 
comments on inconsistencies and conflicting values within 
and between them, 
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Chapter Six: A View of Man 
Much liberal reaction to problems in the politics of race 
has been based on an explanation of behaviour by reference 
to the social environment. 1 This form of social 
determinism has placed heavy emphasis on the argument that 
human action and thinking are closely related to the social 
circumstances of the individual. 2 Exposure to external 
social stimuli, it has been assumed, significantly shapes 
both behaviour and beliefs. The discussion below does not 
attempt to assess the accuracy or justification for this 
view; rather it attempýs to identify problems and dilemmas 
which result from holding this view. Several aspects of 
the debate are detailed here to illustrate these social 
determinist assumptions: the opposition of the indigenous 
population to immigration, identification of black Britons 
as being in social need, attempts to create the "correct" 
climate of opinion, programmes to help black Britons and 
analysis of social disorder; all reflect different facets 
of this social determinist argument. 
The assessment of the indigenous population's response to 
large-scale New Commonwealth immigration rested heavily on 
social explanations. Hostility detected on the part of 
white Britons to continued immigration was attributed to 
inadequate social provision, which meant that immigrants 
w ere seen as a threat to the indigenous population's 
security in housing and employment. 3 The first immigration 
control measure, the 1962 commonwealth Immigration Act, was 
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opposed by the Labour and Liberal Parties and the churches; 
they argued that the only genuine problem caused by 
coloured immigration was social, and housing in particular. 
The leader of the Labour Party, Hugh Gaitskell, 4 Liberal 
Party spokesman Jo Grimond. 5 and the Archbishop of 
Canterbury6 were united in viewing immigration from this 
stance. Poor housing, overcrowding and generally 
inadequate social provision, they argued, was the real 
cause for concern, particularly since the majority of 
immigrants had settled in areas already suffering from 
inadequate provision. Since the Bill did not address 
itself to these issues, they found it most unsatisfactory. 
It is clear that they believed that the correct response 
was not immigration control measures, but an initiative by 
the Government to improve the social environment. 
By 1965, however, a consensus had been reached amongst 
established political opinion that some control of New 
Commonwealth immigration was necessary. These controls 
were commonly justified in terms of the social problems 
which would be created by continued immigration at the 
current level. Labour's 1965 White Papere immigration from 
the Commonwealth, affirmed that the presence of immigrants 
had led to various new social problems and tensionsi and 
that action must be taken to alleviate the tension. 7 
Jeremy Thorpe summarised the position of his party during 
its 1965 Annual Conference; he suggested that the major 
problems were attributable to poor housingo health and 
education, which produced friction, and could be overcome 
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with the correct policies. He concluded that these social 
problems were the real cause of racial prejudice-8 The 
Bishop of Liverpool, speaking in the House of Lords in 
December 1964, suggested that social tensions could easily 
give rise to racial tensions, which, having been created, 
would be very difficult to control. 9 
The argument that poor social conditions led to hostility 
between races persisted over the years. The pamphlet 
Labour's 
-Programme: 
1973 argued that moves towards 
integration were required, but were bound to fail whilst 
poor housing, education and employment bred mistrust and 
racial prejudice. 10 The Labour Party's Annual Conference 
in 1976 carried a resolution calling on th e Government to 
alleviate these social problems, which led to racialism-11 
The 1976 Liberal Party Assembly similarly urged the 
Government to make a major effort to improve inner-city 
areas and thereby eradicate the major cause of racial 
problems. 12 
Another, and related, argument in race politics was that 
a "correct" climate of opinion should be created. In this 
viewr immigration control measures were "negative"t whilst 
measures to improve the lives of immigrants already settled 
in Britain were "positive". James Callaghan, for example, 
at the Second Reading of the 1971 Commonwealth Immigration 
Bill, argued that the way to deal with problems of 
immigration was not further controls, but further 
improvements in housing and educational provisions. 13 
David Steel, leading the Liberal attack on the 1968 
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Commonwealth Immigration Billf condemned the lack of a 
positive policy towards immigration; he acknowledged that 
racial tension was increasing but suggested that the only 
way to fight it was through the underlying social 
problems. 14 The Community Relations Commission identified 
a central part of its work of promoting good race relations 
as acting against racial discrimination in housing and 
employment and condescending attitudes towards black 
Britonsp all of which led to a lack of racial harmony-15 
This desire to create a "correct" climate of opinion was 
also strongly evident in the emphasis placed upon a 
persuasive educational campaign (see Chapter Seven below). 
There were many calls for action to educate and persuade 
people towards acceptance of large-scale immigration from 
the New Commonwealth and the creation of a multi-racial 
society. Reaction to Enoch Powell"s speeches further 
illustrates this desire, since the liberal consensus 
believed that Powell's views gained public support on a 
basis of ignorance and intolerance. 
A theme which gathered momentum from the mid-1960s 
onwards was the perception that many black Britons were 
living in poor social conditions which restricted their 
opportunities to participate in society. The solution was 
to improve the social environment by providing better 
housing, 'schooling and employment, and this was the 
rationale behind the Urban Programme. James Callaghan, 
Labour's Home Secretary in 1969, introduced the Bill which 
initiated the Urban Programme, and suggested that the 
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purpose of the Bill was to fight the social problems 
experienced by citizens who, because of these problems, 
were unable to cope. 16 Michael Winstanley, speaking for 
the Liberal Party, said that his Party regretted the 
necessity of such a bill to treat cases of special need; 
that such places existed at all was an indictment of 
Government policy. 17 
Policy in the 1970s emphasised increasingly the effects 
that racial discrimination had upon black Britons. In 
1975# Labour's White Paper Racial Discrimination suggested 
that there might exist a cycle of social disadvantagel to 
which was being added the problem of racial discrimination. 
Such a cycle, the White Paper argued, trapped those caught 
in it and their children, so that escape was almost 
impossible. 18 This emphasis on inadequate social 
provisions was also linked to the idea that such conditions 
led to law breaking. The Community Relations Commission 
asserted in its 1972-73 Report that anti-social behaviour 
was the predictable result of low achievements in education 
and employment coupled with poor housing or even 
homelessness, and that measures must be taken to assess the 
degree of deprivation that immigrants suffered. 19 
The Commission for Racial Equa1ity, in its 1979 Report, 
unhappily prophesied that unless extra funds were supplied 
by the Government for the areas where black Britons were 
concentrated, violence might occur# and would obviously 
harm race relations. 20 It was this same theme which Lord 
Scarman emphasised in his report two years later on the 
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Brixton riots. He cited with approval President Lyndon 
Johnson's Address to the Nation which prefaced the 1968 
United States Report of the National Advisory Commission 
for Civil Disorders. The President had argued that poor 
housing and health, ignorance and discrimination bred both 
an apathy and violence towards the rest of society, and 
must be vigorously attacked; Lord Scarman found himself in 
close agreement with this analysis and saw it as directly 
applicable to Britain. 21 others supported this analysis 
also: the Commission for Racial Equality believed that the 
problems of the inner cities must be solved quickly, 
particularly the needs of young black Britons, in order to 
remove the underlying cause of riots and disorder-22 The 
Liberal Party was also committed to higher spending in the 
inner cities, areas which like Brixton, suffered a type and 
level of stress which was absent from more prosperous 
suburbs. 23 The Labour Party Annual Conference in 1981 
deplored the lack of Government spending against social 
deprivation, and declared that without actiont such 
violence would increase. 24 Roy Hattersley, commenting on 
the Sbarman Report, predicted that a continued lack of 
spending in deprived urban areas would deny equal 
opportunity to Britain's black citizens, whose despair 
could only lead to violence-25 
These arguments indicate the primacy in liberal thinking 
of social determinist assumptions. Human behaviour and 
thought was explained in terms of external social stimuli: 
the hostility of white Britons towards immigration, the low 
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achievement of black Britons and riotous behaviour, were 
viewed as problems created by the social environment; 
reform of the environment was self-evidently the solution. 
Typically these improvements involved policies to increase 
material resources so that housing, education and 
employment opportunities would be enhanced, coupled with a 
persuasiver educational campaign to promote acceptance of 
black Britons by the indigenous population. 
It is difficult, however, to assess the extent to which a 
social determinist interpretation has informed policy in 
this area. Sophisticated contributors to race politics 
have, it appearsp carefully avoided stating a 
straightforward cause and effect relationship between 
social circumstances and behaviour; such a relationship has 
certainly been implied. An example of this difficulty is 
contained in Lord Scarman's report on the Brixton riots of 
1981: he suggested that poor social conditions could never 
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be a justification or excuse for social disorder, but that 
they did form a predisposition for *violent protest against 
an unsympathetic society. 27 It is not clear that Lord 
Scarman's analysis is tenable, however; if people are 
predisposed to rioto there is a suggestion that they could 
not choose not to riot. If, on the other hand, they could 
elect not to protest violently, then social conditions were 
not dictating their actions. 28 Despite his assertion that 
social cicumstances are not an excuse for violent protest 
Lord Scarman's analysis of both the cause of the riots, and 
the solution to them, lies firmly in the social 
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environment. 29 His argument appears to be caught on the 
dilemma between free will and social determinism. 
Liberal values in the politics of race strongly reflect 
the social determinist position. It is not easy, however, 
to judge whether a policy is a broad humanitarian appeal to 
help people, 'or whether a causal link between circumstances 
and behaviour is being posited, or indeed, both. This is 
partly because of the universally recognisable fact that 
all humans are shaped and influenced to some extent by 
their environmental experiences. Whilst this seems a 
commonplacet the key issue is whether the individual is 
able to choose to overcome strong environmental forces or 
not. 
An important point here is the issue of racial 
discrimination; if black Britons can be shown to have been 
prevented from participating in British society by racial 
discrimination, then clearly they will have been strongly 
adversely affected by their social environment. The full 
extent of discrimination which bars access to the benefits 
of British society on racial grounds is hard to assess 
accurately. In Lord Scarman's opinion, overt institutional 
racial barriers do not exist in Britain. 30 Black citizens 
are not debarred from opportunities because of official 
legal or administrative restraints; quite the opposite, 
since a quantity of legislation exists to give them an 
equal opportunity to participate. 31 The extent to which 
racial discrimination may be practised by private 
individuals or employers is hard to discover. 32 There is 
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some evidence, for example, that members of different 
racial groups in Britain achieve varying results in 
education, housing and employment. 33 This would suggest 
that any barriers which do exist are not the sole 
determinants of the performance of black Britons. 
Despite some difficulties in interpreting the evidence, 
it can be seen that a common assumption in race politics 
has been that individual behaviour is primarily the product 
of external social stimuli. Such a view forms a broad 
persuasive ethos which permeates discussion in this area. 
This ethos can be highlighted by considering an alternative 
viewpoint. The argument that white Britons were hostile to 
immigration and settlement of black Britons because they 
freely chose to be, or because they reasoned that 
opposition best achieved their interests, has not featured 
strongly in the liberal account. The argument that black 
Britons did not reach white British standards in education 
or employment to some extent at least, because of their own 
choice, was not prominent; nor was the view that rioters in 
Brixton had freely chosen to participate canvassed widely 
amongst liberals. 
In many respects, this emphasis on social determinism is 
understandable. The essence of the idea is that individual 
behaviour is not taken at face value, but prior causes 
sought in explanation. To locate responsibility for 
actions in external pressures appears more compassionate 
and humane than to place it squarely on the individual. To 
locate hostility to immigrants, for example, or failure to 
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achieve perceived goals in prior, social and material 
factors beyond the individual's control appears to be more 
understanding and caring. This social determinist 
viewpoint has, however, important consequences for our 
attitudes towards people's character and behaviour. Much 
of what is commonly desired to be ascribed to human beings 
becomes difficult once human behaviour is viewed as being 
determined by social forces external to the individual. 
Whilst social forces are clearly important influences on 
character, liberal values have heavily stressed these 
attitudes when interpreting behaviour and beliefs. 
The image of the individual which is valued in many areas 
of politics is of the person who is autonomous# free, 
reasoning, responsible, moral, creative and active. Social 
determinist views tend to undermine this image by 
visualising an individual instead as passive, unable to 
overcome circumstances, a victim. 34 The idea of the 
autonomous, free and reasoning individual is thrown into 
some doubt. A strongly determinist analysis may have much 
to commend it, but it is suggested here that such an 
analysis predisposes its supporters to certain assumptions 
about the nature of mankind. When behaviour is viewed as 
the product of social forces, much else that is valued 
about people, and many favoured liberal values in race 
politics, become difficult to hold. 35 
It appears likely, and there is some evidence from 
psychological studies, that those individuals who believe 
that they control their own behaviour are more likely to be 
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happy, to have a sense of efficacy, and try to control 
their own environment. Experiments with old people in 
nursing homes, for example, have shown that those who were 
told that they could influence the running of the home were 
more alert and content than those who were the passive 
recipients of care. 36 A sense of personal control over 
circumstances can apparently be linked to health and 
survival in certain illnesses. 37 A disadvantage for those 
who hold the social determinist view is that it may lead 
people to adopt a dreary, fatalistic and passive acceptance 
of life. The Labour Party's White Paper of 1975 on racial 
discrimination, for example, described the deprived as 
being 'an entire group... launched on a vicious downward 
spiral of deprivation'. 38 To describe black Britons in 
these terms, even if with the most benign of motives# is to 
say that they have no control of their lives and are 
totally at the mercy of the environment, and thus may lead 
to a sense of inadequacy and powerlessness; it it also hard 
to deny a charge of being patroniging. 39 This has been 
more widely recognised in the United States, where black 
leaders have called for more self-reliance amongst their 
group members. As James Baldwin observed of American white 
liberals: 'there is something impertinent in the 
assumptions they make about me'. 40 
In Britain, this is perhaps most clearly seen in the 
analyses of Lord Scarmanj the commission for Racial 
Equ 
. 
ality, Roy Hattersley and the Liberal Party of the 
rioting in Brixton and elsewhere. The reasons, or in Lord 
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Scarman's words, "predisposition" towards violence# are 
seen as racialismi disadvantage, poverty, bad housing, 
unemployment and lack of Government spending. on such an 
analysis, rioters are not believed to be free to exercise 
their own will, to choose despite their circumstances 
whether to riot or not; instead, their rioting is 
interpreted as determined by external stimuli. This 
argument strikes at the ideal of harmonious community lifej 
highly valued by liberal opiniont since it creates an 
atmosphere where violence is legitimate if the perpetrators 
are in difficult, or deprived, circumstances. It is 
evident that most citizens in Britain do not riot# even in 
difficult circumstances of long-term unemployment or 
hardship, so that only if black Britons are a special and 
distinct case is this argument tenable. This paternalistic 
attitude on behalf of liberal opinion directly contradicts 
any notion of all individuals, regardless of race, being 
equal. Furthermore, it may lead to a sense of alienation 
amongst those so identified, and defeat the liberal desire 
for a strong multi-racial community, which depends on the 
belief of all that they are part of that community. 
Another aspect of this social determinist argument is its 
implicit denial of variety. it is a generally acceptable 
proposition that the individual is affected by his 
environmentt and derives different experiences within it. 
Social determinist views, howeverl identify groups of 
people as being uniformly affected by the same social 
forces; this leads to a view - of people as being 
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predictable, uniform and unspontaneous. This is in 
conflict with the liberal ideal of promoting a diverse, 
plural society. In reality, there has been a variety of 
culture and opinion in the area of race policies. Many 
black Britons in Brixton in 1981 did not riot, and many 
achieve the social and economic standard perceived as 
normal in white society. This variety, once social 
determinist views are held, becomes difficult to explain, 
for if all are not uniformly affected by social forces, 
much of the predictive power of this explanation is lost. 
It is an interesting omission in the social determinist 
account that individual and group attitudes and culture are 
largely ignored. The emphasis on the needs of black 
Britons, for example, and policies of positive and reverse 
discrimination to help them, focus on black Britons as 
victims of external forces in a white society, particularly 
of racial discrimination. The social determinist view 
requires society to be altered in order that black Britons 
achieve the norm, and pays scant attention to the 
differences of cultural expectations. Given that racial 
discrimination does exist and does limit the opportunities 
of black Britons, the liberal account is weighted very 
strongly towards correcting adverse external social 
pressures on black Britons. Little cognizance is taken of 
black Britons, culture and personal attitudes as a 
determinant of performance. A more balanced account would 
acknowledge that racial discrimination existed, but seek 
conclusive proof that without this discrimination, the 
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achievement of black Britons would match equally that of 
other racial groups. Inequality can be a consequence of 
cultural differences. 41 it has to be shown then, if a 
social determinist position is to be held, that 
disadvantages are due solely to external forces rather than 
to individual and cultural differences. There. is evidence 
to suggest that the culture of a racial group, or possibly 
social class characteristics, is an important factor in 
economic and social performance. For example, a survey 
published in June 1982 by the Commission for Racial 
Equality on young people and employment, found that youth 
unemployment in inner-city areas was 59% of Afro- 
Caribbeans, 42% of whites and 40% of Asians. 42 If racial 
discrimination by whites and external social pressures were 
the sole determinants of youth unemployment, then it would 
be expected that white unemployment would be lower than the 
other two categories. This omission of the importance of 
individual and racial group culture in the social 
determinist explanation is curious, given the emphasis that 
is placed on racial group culture, particularly the culture 
of black British groups, in a plural society (see Chapter 
Nine below). 
A strongly determinist analysis may be the correct one; 
what is questioned here is whether such an analysis 
predisposes its adherents to certain assumptions about the 
nature of man and political life and values. Liberal 
attitudes on questions of race have strongly emphasised 
such a determinist stance; this emphasis has tended towards 
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certain assumptions about human beings which, humane as 
their intention has no doubt been, have led to a 
questioning of individual autonomy - another central 
liberal value. 
When behaviour is viewed as being primarily the product 
of external forces, it loses responsibility for itself, and 
thus any right to praise or blame. Praise cannot be duly 
given for improved behaviour if it is understood that such 
improved behaviour is the result of an improved 
environment. It is also unclear how morally correct or in 
liberal terminology, rational, behaviour can be accounted 
for among the socially determined. Holders of liberal 
values who, for example, persuade white Britons to accept 
their view of New Commonwealth immigrationj must attribute 
their success to their own actions and power of persuasion. 
There can be no praise or blame on this basis for the 
person hostile to immigration who changes his mind to 
welcome immigrants; the reason for this change must be that 
he is submitting to the external forces being applied to 
him. That in turn makes it hard to admire such a person# 
unless he freely chooses to behave in this way. 
Similarly, blame is hard to apportion if responsibility 
is removed from the individual and placed instead on the 
environment. A social determinist might argue that man has 
no choice but to act in the way which external forces 
dictate, and thus no responsibility can be held by 
himself. 43 "I could not help it" has often been a 
successful plea. 44 A strong social determinist analysis 
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allows those so identified to say that their own' behaviour 
is not under their control, yet the notion of 
responsibility is a key component of social relationships 
and communities. 
This has grave consequences; laws forbidding racial 
discrimination and riotous behaviour have been used in 
punishing people. Yet if law breakers' behaviour is viewed 
as the product of external forces, it is inconsistent to 
punish them for what they could not control. An 
enforcement of moral behaviour itself relies on the 
assumption that people are responsible for their own 
actions. 45 A sustained effort (see Chapter Seven below) 
has been made to create a particular moral climate 
accepting the presence of black Britons. The commission 
for Racial Equality, for example, wrote in its 1972 Report 
that it 'has still to persuade the majofity to do what they 
ought to be doing in any case'. 46 Nowl "ought implies 
can", and there is little reason to persuade the majority 
to do something unless they can freely and responsibly 
choose to do it. To the extent that a heavy social 
determinist emphasis is pressed, then people are not 
responsible for their actions; they do not choose them, 
they are not free to respond to laws and moral 
exhortations, and should therefore not be punished for 
their misdemeanours. 47 
This social determinist emphasis has important effects 
extending to other key liberal ideas identified in this 
study. Those identified as being socially determined 
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actors are not autonomous actors able to examine issues and 
to make rational evaluations about them. 48 If soj then 
political debate becomes unnecessary and is replaced by 
policies aimed at changing the social environment, and thus 
people's behaviour, to the attitudes and behaviour approved 
of by liberal opinion. People are not informed so that 
they can contribute to political debate and make 
responsible decisions; instead, their social environment is 
manipulated so that they will adopt the desired view. This 
aspect of liberal values is discussed in greater detail in 
the following chapter, where it is suggested that political 
debate has been curtailed and shaped in the area of race 
politics. 
A central concern of liberal values has been for 
equality; paradoxically, social determinist explanations of 
human behaviour lead to inequality. Identification of the 
behaviour of others as a product of external forces or 
environment, is frequently made by those who deny that 
their own opinions have been similarly formed: theirs are 
claimed to be the result of rational analysis and 
evaluation. 49 Society is often thus divided into two 
groups: those whose behaviour is understandable and 
explainable by reference to prior causes, and those who 
independently reach their own decisions. For example, the 
hostility of white Britons to immigration has been 
subscribed to scarcity of housing or employment, which, 
once removed, would eradicate the hostility; this 
presupposes that hostility is the sole product of external 
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causes, and makes little allowance for there having been a 
rational evaluation which caused hostility. This 
philosophy implies considerable intellectual inferiority in 
such a group, and equally, a moral and intellectual 
superiority on the part of the group making such a 
judgement. 
The multi-racial, multi-cultural plural society is also 
touched by social determinism. The plural society 
celebrates diversity, but if people are seen as malleable 
by social policy and education, then diversity is severely 
limited. The social environment becomes a tool of 
conformity restricting the diverse practices which are 
desired. The desire for a plural society merges into 
the desire for peaceful, harmonious community. Again, such 
a concept is undermined by social determinist ideas since 
they are likely to lead to a guilt-ridden anomic 
community. 50 Problems that occur are viewed, given that 
men are assumed to be good, as the product of poor social 
circumstances which are consequently solvable by the 
correct policies. That problems continue and are not 
solved is seen as evidence of the culpability of society in 
not solving them. This theme of guilt runs strongly 
through the evidence of race relations bodies, reviewed in 
Part One of this study. 
The emphasis on social explanations of behaviour view the 
social environment as an independent entity which shapes 
the individual. But social forces have causes. The 
question is whether individuals make society, or society 
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individuals-51 This question is partly a derivation of the 
"nature versus nurture" debate. Liberal values have laid 
very heavy emphasis on the theory of society making the 
individual, or at least some individuals, for liberals 
generally exclude themselves from such a process. Little 
emphasis has been placed on the argument that all 
individuals can or do create and control their own 
environment. This strong emphasis on social determinist 
explanations is undoubtedly humane and caring in its 
intentions, but it is unfortunate that it undermines many 
of the characteristics which are normally attributed to 
human beings and which are part of liberal values in race 
politics as elsewhere. Social determinist theories have 
been used in the politics of race to explain errant 
behaviour; once policy recommendations are made, a 
different view of individuals is required. To recommend 
policy, to persuade, to exhort, to punish# people must be 
viewed as free, responsible* moral beings capable of 
choice. This conflicting account of human behaviour is a 
consistent strand perceptible in liberal values throughout 
the area of race politics. 
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Chapter Seven: Rationality 
The terms "rationality" and "reason" are often used in 
political discourse as weapons. it is common for 
publicists to characterise their own views 'as rational, 
with the implication that they are considered, intelligent, 
reasoned and thoughtful, whilst the views of their 
opponents are irrational, and, if only by implication# ill- 
consideredt impulsive, emotional and unintelligent. 1 
Another, and sometimes linked, common usage is to describe 
activity as rational which'decides, by rational thought, 
upon a goal and then achieves that goal at least cost-2 A 
common feature of the debate on racial policy has been an 
appeal to rational thought and behaviour. One, recurrent 
theme has been an appeal to rational self-interest. 
Another has been to rational values and policieg. The 
meaning attached to the term rational in this case has not 
been made clear, except that values opposed to the liberal 
tradition's values have been viewed as irrational. 
A repeated theme in the liberal response to the issue of 
race has been that rational, informed, educated, calm 
debate on the question is necessary. A Liberal Party 
publication of 1973 stressed that the nature of the debate 
about racial issues should be changed. it argued that New 
Commonwealth immigration should not be viewed as a problem, 
for this allowed Populist politicians to exploit the issue; 
instead of this type of discussion# which it described as 
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irrational, what was required was debate about the genuine 
economic and social problems involved. 3 
Sir Harry Nicholas, General Secretary of the Labour 
Party, stated in a Green Paper in 1972 that discussion 
about race over the last ten years had been characterised 
by emotion rather than reason, and that the Green Paper set 
out reasoned, unemotional policy. 4 The Race relations 
bodies revealed a consistent concern with the type and 
quality of public debate on race politics. The Community 
Relations Commission, which saw itself as a persuasive# 
publicising body, noted the dilemma which this role 
produced: it could achieve publicity and an increased 
volume of debate on racial matters, but all too often this 
debate was unsympathetic to the CRC's aims-5 Mark Bonham 
Carter commented, when first appointed chairman of the CRC# 
that matters of race had become matters of public concern, 
and that the CRC often found itself embroiled in 
embarrassing controversy. 6 In its report of 1978, the CRC 
also regretted the nature of public debate on race, which 
frequently presented New Commonwealth immigrants as a 
danger to British culture; the CRC considered that such 
debate was irrational, and that what was required was calml 
rational discussion instead. 7 A briefing document from the 
Church of England's Board for Social Responsibility in 1965 
argued similarly: political debate about race relations had 
led to words such as "colour" and "immigrant" being charged 
with an emotion which should be removed from the argument. 8 
These examples suggest that two major points were being 
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made: firstly, that public debate and discussion were 
considered important, and secondly, that given public 
debate of the "right" kind, a rational consensus would 
emerge. 
There was a problem, however, in that public debate on 
racial issues was not characterised by the emergence of a 
liberal consensus. Chapter Five of this study shows that 
the majority of the indigenous population were consistently 
hostile to New Commonwealth immigration, unhappy at the 
existence of black Britons, and uncomfortable about the 
creation of a multi-racial society. When widespread public 
debate has occurred on race politics, it is this hostility 
which has often been most prominent, and which has received 
most public support. 
Public debate in a democracy will necessar ily entail full 
and open discussion between diverse views. However, in the 
area of race politics, it is not clear that sustained or 
open discussion has occurred. Those who have held views 
which led them to oppose New Commonwealth immigration have, 
as the evidence above suggests, been viewed by many 
important contributors to this policy area as ill-informed, 
emotional and irrational; their views have been represented 
as disreputable. Hence, whilst free and open debate was 
being advocated, the terms of the debate were being 
narrowed to include only those whose views were considered 
rational; that is, those whose views were supported by the 
liberal consensus. 
Opposition to the views of those hostile to New 
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Commonwealth immigration and the creation of a multi- 
racial society is perhaps best documented in the response 
of liberal opinion to the issue of immigration control. In 
the early days of immigration from the New Commonwealth in 
the 1950s, there was a reluctance to count the number of 
immigrants arriving at ports and airports, lest this should 
cause concern amongst the public. 9 Reticence in discussing 
matters of immigration and race amongst liberals, both in 
the 1950s and since, manifested itself in several forms. 
Liberal opinion formers exhibited a marked reluctance to 
discuss racial matters publicly. 10 This extended during 
the 1960s to deliberately keeping to a minimum the 
expression of opinion hostile to New Commonwealth 
immigration broadcast by the BBC. 11 Indeed, the BBC's 
official handbook in the 1960s noted the Corporation's 
commitment to political impartiality and neutrality, but it 
also stated that it felt no obligation to publicise views 
considered to be racialist. 12 
This was in many ways understandable, given the 
abhorrence of the racial doctrines generated by the Nazis 
in the Second World War. Distinctions based on racial 
characteristics were seen as unacceptable. Britain's 
position at the centre of a multi-racial Commonwealth# 
coupled with the growing importance of Third World 
countries in the post-war world added to this feeling. 
Liberal opinion was committed to values which refused to 
recpgnise racial characteristics or colour as relevant 
criteria in public debate or policy. Alternative policies 
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were morally repugnant. Given these commitments, it was an 
almost insoluble dilemma that so many of those who wanted 
to emigrate to Britain were racially distinct from the 
indigenous population; their immigration could not be 
controlled without giving a strong impression, at least# 
that such controls were based on racial criteria. 
The Conservative Party's reluctance in introducing the 
1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act# strongly opposed by the 
Labour and Liberal Parties, the churches and the quality 
press, well illustrates this dilemma. The Conservative 
Party denied that the Act was one which made distinctions 
on racial grounds, and argued that it simply adjusted the 
flow of immigrants to Britain in line with the number of 
jobs available. Opponents of the Act considered it to be a 
colour bar. 
It was the events of the 1964 General Election, 
particularly the dramatic Smethwick result, which 
emphasised the possible political consequences of public 
hostility to large-scale New Commonwealth immigration. The 
Smethwick result was contrary to the national swing towards 
the Labour Party, and the result was widely interpreted as 
due to the electorate's hostility to immigration. Faced 
with a choice of two candidates# one being identified as a 
supporter of continued immigration, the other campaigning 
on a platform strongly opposed to it, the electorate had 
favoured an end to immigration. This result revealed that 
when Immigration and racial matters were made a major issue 
in a campaign, an issue of public debate, or the subject 
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of party controversy, then the majority of the indigenous 
population were likely to vote in one direction. This 
realisation led to a consensus being formed by those who 
had earlier opposed the 1962 Commonwealth Immigration Act: 
the Labour Party, Liberal Party and the churches all 
changed their policy on immigration by 1965 to support for 
control measures. 13 Even liberal Conservatives such as 
Francis Pym and Nigel Fisher,. who had opposed the 1962 Act 
quickly became converted to its necessity. By 1965, as 
argued in Part one of this study, a consensus existed 
amongst liberal opinion that control of New Commonwealth 
immigration was necessary. 
Another feature of this consensus, reached at much the 
same timet was that the issues of immigration and race 
should be depoliticised, taken out of party politics. it 
was thought that racial matters were not fit subjects of 
party division and controversy. 14 Responsible political 
leaders, it was commonly argued, should provide leadership 
in disseminating the morally correct values in this area. 
Even the leadership of the Conservative Party, who could 
have made much of the change of heart by the Labour and 
Liberal Parties over immigration controlt forbore to take 
much electoral advantaget such was the commitment to 
liberal values. 15 For the Labour and Liberal Partiest 
liberal values and electoral advantage were in conflict: 
extensive public debate over racial matters would have led 
to their being identified increasingly as "pro- 
immigration"t and since the Smethwick result, this was 
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evidently a vote-loser. In addition, widespread public 
debatep because it would have been largely hostile to Now 
Commonwealth immigration and the newly-arrived black 
Britons, could in their view only harm race relations. 
This desire for a cross-party consensus and for the 
exclusion of race from party politics was frequently 
expressed. Dr Michael Winstanley remarked# during the 
second reading of the 1968 Race Relations Act, that race 
relations were one of the few political areas where it was 
essential to achieve a consensus, and clear leadership 
should be given to achieve this end. 16 At the second 
reading of the 1971 Commonwealth Immigration Billp James 
Callaghan supported the principle of consensus also, 
arguing that party divisions on racial matters would be of 
no assistance to either the immigrant community or the 
indigenous population. 17 The Commission for Racial 
Equality also pressed consistently for immigration and race 
relations to be kept free of party politics-18 Similarly, 
the British Council of Churches' document 'Immigrants in 
Britain' considered that there was enough common ground 
between the parties to permit reasoned debate, from which 
irrationality and prejudice should be excluded. 19 
A new concept, which entered public debate towards the 
end of 1964, was that of a "multi-racial" society, to 
which, it was suggested, everyone was committed. The 
Labour Party's White Paper Immigration from the 
Commonwealthr published in 1965, for example, stated quite 
clearly that 'the United Kingdom is already a multi racial 
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society'. 20 The Bishop of Liverpool, speaking in 1964, 
said that he believed that Liverpool was ready to accept 
the notion of a multi-racial Britain as the heart of a 
multi-racial Commonwealth. 21 The second report of the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Committee pointed out that 
although it was obvious that the New Commonwealth 
immigrants who had come to Britain would stayl many people 
had not yet recognised the fact that Britain would become a 
multi-racial society. 22 By 1968, James Callaghan, as Prime 
Minister, was stating that Parliament, the Government and 
all Parties in the country were united in their commitment 
to Britain's development as a multi-racial society-23 
The assertion that Britain was, and welcomed being, a 
multi-racial society, was made against a background of 
sparse public debate. The presence and continued arrival 
of New Commonwealth immigrants tended to be presented as a 
fait accompli, the needs of which it was not necessary to 
discuss. Katznelson suggests that the political consensus 
on racial matters after 1965 used race relations bodies to 
remove the subject from mainstream politics. 24 immigrants' 
needs and wishesp Katznelson argues# were allocated to non- 
governmental bodies such as the community Relations 
Commission and the Race Relations Boardi and thus both 
Government and Parliament were distanced by this strategy 
from the issues themselves. The appointment of the 
Archbishop of Canterbury as Chairman of the National 
Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants also strengthened 
this tactic. As an overtly non-party political 
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establishment figure, he could deflect criticism and head a 
persuasive moral campaign. To this can be added that this 
strategy also had the effect of displacing somewhat the 
hostility of the indigenous population towards immigration, 
to various ill-defined, and somewhat powerless, quangos and 
establishment figures. 
A further example of the curtailment of public debate can 
be seen in the reactions to Enoch Powell's "rivers of 
blood" speech in 1968. Powell called for an almost 
complete halt to New Commonwealth immigration and the 
repatriation of black Britons. The indigenous population's 
support for Powell's views, as shown in Chapter Five, was 
very strong. Established liberal opinion, however, viewed 
the matter differently, and Implicit in this view was a 
need to restrict this kind of public debate and discussion. 
There was fury at Powell's breach of the liberal consensus 
on racial matters. David Ennals, whilst a Minister in the 
Home Office, spoke of the enormous damage that Powell's 
speech had done; he acknowledged that both Powell and his 
supporters spoke with sincerity, but that community 
relations would suffer as a result. 25 The Liberal Party 
lamented the 'hysteria' which followed Powell's 
utterances. 26 The Community Relations Commission argued 
that public expression of the view that New Commonwealth 
immigrants' were undesirable and a burden to Britain could 
only damage the whole community. 27 In its view, Powell's 
speeches had had the effect of making blatantly hostile 
emotions against black Britons a socially acceptable 
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public statement. 28 The Race Relations Board, seeing the 
subject of race relations made public in all its extremes, 
called for an identification of the real problems of 
immigration, rather than inflammatory discussions of '. myths 
and stereotypes', 29 Likewise, the British Council of 
Churches argued in 1969 that public debate had 
'considerably retarded' good race relations. 30 it 
supported the formation of a positive policy on 
immigration, and an attack on the assumption that 
immigrants were inescapably a problem, in which the size of 
the problem was directly related to the size of the 
immigrant population. 31 
Much of the significance of Powell's "rivers of blood" 
and subsequent speeches lay in his having broken the 
liberal consensus on racial matters. It broke the 
consensus in arguing for a complete halt on immigration, 
and in introducing the idea of repatriation; it broke the 
consensus in being expressed in emotive# vivid terms# and 
in possessing a very different concept of good race 
relations. Until this point, the leadership of the main 
parties, aware of the hostile opinions of the indigenous 
populatione believed that maintaining a "low profile" on 
racial matters, whilst the government-sponsored bodies 
worked for better race relations, would keep immigration 
out of party politics and public debate. Powell's much- 
publicised views forced racial issues into the open, and 
made it evident that race relations could not easily be 
dealt with. To much liberal opinion, Powell's sentiments 
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could only be seen as harmful in their effect and as an 
encouragement to public debate which was far from rational 
or informed. 32 
Another example of the desire to limit public debate in 
the area of race politics is more relevant to the 1970s and 
1980s. A number of commentatorsp mainly Conservative, have 
argued that a climate of opinion has been created which has 
made the expression of certain views unacceptable and 
illegitimate. 33 Typically, such views would include 
serious discussion of, and support for, policies such as 
repatriation, hereditary intelligence based on racial 
groupings, the rejection of multi-cultural education, and 
so on. In the nature of things, the claim that certain 
views are unacceptable is hard to assessr since if such a 
climate of opinion exists and is successful, open 
discussion of such views is not likely to be welcomed. It 
does seem likely, however, that the accusation of "racism" 
has silenced some opinions and some debate. 
Related to the demand for the right kind of debate, a 
major thrust in the liberal argument has been both to 
emphasise the ignorance of those illiberal views and to 
stress the need for education in the correct values to 
create the correct moral climate. Those opposed to 
immigration from the New Commonwealth have been presented 
as unintelligent and ill-educated. Roy Jenkins, in 1966, 
viewed opposition as either 'political opportunism' or 
'personal inadequacy', playing on the ignorance of 
others. 34 James Callaghan argued in 1968 that prejudice 
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was derived from fear and ignorance; the way to overcome it 
was education. 35 The Liberal Party's 1965 document on race 
portrayed those opposed to immigration as being irrationalf 
with fixed views which could not be swayed by argument. 36 
In 1964 the Bishop of Liverpool pressed the need to 
persuade people of the benefits of a multi-racial society, 
and help the many less able people who required help to 
understand the real nature of. race problems. 37 The Bishop 
of Worcester in 1976 praised the Race Relations Act of that 
year and the multi-racial society, which had brightened the 
drab, monotonous lives which so many people led. 38 The 
liberal argument has not permitted the notion that 
prejudice could survive education, or be founded not, as 
they suggested, in ignorance, but in knowledge. Along with 
this analysis was a strong emphasis on the educational 
process* The Race Relations bodies were particularly keen 
on this and saw education as one of their main roles. The 
NCCI spoke of the need to educate white Britons away from 
their prejudices, and saw this . purpose as its chief 
occupation. 39 The CRC also argued that the way to improve 
race relations was by education. 40 The Liberal Party 
affirmed that it was clearly the job of Liberals to stand 
against manifestations of irrational emotion and 
behaviour. 41 The Labour Party called for a sustained 
educational campaign which would secure greater knowledge 
and understanding of immigrants. 42 These sentiments 
illustrate clearly the liberal assumption that correct 
information and education would in turn lead to correct 
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behaviour in liberal terms. 43 
It can be seen that there is a good deal of evidence that 
liberal opinion has been anxýous to restrict public debate 
in the area of race policy. It has held strong views about 
what constituted rational policies and values in this area, 
and it has rýcognised that not everyone shared -these views. 
Critical response and debate has been seen as improper. 
Liberals would perhaps argue that by the time that popular 
hostility to immigration was clearly manifested, in the 
1964 General Election in Smethwick, for example, the 
creation of a multi-racial society had already occurred and 
that this was not worth debating as such. Thd issue still 
open to debate was how to make such a multi-racial society 
more harmonious. Such an argument, however, reflects 
liberal values and assumptions. It is unlikely that the 
typical supporter of Enoch Powell viewed the matter in the 
same way, The Powellite position, supported by a 
substantial majority of the indigenous population, was to 
return to the situation before mass immigration, by 
stopping further immigration and repatriating those black 
Britons already living in Britain. Naturally such views 
were anathema to liberal opinion and quite outside the 
bounds of normal political debate, and attempts to limit 
publicity of Powellite views reflected this. 
For the liberal, public debate in the area of race 
politics poses problems, tending as it does to raise 
conflict, emotions, passions and hostility to black 
Britons. These conflicts and passions can only be kept 
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largely dormant if public debate is restricted and 
channelled in certain directions. Thus# those who demand 
rational discussion and debate face a dilemma when public 
debate produces results which are undesirable. The two 
objectives of encouraging free, open public discussion and 
reaching a consensus around rational policy, have not been 
easily reconcilable. Commitment to free public debate 
might be seen to be instrumental: it should be the means 
which leads to the goal of rational policy. However# to 
the extent that public debate is simply instrumental to 
achieving rational values, and fails to do sot it is 
sacrificed to achieve rational policy. The result of this 
is an unwillingness to accept that there can be a 
worthwhile public debate about matters of race and 
immigration when it does not reach conclusions perceived as 
being rational. 
The question arises of how particular values and policies 
can be identified as being "rational". As has been seen, 
what have been taken to be rational views include the idea 
that immigration is not a threat or danger, that no 
dictinction must be made on racial grounds, and that the 
real issues are social and economic ones. Coupled with 
this is the claim that approach to these issues must be 
calml cool and unemotional. A problem in accepting this 
definition of rational argument (and, it is implied, the 
politically and morally correct definition) lies in the 
strong, social determinist emphasis evident in liberal 
opinion (see Chapter Six above). Such social determinism 
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identifies behaviour, opinions and thought as being 
largely, if not wholly, determined by social environment. 
However, if this is combined with the view that certain 
groups can be characterised as irrational, then society is 
implicitly divisible into two groups: those whose values 
are determined by their environment, and those who claim 
that this is the case. To claim that the values of others 
are the product of social experience requires the 
assumption, implicit or otherwise, that one stands outside 
the shaping influences of one's own social environment. 
This, as Marx clearly recognisedt is to divide society into 
groups perceived as superior and inferior to each other, 
and this strikes at the desire for equality so evident in 
this area of policy. 44 
The essence of the appeal to the words "rational" or 
"rationality" is the implication and sometimes strong 
assertion that the values and policies so decribed are 
morally correct ones, and that the alternatives are both 
irrational and morally incorrect. Yet social determinist 
attitudes undermine this claim. Unless holders of rational 
values can stand outside the social system, it must be 
assumed that they are as much influenced by their social 
environment as those they view as holding irrational 
values. 45 once it is argued that values and opinions are 
socially determined and that all opinions are subject to 
this process, difficulties arise. The truth of opinions in 
the social sphere becomes controversial. It is difficult 
to find an impartial arbiter who can judge which argument 
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is the more rational; social truth becomes relative and 
subjective. This is compounded by the promotion of a 
plural society which encourages a variety of social 
environments. If all values and interpretations of social 
issues are seen as the products of differing social forces# 
it is difficult to see how one interpretation can be 
accepted as the more rationally compelling. This in turn 
implies a relativity of ideas and values which contrasts 
oddly with the assertion that there are rational, morally 
correct solutions to particular policy problems. Despite 
these considerations, it is clear that holders of rational 
values in the area of race policy have not been 
relativistic in their attitudes. They have supported 
policies which they have termed rational, with the implied 
contention that debate, of the right kind, will lead to 
agreement about social policy. The contention has been 
that consensus on views that are in some sense true or 
morally correct can be achieved. 
A further aspect of the demand for-rational debate in the 
area of race politics is that the basic nature of this kind 
of debate may exclude certain views from public discussion. 
The demand for rational debate carries with it implicit 
assumptions about what constitutes such debate. it 
requires serious factual analysis, an "objective" 
consideration of issues, the avoidance of emotionalism and 
the deployment of educated skills. Howeverl those who have 
opposed large-scale immigration from the New Commonwealth 
and the creation of a multi-racial society have been mainly 
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of a conservative outlook, and such conservatism typically 
relie's upon intuitive feelings, a sense of nationhoodt 
tradition, identity, continuity, and the appeal to 
traditional values, emotions and morality. 46 In passing, 
it is worth noting that there is a contrast here between 
the desire for cold, factual, unemotional rational 
discussion and the ideas of plural society fostered in the 
area. of race. The values of the plural community are those 
of diversity, spontaneity, warmth and emotional commitment. 
The rational liberal is curiously out of place in such a 
scenario (see Chapter Nine). It is clear that in the 
general debate on racial issues, two different political 
languages are in use: one appeals, at least in part, to 
what it claims is largely factual, unemotional analysis# 
the other appeals to intuitivel emotional values. The call 
for rational discussion and debate, by its nature, has a 
tendency to inhibit contribution to public debate expressed 
in the conservative form. 47 
Finally, it should be noted that the liberal tradition in 
the past and in other policy areas has often supported the 
idea that the goals of public policy can be correctly 
arrived at only if fulli open public discussion in allowed. 
Restriction of public debate, it is argued, is likely to 
mean that alternative policies, which may be the correct 
ones, are not heard. It is also commonly asserted that a 
consensus about the goals of public policy is harder to 
achieve without full public debate and discussion. John 
Stuart Mill's on Liberty contains a celebrated defence of 
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the freedom of speech on these grounds. Mill had a deep- 
seated dislike of restriction of either freedom of speech 
or of opinion. 48 Cowling has attacked Mill's argument by 
suggesting that Mill only favoured freedom of speech for 
the rationally educated rather than those of a more 
conservative disposition. 49 Whatever the merits of 
Cowling's attack on Mill, his argument is redolent of what 
happened in British race politics. 
Rational public debate has been presented as a means 
towards an acceptance of the fact of large-scale New 
Commonwealth immigration to Britain and the creation of a 
multi-racial society. This political end has been 
justified in terms of rational action to achieve maximum 
collective and individual benefit. 
In the earlier years of political concern over 
immigration, during the 1960s, continued New Commonwealth 
immigration was often defended in simple economic terms. 
Britain's economy, it was argued, required more labour: New 
Commonwealth immigrants supplied -this, and hence Britain 
benefited from immigration. For example, Labour's 1965 
White Paper Immigration from the Commonwealth commented 
that immigrants made a very valuable contribution to 
Britain's economy. 50 The Liberal Party's Immigration Group 
argued similarly in 1965 that Britain's economic 
requirements, particularly the need for skilled workers, 
meant that immigration was both beneficial and necessary. 51 
The British Council of Churches believed that suggestions 
that immigrants took more out of Britain's economy than 
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they contributed was irrational. 52 The NCCI stressed both 
the financial and economic benefit derived from immigrants 
and the way in which they had added to Britain's cultural 
life. 53 Roy Jenkins said in 1966 in a speech to race 
relations activists that hostility towards immigrants was 
irrational add often the result of looking for scapegoats 
in society. 54 An interesting contrast appears here 
between this argument and that cited earlier in Chapter 
Six, that opposition to immigration was due to competition 
for scarce resources such as housing, education and 
employment. It seems unlikely that those who were told 
that their opposition to New Commonwealth immigration was 
due to such competition would view such immigration as a 
benefit to themselves economically. it is worth noting 
that this attribution of opposition to immigration to 
competition for resources further restricted public debate, 
for it did not present concern over race as an issue which 
should be tackled in its own right. Instead, it deflected 
attention to material social issues such as housing and 
employment. 
As Britain's economy faltered in the mid-1960s and 
unemployment began to rise, this argument of economic 
benefit was superseded by another. The argument which 
replacedt and sometimes overlapped itt was one which 
emphasised how much Britain had gained culturallyt 
socially, and religiously from immigration. Lord Elton, in 
a book published in 1965t summarised the current debate 
over New Commonwealth. immigration and concluded that it was 
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rarely claimed that such immigration aided Britain's 
culture. 55 This was the case until the mid-1960a when much 
more emphasis began to be placed on the cultural benefits 
gained from a multi-racial Britain; it came to be argued 
that in was in the interest of white Britons to welcome 
immigrants. This argument will be further explored below 
in discussing pluralism (see Chapter Nine). The general 
idea surfaced in Labour's Proaramme: 19731 which agreed 
that Britain was a multi-racial society which gained a 
great deal from the variety of cultural, religious and 
ethnic traditions within it. 56 The 1979 Liberal Party 
manifesto claimed similarly that Britain had gained a 
diverse and rich culture as a result of New Commonwealth 
immigration. 57 The Bishop of Worcester believed that the 
new cultural structure of society was something for which 
everyone should be thankful. 58 In his Christmas Day sermon 
in 1976, the Archbishop of Canterbury expressed the 
sentiment that far from being a menace, immigration had 
provided a source of enrichment to British life. 59 The 
NCCI in its 1966 Report stated that black Britons had made 
a valuable contribution to both Britain's economy and 
culture. 60 
Support for and appeal to economic and cultural self- 
interest makes a number of economic assumptions about 
rational self-interested actors. Self-interest can be 
defined as 'the constant and uninterrupted effort of every 
man to better his own condition'. 61 Rational self- 
interested persons can consider and weigh alternativesp 
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know what they want and what pleases them bestj they choose 
the most efficient way to achieve their goals. The appeal 
to self-interest in the area of racial issues, however, 
must be viewed against the evidence of the majority of 
white Britons' hostility towards the phenomenon of New 
Commonwealth immigration. The evidence surveyed in Chapter 
Five above suggests that the perceived self-interest of the 
indigenous majority required no immigration and the 
maintenance of a largely homogenous society. Tacit 
acknowledgement of this can be seen in these liberal 
appeals to self-interest, which aim to persuade those of 
differing views to change their primary preferences. Those 
who have favoured immigration and the creation of a multi- 
racial society have in effect said to those who disagreed 
with them, 'you are mistaken about your own best 
interests'. Resistance to New Commonwealth immigration was 
interpreted as fear of financial and cultural loss; this 
interpretation was linked to the view outlined earlier that 
hostility was created because immigrants were seen as 
competitors for scarce social resources. it was assumed 
that those who were hostile to New Commonwealth immigration 
felt as they did because they did not believe that such 
immigration would advance their financial and cultural 
interests and benefit them. Implicit in this was a further 
assumption' that those opposed to immigration desired 
financial and cultural gain above other values. 
Consequently, it was argued that the creation of a multi- 
racial society would benefit all its members and allow them 
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to realise their economic and cultural goals with greater 
success. 
Although this appeal to rational self-interest was made 
to justify acceptance of immigration and a multi-racial 
society, the full implications of this argument do not 
appear to have been drawn. Basic to the rational self- 
interest argument is the idea that individuals know and can 
rank their preferences. In the area of racer there are 
several possible orders of preference: one is implicit in 
the argument above, associated with liberal opinions, that 
Britain benefited financially and culturally from 
immigration. This argument assumes that such immigration 
does indeed foster economic growth, whilst economists are 
divided on this point. 62 Another preference might be for a 
Britain financially poorer, but culturally homogenous; 
cultural enrichment as an ideal has not been defined in any 
detail (see Chapter Nine below). It seems therefore that 
white Britons might legitimately doubt whether New 
Commonwealth immigration would bring either financial or 
cultural benefit. 
Appeals to economic and cultural benefits derived from 
immigration are only likely to succeed with those who value 
the chance of greater wealth and racial and cultural 
diversity more than they do existing society. However, 
opponents of immigration may value cultural and racial 
homogeneity more than they value the possibility of more 
wealth and cultural diversity. They may believe that a 
diverse society does not reflect their view of national 
258 
identity, or that it may be harder to govern or police. 63 
Genuine appeals to rational self-interest must allow those 
appealed to to rank their preferences, and must allowithat 
they have real preferences. Two aspects of the liberal 
approach to the area of race politics particularly hinder 
this. Because public debate has been curtailed, it is 
difficult to appeal to people's self-interest# for the 
absence of debate makes it hard to assess what people's 
preferences are. Secondly, social determinist assumptions 
lead to a dismissal of the preferences of many as being 
simply the product of a somehow distorted social 
environment. The temptation is then to assume that the 
holders of such views are not assessing their own interests 
rationally or do not know their own preferences. 
The area of race politics may, in any case, be one where 
appeals to self-interest will be ineffective. Olson has 
argued that there are instances where rational self- 
interested actors may not act to achieve their common 
interests. 64 In some circumstances, the rational actor 
will act as a "free rider", taking the benefits of the 
action of others without sharing the costs. The non- 
unionised member in a highly unionised workplace who 
receives pay rises negotiated by the union is a good 
example of this. Even if the majority of white Britons 
believed generally that benefits resulted from New 
Commonwealth immigration and the creation of a multi- 
racial society, it does not follow that they decided to 
accept the Costs. The utilitarianism on which the argument 
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for economic rationality in the race area is based assumes 
that people have interests in common which override their 
self-interests. A "free rider", faced with large-scale 
immigration, may argue that while he prefers a homogenous 
nation, he will take any economic and cultural benefits he 
can from black Britons. This might mean that the "free 
riding" white Briton would be happy to use black Britons 
for low paid, menial jobs, but that he is also happy to 
discriminate against black Britons when they impinge upon 
other areas of life about which he feels strongly. The 
indigenous white "free rider" may on this basis only see 
his interest as using black Britons for what he can gain 
from them. 
This argument may go some way towards explaining the 
dilemma mentioned in Chapter Five above, of evidence 
showing general support for principles of equality and 
fairness towards black Britons coupled with a willingness 
to discriminate on racial grounds. The "free rider" may, 
given the existence of a distinct racial group, want to see 
measures to promote good race relations and a peaceful 
society, but also want to minimise his personal costs and 
maximise his benefits by freely discriminating against 
black Britons when he chooses. 
For these reasons, it may be very hard to promote the 
acceptance of black Britons by the majority of white 
Britons on the basis of voluntary self-interest. White 
Britons may decide that their preference is racial and 
cultural homogeneity and that they value this more than 
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racial and cultural diversity. If white Britons calculate 
that there are benefits to be had from black Britons, it 
may always be tempting for them to act as "free riders" who 
discriminate against black Britons to take any benefits 
they may provide. 
If self-inEerest is promoted as a main policy-for liberal 
race attitudes, it is likely that only those policies which 
give private individuals direct and tangible benefits are 
likely to succeed. In this area, however, the capacity of 
public policy to provide private economic and social gain 
is unlikely to be great. And the "free rider" is likely to 
be able to obtain the benefits without paying the costs. 
Consequently, the persuasiveness of self-interest arguments 
is likely to be slight. 
Conclusion 
Several tensions exist in the ideas of rationality detailed 
above. Commitments to rational values and policy are in 
conflict with commitments to encourage public debate. 
Appeals to self-interest lead to a number of problems: for 
the rational self-interested actor there is often little to 
be had for paying for collective goods which he may reason 
will be gained without his participation. The white Briton 
who is self-interested may calculate that it is in his 
self-interest to use any benefits which black Britons may 
bring whilst denying them full access to social and 
economic benefits. 
The two ideas of rational debate and self-interest also 
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raise conflicting principles. 
debate assumes that people will 
rational policies. Appeals 
expect people to receive ta 
unwilling to make compromises 
sacrifice. 65 
The desire for rational 
compromise and work towards 
to self-interest, however, 
ngible benefits and to be 
if so doing would involve a 
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Chapter Eight: Equality 
Several different themes of equality have been pressed in 
the debate on racial issues. They include equality before 
the law, equality of opportunity and policies of positive 
discrimination or "positive" action. 
Equality before the law is best seen as a concept for 
procedural justice: people should not be treated 
differently by the law for irrelevant reasons. The 
argument in the area of race has been that race, colour and 
country of origin are irrelevant criteria upon which to 
base law or policy. This contention can be seen clearly in 
discussion of immigration control, where much of the 
discussion has centred on the ideal of e. quality before the 
law. The first measure to control immigration from the New 
Commonwealth, the 1962 Commonwealth immigration Act, was 
presented by the Conservatives as a measure which did not 
breach the principle of equality before the law. The Act 
was based on the granting of work vouchers and employment 
opportunities, and therefore discriminated on the basis of 
work skills rather than racial criteria. Patrick Gordon 
Walker, speaking for the Labour Party, attacked this Bill 
at its Second Reading, claiming that R. A. Butler was the 
instigator of legislation which was openly based on 
principles of racial discrimination. 1 Clement Davies, 
speaking for the Liberal Party, stated that however much 
the Government argued to the contrary, the Bill would be 
seen by all as racially discriminatory. 2 By 1965, 
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established political opinion was agreed that control of 
New Commonwealth immigration was necessary, but this change 
of policy was justified by criteria which were economic and 
social rather than racial. Labour's 1965 White Paperl 
Immigration from the Commonwealth, which tightened the 
immigration controls introduced by the Conservatives, 
linked New Commonwealth immigrants to social problems and 
tensions, and suggested that this justified the enactment 
of more controls. 3 The Liberal Party's Report on 
immigration and race, published in 1965, made the same 
point: it claimed that some controls on immigration were 
necessary because of Britain's failure to match social 
conditions to modern needs. 4 The British Council of 
Churches welcomed the bipartisan consensus on immigration 
which emerged in 1965, but argued that if the consensus was 
ever expressed in terms of distinctions made on grounds of 
colour, it should be strongly rejected. 5 
Since 1965, successive immigration control measures in 
1968,1971 and 1981 have tended to'be justified by their 
supporters as being necessary to avoid social tension. 
Opponents of such legislation have argued that it was based 
on racial and colour characteristics. The 1981 British 
Nationality Bill, for example, was opposed by Roy 
Hattersley on these grounds: he asserted that, having in 
the past assured his black constituents that they were 
equal before the law, he would now have to inform them 
otherwise. 6 What the Labour Party wanted, he said, was a 
policy on nationality and immigration which was not founded 
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on racial bias, favouring one race over another. 7 David 
Steel, leader of the Liberal Party, said of the same Bill 
that it would affect black Britons far more than any other 
group, and was therefore a racist measure. 8 The Archbishop 
of Canterbury also opposed the Bill, and sought instead a 
bill which would enshrine the principles of equal respect 
and regard for all people. 9 
A persistent theme in the argument on immigration control 
has been that racial characteristics should not be 
considered relevant criteria for controlling immigration. 
It has been argued that the law should not make 
distinctions or discriminate on racial grounds, but treat 
all equally regardless of race. 
A common justification for race relations initiatives, 
the Race Relations Acts in particular, has been equality of 
opportunity. David Ennals, speaking for the Labour Party 
during discussion of the 1968 Race Relations Bill, stated 
that the Government was determined that all citizens in 
Britain should have equal opportunity not only before the 
law, but also in housing, employment, education and all 
social provision. 10 The Liberal Party saw the purpose of 
the Bill to ensure that black Britons enjoyed the same 
opportunities as white Britons. 11 The Race Relations Board 
saw a dual purpose in the Bill: whilst positively creating 
an environment of equal opportunity for black and white 
citizens alike, it would help to eliminate racial 
discrimination. 12 The churches also supported this Bill, 
and the Archbishop of Canterbury viewed it as a measure to 
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promote good race relations, as defined by Roy Jenkins as 
equal opportunity, cultural diversity and mutual 
tolerance. 13 
Roy Jenkins introduced the 1976 Race Relations Act in the 
Commons and stressed that black Britons should have equal 
treatment in Britain regardless of colour, race or national 
origins. 14 Equal opportunity, he saide was the core of 
Labour's policy. 15 The Bishop of Worcester, representing 
the Church of England in the debate in the Lords, said that 
members of the churches would wonder whether, as a result 
of the Act, black Britons would enjoy a greater equality of 
opportunity. 16 The Commission for Racial Equalityo 
initiated by the 1976 Race Relations Act, was charged with 
the task of promoting equal opportunity as one of its main 
functions. 17 In a policy document of 1978, the Liberal 
Party affirmed that it believed in a multi-racial Britain, 
in which everyone had equal opportunity. 18 
It is clear that equality of opportunity has been a 
recurrent justification for policies in this area; however, 
definition of this equality has often been vague and 
imprecise. 19 The ideal of equality of opportunity is 
usually taken to denote that every individual should have 
an equal opportunity and right to develop his life and 
talents in the way he chooses, towards his desired 
rewards. 20 Individuals should compete in society on 
grounds of merit alone; other factors, such as social 
backgroundt race and sex should entail neither advantage 
nor disadvantage. There is in this an assumption that 
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these are attributes for which the individual is not 
responsible. Application, ability and merit are the key 
criteria in a judgement of 9qual opportunity. It has been 
suggested by Benn and Peters that talk of "equality" in 
equality of opportunity is, in fact, misleading. 21 
Supporters of equal opportunity are not arguing, they 
suggest, that everyone should be treated equally or have 
identical opportunities. Rather, supporters of equal 
opportunities are claiming that certain factorsr of which 
they disapprove, should not be considered relevant criteria 
in the distribution of benefits and handicaps. The choice 
of "relevant" criteria is not completely arbittary: unequal 
treatment on grounds that are approved of by the supporters 
of equal opportunity is considered acceptable. 
The provisions of the 1976 Race Relations Act illustrate 
such assumptions well. The Act forbids direct racial 
discrimination, defined thus: 
'A person discriminates against another in any 
circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision 
of this Act if on racial grounds he treats that other 
less favourably than he treats or would treat other 
persons. 122 
The Act also forbids indirect discrimination# that is# to 
apply to another a condition or requirement such that the 
proportion of persons of another race who can comply with 
it is 'considerably smaller than the proportion of persons 
not of that racial group who can comply with it' and which 
cannot be shown to be 'Justifiable irrespective of the 
colour, race nationality or ethnic or national origins of 
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the person to whom it is applied'. 23 The Act defines 
"racial grounds" as any of the following: 'colourl race, 
nationality, or ethnic or national origin', whilst "racial 
group" is defined as 'a group of persons defined by 
reference to colour, race, nationality or ethnic or 
national origins. 24- 
When 'colour, race, nationality or ethnic or national 
origins' are chosen as being criteria which should be 
irrelevant in promoting equality of opportunityt other 
inequalities result. This can be seen by examination of 
some successful prosecutions under the 1976 Race Relations 
Act. The following case details are taken from summaries 
which appeared in annual reports of the commission for 
Racial Equality, and are reasonably typical examples of 
such prosecutions. 
Firstly, two cases of racial discrimination. In the 
first case, Messrs L. Hussain and M. Sabar, both of 
Pakistani origin# applied for work as weavers in a 
Yorkshire textile factory, the vacancies having been 
advertised in the local newspaper. The men were told that 
the jobs had been taken, but later a white officer of the 
Bradford Commission for Racial Equality telephoned the 
company, and was invited for interview. It was 
subsequently found that all two hundred workers at the 
factory were white Britons. The firm admitted that they 
had discriminated on racial grounds and paid damages to the 
two men. 25 In the second case, Mr Dawinder Singh Juttla, 
an Asian who had come to Britain from Kenya, saw a flat 
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advertised in his local newspapers and arranged to meet the 
landlord and view the flat. When Mr Juttla arrived at the 
meeting with his wife, the landlord told him that the flat 
had just been let. However, a telephone call half an hour 
later from an English friend of Mr Juttla's established 
that the flat was still available. The landlord eventually 
paid damages for discrimination on racial grounds. 26 
The 1976 Act also made indirect discrimination illegal, 
that is, practices which adversely affect one racial group 
more than another. In the third case, a girl of Pakistani 
origin applied for a job as a shop assistant with British 
Home Stores. She was told that she would have to wear the 
store's uniform, an overall over a skirt. The girl said 
that she could not do this: because of her muslim faith and 
her Pakistani origin, she had to cover her legs with 
trousers. The store argued that it c'ould not change its 
rules on uniform, and the girl withdrew her application. 
She subsequently initiated proceedings contending that the 
ban on her wearing trousers was an act of indirect racial 
discrimination. British Home Stores argued that it was to 
the benefit of their national commercial image that their 
shop assistants wear uniform. The Industrial Tribunal 
which heard the case decided that such uniform requirements 
were detrimental to persons such as the girl of Pakistani 
origin, and that it was an easy matter for the store to 
change its uniform regulations. The Tribunal ruled that 
the girl had been indirectly discriminated against, and 
that British Home Stores should change its uniform rules so 
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that women of similar faith and origin could wear a uniform 
which included trousers. 27 
The fourth case also entails indirect racial discrimin- 
ation. Mr Sewa Singh Mandla, a Sikh, tried to get his son 
admitted to an independent private school in Birmingham. 
He made it clear to the school's headmaster that his son, 
as a Sikh, would wear a turban. The Headmaster, a 
convinced Christian, was equally adamant that no pupils at 
his school were to wear turbans since these were symbols of 
a religion of which he as a Christian could not approver 
and that turbans were in any case hostile to the school's 
ethos. Mr Singh, with the help of the commission for 
Racial Equality, brought proceedings against the school, 
alleging indirect racial discrimination under the 1976 Act. 
After an appeal, the Headmaster was found guilty of such 
discrimination. 28 
These cases illustrate that to hold racial grounds as 
being irrelevant for denying equal opportunity leads to 
other inequalities. As was noted above, a common 
justification for the Race Relations Acts has been that the 
law should promote equality of opportunity for all 
citizens; none should have special rights. It is clear, 
however, in the cases cited above, that under the 1976 Act# 
the law can favour members of a racial group by bestowing 
rights upon them which would not be bestowed on other 
groups, 
In cases of direct discrimination in accommodation and 
employment, the freedom of, for examplet the landlord or 
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employer to exercise his preferences or judgement is 
restricted. This restriction of freedom may be justified 
on many grounds, not least that it nominally applies to all 
citizens, black or white, so that if a black British 
employer or landlord discriminated against a white Briton 
on racial grounds# he would also be guilty under the 1976 
Act. However, law does not operate in a vacuum; it affects 
and is affected by the society which it serves. The 
society favou red in race politics is a plural one, where 
racial group identity is recognised and encouraged (see 
Chapter Nine). Indeed, the 1976 Act encourages this 
thinking when it explicitly uses the term "racial group" 
and defines it in terms of colour, nationality, race and 
the like. In a group-based society where one group 
predominates both in numbers and resourcesp as white 
Britons do in Britain, such equal opportunity legislation 
is likely to bear most heavily on members of this majority 
group. There are evidently fewer occasions for minority 
racial group members to exercise any preference they may 
have to deny equal opportunities to other group members. 
In a group-based society, a policy of equality of 
opportunity is likely to favour one group more than another 
because equal opportunity is an individualistic ideal which 
does not fit neatly with the provisions of a group-based 
plural society. Equality of opportunity policy presents 
life as a race between individuals competing on grounds of 
merit and application. Law and social policy is aimed to 
make the race as fair as possible so that merit and 
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application are the sole deciding factors in the race. 
This rests on equality before the law and since individuals 
face equal law and rules, any subsequent inequalities are 
more acceptable. once racial groups replace individuals in 
the equal opportunity formulation and since groups control 
and dominate sectors of society, some groups have to be 
held back and have their opportunities restricted. 
Of even greater interest. are the examples of indirect 
discrimination cited above. In these cases, the law is 
choosing between, and favouring, the culture of one group 
rather than another. A girl of Pakistani origin who 
prefers to wear the dress of her racial group clashes with 
the preferences of a shop chain whose owners' preferences 
belong to another racial group for a particular dress 
style. At issue here are the cultural preferences of two 
racial groups. This is even more evident in the case of 
the Christian headmaster and the Sikh schoolboy. The 
Headmaster, on personal religious grounds, and for the 
promotion of his private school's culture, as embodied in 
uniform requirements, insists that turbans should not be 
worn by his pupils. The father of the pupil insists# again 
for reasons of religion and culture, that his son be 
allowed to wear a turban. Deadlock results. The Sikh 
father appeals to the law and secures a decision that his 
son has been discriminated against. The law must 
adjudicate and choose between the cultural and religious 
practices of different minority groups (for the sort of 
Christianity espoused by the headmaster must surely be held 
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only by a minority) and promote and protect one at the 
expense of another. 
These cases raise in an 'Acute manner the question of 
relevant criteria for discrimination. The preferences in 
these cases, by British Home Stores and by the Christian 
headmaster ýre not racial discrimination ds such. The 
preferences involved act to exclude certain persons unless 
they are able to accommodate themselves to certain cultural 
practices and preferences. There is nothing explicitly 
"racial" about such cultural preferences save that in 
Britain, "racial groups" are often synonymous with a 
particular type of culture and religion. The girl of 
Pakistani origin who will not wear a skirt, or the Sikh who 
insists upon his son wearing a turban are only 
discriminated against because of their own cultural 
preferences rather than on racial grounds. 29 British Home 
Stores' uniform policy would apply equally to a white shop 
assistant who preferred to wear trousers, but who would, 
presumably, have no case before the law. 
In these two examples of racial discrimination, the 
freedom of members of one racial group to practise their 
religious and cultural preferences is being promoted at the 
expense of members of another racial group's religious or 
cultural preferences. This is a dilemma: policies 
justified as increasing equal opportunity are decreasing 
the opportunities of some citizens. The dilemma stems from 
the application of individualistic equal opportunity 
practice to a group-based plural society. These cases 
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highlight some of the difficulties a plural society may 
have when it encourages cultural diversity. Should not all 
groups have freedom to practice their culture unless such 
practice harms others? How is it to be decided that the 
Sikh schoolboy has been harmed more than the Christian 
headmaster? (This problem is discussed in more detail in 
Chapter Nine below). An interesting insight into this area 
is provided by a remark of Alex Lyonj one of the spokesmen 
for the Labour Party during the debates on the 1976 Race 
Relations Bill. He stated that one of his justifications 
for the Bill was that treating black Britons adversely 
compared with white Britons was to do black Britons serious 
harm. 30 The true purpose of the Act would then appear to 
be to ensure some form of equality between groups rather 
than ensuring equality of opportunity. Minority group 
members can be treated differently, it seems, but only in a 
beneficial sense; this, as is suggested below# is a 
different concept from equality of opportunity. 
Policies of equal opportunity assume that people have, at 
least# a roughly equal chance to compete in society and for 
social benefits. It is# however, often argu'ed that for 
some people equal opportunity is a sham. Their social 
circumstances, it is suggested, mean that they cannot begin 
to compete upon an equal footing with others. one solution 
is to provide special helpi opportunitiest facilities and 
benefits to those viewed as being especially disadvantaged 
and who appear unable to use their equal opportunities 
fully. 
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Special help programmes have been directed towards black 
Britons since a number of them have been perceived to be 
living in poor social circumstances, receiving a less than 
adequate share of society's benefits and suffering racial 
discrimination. Since the mid-1970s this collection of 
handicaps has increasingly been referred to as "racial 
disadvantage". 31 Support and special help provisions to 
overcome the disadvantage have taken several forms, and a 
number of terms have been used to describe these policies. 
Terms such as "positive action", "affirmative action", 
"positive discrimination" and "reverse discrimination" are 
in frequent use, and sometimes applied with apparent 
indiscrimination to the same policy. There has been a good 
deal of confusion over what policies of -equal opportunity, 
positive discrimination, positive action and reverse 
discrimination involved. A study of local authorities# for 
example, found widespread uncertainty and differing 
interpretation of what constituted equal opportunity, 
practice and policy. 32 The author of an important work 
about positive discrimination suggests '... there is 
probably no more misconceived and misunderstood (sometimes 
deliberately) social policy practice in Britain'. 33 Some 
classification of these terms is needed, derived from the 
history of their development. positive discrimination 
programmes are initiatives based upon a perceived need or 
disadvantage. They typically involve public spending in 
attempts to remedy or ameliorate social problems, and as 
such they are not unusual in British social policy. 
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Programmes designed to meet special needs with special 
provisions for particular groups or geographical areas have 
been implemented in education and housing, for example. 34 
The 1966 Local Government Act was the first government 
initiative to allow extra public spending by local 
authorities to cater for black Britons. 35 
In the aftermath of Enoch Powell's "rivers of blood" 
speech, Harold Wilson, as Prime Minister, initiated the 
Urban Programme. The aim of the Programme was to channel 
public spending towards geographical areas of deprivation, 
particularly those areas where immigrant groups were 
concentrated. The defence of the Programme and subsequent 
attempts to "revitalise" the inner cities via Inner City 
Partnership schemes in the light of racial disturbances, 
have insisted that the basis of action was not race. 
Although many commentators have seen an implicit commitment 
in these programmes to help black Britons36 there has been 
a marked reluctance to use unambiguously racial 
characteristics as a basis for resource allocation-37 The 
Urban Programme was initiated by the Local Government 
Grants (Social Need) Bill. James Callaghant introducing 
the Bill in the Commons, spoke in the broadest terms and 
suggested that it was aimed at the poor of whatever colourl 
and was designed to give all Britons a fair opportunity and 
chance in life. 38 
The 1970-71 Report of the Race Relations Board claimed 
that the Board supported "affirmative action" and "positive 
action"t both terms apparently being used to describe the 
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same thing. 39 To the objection that special measures to 
help minorities were unfair, the Report replied that this 
objection rested on the belief that special programmes gave 
black Britons more than everyone else, when their real 
purpose was to give the same opportunities as the majority 
already enjoyed. 40 
In its 1972-73 Report, the Community Relations Commission 
argued that all that black Britons needed was an atmosphere 
conducive to equal opportunity. The CRC itself was 
committed to the creation of a society in which black 
Britons could participate equally in all spheres-41 The 
Race Relations Board's Report covering the period from 
January 1975 to June 1976 reveals an interesting 
development in policy. The Report suggested that there was 
a myth that minority groups were receiving favoured 
treatment. It distinguished between privileged treatment 
and different treatment necessary to achieve equal 
opportunity, and foresaw this distinction being 
increasingly misunderstood as the special problems of black 
Britons were tackled in the future. 42 The CRC's Report for 
1975-76 welcomed the Labour Government's white paper# 
'Racial Discrimination', which emphasised the existence of 
racial disadvantage, which the CRC defined as '... those 
disadvantages that stem from discrimination, intolerance 
and less equal treatment'. 43 The eradication of this 
disadvantage required, argued the CRC, many changes in 
public policy in the areas of social services, unemployment 
and housing. The CRC suggested that Government should 
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remove all inequalities in these areas which were based on 
race, colour and national origin; this required not only 
equality before the law but also "positive policies" to 
give more social resources to black Britons. 44 What was 
meant by "positive policies" was not detailed, but this 
strand of thought led the CRC to support# if only 
temporarily, positive discrimination based upon racial 
criteria. The CRC's justification for this was that until 
enough was known about the disadvantages experienced by 
black Britons, positive discrimination in their favour was 
necessary. 45 
It is evident that a developing strand of thought has 
been the need to direct special help towards black Britons. 
Public policy should, it has been arguedl not only provide 
equal opportunity in the sense of forbidding overt 
discrimination, it should also take positive action to help 
black Britons. The impression gained from the evidence 
cited above is that the early Urban Programme in the late 
1960s was aimed towards geographical areas of need in which 
black Britons lived. From the early 1970s, the emphasis 
shifts towards a more racial group oriented policy, and 
this movement becomes more pronounced with the discovery of 
racial disadvantage. It is difficult to identify clearly 
and exactly what is being suggested when "different" 
treatment is called for in order to provide equality of 
opportunity. It is particularly difficult to decide how 
much policy and values are based on racial criterial and 
their desired outcome. 
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The 1976 Race Relations Act took this "positive action" 
still further. Sections 35,37 and 38 allow members of 
racial groups to be specifically offered education and 
welfare facilities in preference to members of other groups 
if such an offer is to meet the 'special needs' of that 
group. 46 Reflecting the difficulty of terminology and 
definition mentioned above, discussion of these provisions 
in the 1976 Act reveals both ambiguity and difference of 
opinion. Lord Scarman, in a lecture given in 1977# 
described these provisions as 'reverse discrimination' and 
noted that discrimination against members of a 
disadvantaged group was illegal# but discrimination in 
their favour was legal. 47 The author of an academic study 
of the law and racial discrimination has written that 'the 
1976 Act firmly repudiated reverse discrimination'. 48 Alex 
Lyonj speaking in the Commons about the Bille said that he 
disliked the term "positive discrimination", and preferred 
to consider týe measures as correcting the disadvantages 
felt by particular racial groups. 49 similar sentiments 
were voiced by Roy Jenkins# Labour's Home Secretary# when 
he introduced the Bill. Referring to these provisions, he 
stated that it would be wrong to ignore the disadvantages 
suffered by so many black Britons, and that formal 
principles of equality must be set aside in their favour. 50 
In practices the 1976 Act allows training bodies, for 
example, to offer members of a particular racial group 
access and encouragement in training opportunities if it is 
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observed that during the last twelve months: 
1) there were no persons of that group among those 
doing that work in Great Britain 
or 
2) the proportion of persons of that group among those 
doing that work in Great Britain was small in 
comparison with the proportion of persons of that 
group among the population of Great Britain. 51 
Similarly, employers are allowed to offer 'encouragement' 
to employees of a particular racial group, 'to take 
advantage of opportunities for doing the work of that 
establishment'. 52 Again the main criterion in justifying 
this provision is that members of that racial group are 
under-represented in that firm. Lustgarten suggests that 
under this provision a black Briton employed by a firm may 
be given training, apprenticeships, secondments for 
example, which a white employee is denied. 53 Examples of 
the exercise of these provisions include the mounting of 
'special access' courses in colleges of further education 
and polytechnics. 54 A local authority in London has 
offered places on a local government administrative 
training officer scheme to black Britons only. 55 
Derbyshire has recruited trainee police cadets from 
minority groups without the usual necessary qualifications, 
in the hope that special training will raise the cadets to 
the standard necessary for selection. 56 
It must be noted that these provisions apply to education 
and training and not to Job selection# where it would be 
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illegal to use race as a criterion of selection or 
exclusion for employment. 57 In practice, however, it is 
arguable that once minority group members had been given 
special training opportunities that this could affect the 
selection process as well. 58 The underlying argument for 
these provisions is to facilitate equality of opportunity 
by giving those with the potential the opportunity to 
become qualified when otherwise, it is argued, racial 
discrimination and racial disadvantage would prevent this. 
Such people are given special help, but once qualified they 
are left to compete within the framework of policies of 
equal opportunity. There is an ambiguity, as was suggested 
abover about how these provisions should be regarded. 
Policies of reverse discrimination are common in the United 
States# where the term often refers to policies giving 
special and preferential treatment to minority groups who 
are believed to suffer, or have suffered, disadvantage or 
discrimination. Often this favourable treatment is enacted 
by way of a quota system; in policing a racially divided 
area, for example, the police force might be required to 
reflect such racial divisions in the composition of its 
force. 59 Such quotas are forbidden in Britain by the 1976 
Act, although some local authorities have set "targets" by 
which they have tried to reflect the composition of the 
local population in their work force. 60 Such targets 
require some implicit or explicit racial quota. 61 Reverse 
discrimination need not employ quotasi howeverl and the 
relevant provisions of the 1976 Act are perhaps best 
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regarded as reverse discrimination without the use of 
specific quotas. 
The Commission for Racial Equality has been the main body 
responsible for implementing the 1976 Act, and its 
publications on employment for example, are revealing-62 
The CRE has been keen to identify areas where workers from 
minority racial groups are under-represented in employment 
categories in comparison with the majority group in a 
firm's work force, or in that particular labour market. If 
workers in a racial group are found to be under- 
represented, then in the view of the CREy "positive action" 
should be taken to rectify the situation. Specific quotas 
or ratios are not mentioned, but there is an apparent 
guiding principle of fair or equal representation. The 
overriding idea is that black Britons should be represented 
throughout the work force in proportion to their numbers in 
society. 
The Bishop of Liverpool argued in 1976 for what he called 
positive discrimination, the spending of more money in the 
inner city areas where many black Britons lived. 63 In his 
report on the Brixton riots, Lord Scarman repeated his 
support for 'positive action'; he suggested that black 
Britons had special needs which justified special help in 
geographical areas of deprivation. He emphasised that the 
need of such people, rather than any other criterion, 
should be the basis of such special help, and believed that 
Parliament had already acknowledged this in the principles 
of sections 35,37 and 38 of the 1976 Act. 64 Later in his 
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reportp Lord Scarman described these policies as 'positive 
discrimination', an indication of the various terms used in 
this area. 65 During the Parliamentary debate on Lord 
Scarman's report, Roy Hattersley called for special 
programmes of help, particularly in the area of employment 
for young black Britons; this would not be granting them 
greater opportunities than their white counterpartst but 
the same opportunities, which were at present denied 
them. 66 
Policies of "positive action" and reverse disrimination 
have frequently been justified by participants in the race 
area as helping the disadvantaged so they can then compete 
within a framework of equal opportunity. Another 
principle, however, is proposed by those who desire an 
equality of outcome whereby racial groups are spread 
proportionately throughout society according to their 
numerical presence. This idea of proportionate racial 
equality appears to be playing an increasingly important 
part in the debate. 67 The reverse discrimination 
provisions of the 1976 Act are justified on the grounds of 
being a counterweight to racial disadvantage; positive 
action is employed to achieve a fair representation of 
racial groups throughout society. There is also incidental 
evidence to support this interpretation: Lord Scarman, for 
example, spoke in his report of the need to recruit more 
coloured police so that the racial identity of the police 
force 'fully reflects that of the society the police 
serve'. 68 
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Conclusion 
The evidence considered above reveals that several 
different ideals of equality have featured prominently in 
the politics of race. These ideals rest upon differing 
assumptions, some of which conflict'with others. 
The principle of equality before the law has been an 
overriding one, and early in the debate on immigration 
control, this principle declared that racial 
characteristics should be discounted in law making. 
Immigration control, it was argued, should be based on 
other criteria, such as the nation's economic needs or its 
capacity for absorbing immigrants. Equality before the law 
is individualistic in emphasis: each citizen (or in the 
case of immigration control, each potential citizen) stands 
before a law which is impartial. Racial group membership 
on racial or national characteristics should neither 
benefit nor disadvantage the individual under this 
principle. 
Policies of equality of opportunity, however, rest upon 
somewhat different principles. Equal opportunity policies 
are competitive and individualistic in emphasis, and extend 
the principles of the market place to all aspects of life. 
Competitors are set free from arbitrary constraints and are 
then free to compete to the full extent of their ability 
and commitment. The basic premise underlying the Race 
Relations Acts has been the acknowledgement of constraints 
of racial discrimination# and a series of measures to 
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remove them. 
However# as suggested above, the outcome of the Acts has 
been somewhat different from the major justifications used 
to support them. Removing one inequality has rarely 
achieved a neutral effect. The aim of helping a racially 
identifiable, minority requires the restriction of some of 
the freedoms and preferences of the racially identifiable 
majority. The principle of indirect discrimination, the 
practice of which was forbidden under the 1976 Act, served 
to promote minority racial group culture without 
safeguarding the group culture of the majority. Under the 
prohibitions of the Act, equal opportunity to participate 
has been denied to members of the majority racial group 
where minority group cultures are in conflict with them. 
The problems that occur appear to stem from the group- 
based nature of policy in the Race Relations Acts, which 
has been justified by the individualistic ideal of equal 
opportunities. A conflict between group-based and 
individual-based policies is apparent. "Positive action" 
policies, which have been interpreted above as being based 
on the achievement of proportionate racial equality without 
the explicit use of quotas, rest upon assumptions very 
different from those of equal opportunity. Proportionate 
racial equality policies assume that proportionate equality 
is an indication of the existence of equal opportunity. 69 
There is a supposition of fundamental equality which 
dictates that there should be a proportionate distribution 
of all racial groups at every level in society, and that 
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when this distribution does not occur proportionately# this 
is the result of policies of racial discrimination. There 
is an assumption that under-representation must always be 
due to a denial of fair competition, and external 
influences. As was suggested in Chapter Six, the social 
determinist argument leads to an emphasis on external 
forces having restricted the abilities of the individual. 
Proportionate racial equality is very different from 
equality of opportunity. Equal opportunity policies are 
concerned with a distribution based on merit alone, all 
competitors being placed at the same starting-point. There 
is an emphasis on individual responsibility and initiative, 
whereby the well-motivated will forge ahead of the poorly- 
motivated. Individual motivation, culture and ability is 
the key to success or failure in the society based on equal 
opportunity. Proportionate racial equality policies, 
however, do not take into account questions of motivation 
or ability, and their desired end is a numerically 
proportionate representation of all racial groups. Equal 
opportunity entails the opportunity or freedom to fail, and 
is based on performance rather than a predetermined rate of 
success and failure. Policies of proportionate racial 
equality presume an innate equality of both ability and 
motivation in all racial groups, which is not necessarily 
borne out by the evidence. Studies of the performance of 
different racial groups in Britain suggest that all black 
Britons do not achieve in a uniform manner: school pupils 
of Asian ethnic origin appeart for example, to achieve 
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better results than black Britons of West Indian ethnic 
origin. 70 Such disparity presents the liberal outlook with 
several conflicts; if all groups are supposed to be 
innately equalt and if racial disadvantage is also 
experienced equally, then it is difficult to account for 
disparities of achievement without also considering 
questions of motivation. This naturally brings into focus 
the issues of culture and the controversial area of racial 
differences in inherited intelligence. 71 
This neglect of the influence of culture contrasts 
markedly with the liberal desire for a plural society. As 
is argued below in Chapter Nine, the desire for a 
culturally plural society emphasises the enrichment and 
value of different group cultures. Proportionate racial 
policiest howevert discount the cultural d ifferences both 
between different minority racial groups and between them 
and the majority racial group. The plural society also 
celebrates diversity, yet proportionate equality leads 
inevitably to uniformity of outcome: if a minority racial 
group accounts for twenty per cent in societyr then they 
must achieve twenty per cent of, for example, jobs in every 
sector of the work force, regardless of individual choiceo 
This argument can also be said to presuppose that the 
cultural aspirations of the majority racial group will 
naturally be desirable for each of the minority groups; it 
overlooks both the diversity of aspirations within the 
minority groups, and presupposes a universal appeal of the 
aspirations of the majority racial group. (For more 
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discussion of this point# see Chapter Ten below). 
Policy in this area has been hesitant, or even coy, in 
explicitly identifying people on racial grounds for 
preferment. A gradual move is apparent, however, from the 
1970sp when area-based policies were defined to help the 
disadvantagedt towards specific race-based policies. The 
reverse discrimination provisions in the 1976 Act, Lord 
Scarman's recommendations in his report on the Brixton 
riots, Roy Hattersley's remarks on the Scarman Report, the 
CRC's report of 1975-76, all point towards action based 
upon racial criteria. Such policies run counter to the 
principles of equality before the law, which have always 
excluded racial identity or origin as criteria. one policy 
demands that the question of colour is an unsound 
criterion, the other demands that formal equality before 
the law be waived on the criterion of colour. Policies to 
benefit members of one racial group must always involve a 
lack of advantage to the members of another racial group. 
The cost of these policies, it could be argued, is that 
disadvantaged white Britons can be denied on racial grounds 
certain opportunities offered to black Britons. Once 
racial group membership is taken into account in 
identifying and helping the needyl then (unless resources 
are infinite) special help to one particular group must 
necessarily discriminate against those of any other racial 
group* In principle, therefore, it is difficult to 
distinguish between those who would benefit black Britons 
on racial grounds, and those who would discriminate against 
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them on the same grounds. 72 
Equal opportunity would suggest that members of all 
racial groups should be allowed to compete for the benefits 
of society on the grounds of ability and application alone. 
If some of these benefits are then distributed by reference 
to racial group membership rather than on grounds of meritt 
equality of opportunity is denied. 
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Chapter Nine: Pluralism 
I 
The settlement in Britain of coloured immigrants from the 
New Commonwealth and Pakistan and their descendants raised 
questions about the relationship of these immigrants with 
the host society. Were the new black Britons to be 
encouraged to become as much like the indigenous population 
as possible, or should they retain their own culture and 
religion and live separately from both the white British 
and other immigrant groups? Did the solution lie somewhere 
between these approaches? It is possible to discern three 
broad alternatives in this area: assimilationy integration 
and pluralism. 1 It was the theory of pluralism in society 
which attracted most attention, and for that reason# the 
theory of pluralism is dealt with in most detail in the 
discussion which follows. 
Government policy towards coloured immigration to Britain 
in the 1950s and early 1960s was largely one of laissez 
faire. Little was done by either central or local 
government to aid the settlement of immigrants. In 
retrospect, this absence of action can be seen to have been 
based upon a theory of expected assimilation. The 
assumption was that black Britons would adapt to the 
culture and customs of the indigenous population, so that 
eventually skin colour would be their only distinguishing 
feature. Assimilation meant that the minority of coloured 
immigrants would conform to the majority white British 
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culture. 
The assimilation approach was paralleled and overlapped 
by an appeal for "integration". Assimilation policies were 
mono-cultural and mono-racial in - emphasis. The 
individuality of black Britons was expected to be 
subjugated to majority white British culture, religion and 
beliefs. The emphasis of integration, however, was on 
equal opportunity# a competitive individualistic ideal, but 
one within a framework of tolerance. Integration policies 
would lead, it was hoped, to a multi-racial, multi- 
religious, multi-cultural society; none would be hindered 
by their race or culture, all would be treated equally by 
each other and the law. The first race relations body 
inspired by central government, the Common wealth 
Immigrants Advisory Committee (CIAC) was set up to advise 
the Home Secretary about the 'integration of immigrants 
into the community'. 2 The CIAC was, however, also charged 
with an investigation of how local authorities had helped 
immigrants to 'adapt themselves -to British habits and 
customs'. 3 Assimilation was also its policy in the area 
of education; the CIAC's first report firmly eschewed 
pluralist policiest arguing that a national system of 
education should try to produce children who could easily 
fit into society# rather than children who reflected the 
different values of other minority racial groups. 4 
The debates on what became the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigration Act show speakers using the terms 
"assimilation" and "integration" interchangeablyl without 
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apparent distinction-5 The integration approach was to 
gain particular prominence in the mid-1960st When Roy 
Jenkinsp Labour's Home Secretary# gave integration a 
definition, which became widely adopted. He saw 
integration not as 'a flattening process of assimilation' 
but as 'equal opportunity accompanied by cultural diversity 
in an atmosphere of tolerance'. 6 
The integrationist approach gradually gave way in the 
late 1960s to an emphasis on pluralist policy# although the 
older vocabulary was still in use. professor Crick, 
commenting on the 1969 report Colour and Citizenship, 
remarked that it had 'reached pluralistic conclusions but 
when the research was begun assimilation was still in the 
airl. 7 Roy Jenkins, for example, was still using the term 
integration and defining it as he had in 1966# during the 
discussions of the 1976 Race Relations Act, when 
pluralistic ideas were clearly dominant. pluralist policy 
emphasised racial and cultural group identity, and 
encouraged membership of such groupings. Society was 
envisaged as a mosaic of groups living in harmony, with 
individual group members being free to practise their own 
culture so long as this did not harm others. 
The 1968-69 and 1969-70 reports of the CRC provide a 
useful indication of how policy in the area of race was 
moving to a more pluralistic stance at that time. The 
1968-69 report suggested that there was an increasing 
tendency to view immigration in a new light: initially, the 
focus had been on the problems of black Britons in settling 
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into a society which did not welcome them greatly; now the 
emphasis was moving towards the need for the indigenous 
population to interact with black British groups in a 
society which was already multi-racial. The change in 
title from the National Committee for Commonwealth 
Immigrants to the Community Relations commission was felt 
to be indicative of the new, wider scope of the body in 
dealing with the community at large. 8 
Policy at this point became aware of a potential problem 
in which separate group identity might lead to separatist 
policies, such as South African apartheid. The liberal 
pluralist ideal desires pluralism but not separatism-9 The 
CRC's report for 1969-70 illustrated its concern over this 
issue, acknowledging that any society which was multi- 
racial would tend to have groups focused around culture and 
nationality. However, it was concerned that black Britons 
might form themselves into enclosed groups which did not 
partic`p'ate fully in British society. 10 
The Liberal Party strongly supported the pluralist ideal# 
as shown by the 1973 document Forward with the Liberals. 
This affirmed that the ultimate aim for Britain should be 
cultural pluralism, in which groups could maintain their 
own culture and tradition so long as this did not 
'dislocate the common functioning of society'. 11 The major 
Liberal report on race, produced in 1974F also emphasised 
its support for a plural society, rejecting both policies 
of assimilation and separatism in favour of cultural 
pluralism, which it defined in some detail. What was 
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desired was a situation in which the black Briton was free 
to live in his own group or to participate in British 
society; it was important that the culture of immigrant 
groups endured. The report wanted the ideal of pluralism 
to be accepted throughout Britain, and particularly by 
those who had frequent contact with black Britons, such as 
teachers, social workers and the police. 12 During the 
debates on the 1982 British Nationality Act# Mr Tilley# who 
concluded the debate for the Labour Party, attacked the 
Conservatives for having missed the opportunity of 
stressing the benefit of ethnic and cultural variety, and 
instead viewing racial differences as a problem. 13 
The churches were generally strongly attracted by the 
concept of a plural society, in spite of having, 
presumably, most to gain from a Christian homogenous 
society in Britain. 14 The Bishop of Coventry, during the 
debates on the 1971 Commonwealth Act, said that many people 
were unhappy about the presence of black Britons and would 
be content to see them asked to leave Britain; in his view, 
however, Britain was renowned for accepting other races and 
deriving great benefits from them. 15 In 1976 the British 
Council of Churches acknowledged that Britain was a 
pluralist society consisting of a diversity of cultures 
which should be respected since a diverse society offered 
all members increased opportunities. 16 
Numerous examples of pluralist policies can be seen in 
the area of race; the Hunt Report of 1967 offers a clear 
illustration. One of the issues examined by the Report was 
314 
state-funded youth clubs in areas whore black Britons were 
of concentrated; it was found that these youth clubs often 
attracted an all-white or all-black membership. Should the 
state fund such "separate but equal" arrangements?. The 
Report suggested in fact that 'separate provision' for 
different racial groups was acceptable as long as no colour 
bar existed and membership was open to all races. 17 
The emphasis reviewed in Chapter Eight on meeting the 
special needs of black Britons through special provisions 
has contributed to the pluralist ethos. The Urban 
Programme directed both money and resources towards areas 
of high immigrant concentration, but lessened the racial 
aspects of this provision by emphasising that aid was for 
all within defined geographical areas. It is generally 
agreed, however, that such policies originated from concern 
for racial disadvantage and have continued to be directed 
chiefly towards such concerns. Appeals for "positive 
action", "positive discrimination" and "reverse 
discrimination" which have, as was suggested in the 
previous chapter, played an increasingly prominent part in 
discussion, have all contributed to the advocacy of a 
group-based society. When racial groups are singled out 
for special help then group membership becomes an important 
factor in defining the place of the individual in society. 
Similarly, the Race Relations Acts tend to emphasise race 
and racial group membership, and indeed, as was argued in 
the preceding chapterl tend to treat members of different 
racial groups differently. Particular policies also tend 
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to emphasise racial group membership: the Motor Cycles 
Helmet (Reliaious--Exemptions) Act 1976 exempts Sikhs from 
the requirement to wear crash helmets, for example. This 
exemption is, as the title of the Act suggests, based upon 
religious rather than racial# grounds. Nonetheless# group 
identity is both acknowledged and fostered by such 
legislation. 
The developing concern over multi-cultural education has 
produced a considerable quantity of literature on the 
subject, and changes in educational curricula. 18 
Questions raised by this concern include whether United 
Kingdom history is to be the major historical topic for 
students, or whether it should be combined with, or 
replaced by, the history of the countries from which the 
New Commonwealth immigrants have predominantly come. 
Similarly, questions have arisen over the teaching of 
French and German languages as opposed, for example# to 
Urdu and Creole. Religious education has also been the 
subject of much debate in schools where Christianity is no 
longer the predominant faith. 
A language of group identity has arisen# using terms such 
as "black youth". "black studies" and "black 
consciousness". A government-financed body has argued that 
black children needing foster parents should be placed only 
in families of their own culture and ethnic origin. 19 The 
British Agencies for Adoption and Fostering have suggested 
that black British children should only be adopted by black 
British parents, in place of the current practice of 
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adoption mainly by white families. The authors of the 
report suggested that in general, black children who had 
been adopted by white families seemed quite content* but 
that they: 
'did not, however, see themselves as black or show real 
signs of having developed a sense of racial identity. 
The children, while not directly denying their racial 
background, perceived themselves as white in all but skin 
colour. 120 
The Commission for Racial Equality, in its 1970 Annual 
Report, called for the setting up of a black civil rights 
movement to represent black voters. 21 The Labour Party has 
for several years debated the advisability of having a 
separate black section or group. 22 some local authorities 
have also contributed to these developments: the West 
Midland County Council has given special financial support 
to small businesses owned by black Britons. 23 
The evidence outlined above suggests that discussion of 
racial issues has moved increasingly towards a pluralist 
concept of society. Nevertheless, it is not easy to define 
this idea of pluralism precisely. ' it is a concept which 
has developed over a number of years to meet particular and 
varying needs, and means different things to different 
people. In generall however, the pluralist position 
features three underlying principles: 
(1) A plural society is one of diverse racial groupings 
and has a genuine unity based on mutual respect 
(2) A plural society should welcome group diversity 
unless society is harmed by such diversity 
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(3) A plural society is richer than a homogenous 
society. 
These claims are discussed below. 
II 
A plural society is a society_ of diverse raicialgroupings 
which has a genuine unity based on mutual respect. - 
Britain has always been a plural society in certain 
respects; the geographical nature of the United Kingdom 
together with past phases of invasion and immigration have 
ensured that this is so. Yet Britain has traditionally 
been viewed as a homogenous country-24 This traditional 
view has been challenged by the influx of immigrants from 
the New Commonwealth, and the development of an explicitly 
pluralist model for British society. It would appear that 
the arrival of New Commonwealth immigrants has prompted a 
different response from that which greeted waves of 
immigration of, for example, Huguenots or Irish. New 
Commonwealth immigration has led to the development of a 
pluralist model of British societyl previouso white# 
immigrants were expected to assimilate with the indigenous 
culture, as indeed, were New Commonwealth immigrants 
initially. 
Recently, there has been a tendency to conflate cultural 
characteristics and skin colour and to minimise the 
distinctions between different racial groupings. This can 
be seen in the diversity of expressions by which the 
membership of racial groups has been identified. A Liberal 
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Party document of 1973 refers to 'a nation of multi-racial 
communities'. 25 James Callaghan referred in 1968 to 'a 
-multi-racial society... diverse in culture'. 26 In 1976 
Roy Jenkins referred to 'Britain's racial minorities'27 
and the Bishop of Worcester alluded to 'the minority ethnic 
groups'. 28 The Commission for Racial Equality in 1981 
referred to 'black minorities'. 29 The 1976 Race Relations 
Act specifically defined 'racial groups' in terms of 
colour, race, nationality, ethnicity and national origin. 30 
In spite of this diversity of description, there is an 
assumption that groups based on recognisable criteria have 
a basic unity, or that this unity can be created. However, 
although frequent reference . 
is made to racial 
characteristics, talk of race is misleading. What might be 
meant by racial diversity is somewhat obscure. The 1976 
Race Relations Act does define racial groups in terms of 
racel colour, ethnic origin and nationality# but it is not 
easy to see how these attributes per se can contribute to 
any society. More importantly, the major defence of 
pluralism rests on the assumption that differences in 
colour are a measure of cultural differences. Defence of 
racial pluralism is actually a defence of cultural 
pluralism or cultural diversity. 31 
There has also been an assumption that recognisable 
racial groupings have a basic unity which, with effort, can 
be strengthened. This plural model envisages a society 
diverse in many ways but united and bound together by 
mutually-agreed principles. The model assumes that both 
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black and white Britons share the same views on basic 
values and the same view of the good society. This 
contention must be seen in the light of the evidence 
reviewed in Chapter Five, which indicated a strong 
hostility on the part of the majority of the indigenous 
population towards the creation of a plural society. 32 
Some of the evidence cited earlier in this chapter 
acknowledges this hostility, by reference to the 
"challenge" and "need" to "create" a plural society. A 
change in national values, organisation and outlook is 
being called for, against resistance to such a change. 
This disparity between the views of supporters of the 
plural ideal and the majority of the indigenous population 
of Britain, is a difference of opinion on the ideas and 
values which unite society. At issue -are differing 
concepts of an ideal society. It is not evidente however, 
that the pluralist model can deal with such disputes. The 
pluralist model respects and tolerates group diversity, and 
on this basis the resistance of the majority of the 
indigenous population to New Commonwealth immigration 
should be seen as a reflection of legitimate cultural 
aspirations. If this indigenous group does not wish to 
give citizenship to large numbers of immigrants, and if a 
large number of this indigenous group favour the 
repatriati. on of immigrants and their descendants, this 
presents problems for the pluralist model. 
Two possibilities present themselves in such a situation: 
one is to deny access to Britain of immigrant groups, the 
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other is to welcome them and largely disregard the views of 
the majority of the indigenous group. The plural model, 
however, requires respectful tolerance of all groups, and 
these groups clearly have irreconcilable differences, The 
liberal pluralist dilemma lies in the attempt to respect 
the views of a majority group whilst nevertheless largely 
overriding these views. Equally, any minority group which 
challenges the pluralist ideal will present a moral 
dilemma. The pluralist model requires and assumes an 
initial consensus of shared values, and pluralist policy 
recommendations are predicated upon the existence of such a 
consensus. 33 Differences are to occur, it is implied, only 
within a consensual framework. The model is not capable of 
dealing with fundamental issues such as disputes over 
citizenship, or the foundation of a plural society in the 
first place. 
The nature of politics also poses a problem. Politics 
can be defined as the resolution of conflict. In a group- 
based society where divisions are 'based on recognisable 
skin colour differences, and cultural differences# and 
where such views are likely to be strongly held, it is 
improbable that major issues can be resolved in a pluralist 
manner. where disputes are about group-derived principles, 
deeply-held beliefs, ideals of citizenship and of the 
perfect society, it is unlikely that the consensus which 
the pluralist model requires will be found. Indeed, the 
more diverse and plural the society, the less likely are 
any disputes to be resolved in a consensual manner. 
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Northern Ireland provides a striking example of a plural 
society where major issues cannot be reconciled in a 
consensual way. Those pressing the plural model may have 
difficulty, for example, in supporting their views against 
those who desire a more homogenous society. if pluralism is 
to be taken seriously, support for pluralism must be seen 
as the belief of one or more groups' members competing with 
the views of other groups. It is not clear how beliefs can 
be evaluated in the plural model if they are simply viewed 
as the cultural preferences of one particular group or 
groups. So while there may be conflict in a plural 
society, there may be little resolution whilst the 
principles of pluralism are adhered to strongly. It seems 
that a culturally plural society may be incapable of 
achieving a common view or a common good, since any 
viewpoint must be seen as one possible belief amongst 
others. 34 only if there is substantial agreement among 
many citizens in a plural society on an issue (itself 
unlikelyl given a plurality of values) could there be a 
common good. Consequently, the establishment of a plural# 
multi-racial, multi-cultural society in the face of a 
majority group's hostility cannot be achieved within the 
terms of the pluralist model. 
Whilst pluralism favours cultural diversity, it requires 
mutually-agreed basic principles. There is an absolutism 
about the basic values necessary to create the initial 
consensus on pluralism together with a tolerance of 
diversity not considered essential.. However, this initial 
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assumption of unity makes pluralism unnecessaryl since if 
there is agreement about the basic framework and 
arrangement of society, pluralism becomes unimportant. 
Pluralism, then is only to operate in those cultural areas 
which are not considered essential# such as dress, food or 
religion. 
Aplural society should welcome group diversity_unless 
society is harmed by such diversity. 
The plural society encourages the cultural diversity of 
groups; members of different groups are encouraged to 
maintain their own culture, identity and unity. This 
encouragement of diversity raises the question of whether 
or not there might be a limit to such diversity. Plainly, 
there must be a limit, for at some point the value of 
variety will conflict with other valued principles. To 
take an extreme example, a culturally-derived practice of 
human sacrifice of outsiders would clearly be rejected by 
other groups. When the activities of one group impinge on 
another in a harmful way, then this, it may be assumedt is 
the limit of cultural diversity in a plural society. The 
major issue then is to determine a definition of "harm" in 
a plural society. 
What, in any given social context constitutes harm, is 
evidently a matter of some controversy. Debates on control 
of homosexual practice and pornography illustrate the 
diverse nature of Judgements of "harm" in society. 35 In 
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many respects, judgement of what is considered harmful to 
society depends on an agreed consensus within society. As 
one writer has suggested,. 'What is regarded as harmful 
depends upon the common values of the community and the 
ideal patterns of life cherished by it'. 36 Definition of 
harm in society arouses controversy in all s6cieties, and 
presents particular problems to a plural society. A plural 
society consisting of various groups, each with its own 
culture, has many allegiances and sensibilities to offend. 
What might appear trivial to an outsider can assume vital 
importance to a member of society: in Northern Ireland, for 
example, the very naming of "Londonderry" or "Derry" 
denotes political and religious stances and considerable 
controversy. The likelihood of members of one group 
feeling themselves harmed because of the activities of 
another is much greater in a plural society than in a 
homogenous one. White Britons may believe, 'as was 
suggested in Chapter Five, that large-scale immigration 
from the New Commonwealth is harmful in itself; black 
Britons may believe that the basic structure of British 
society works against their favour, and find that structure 
harmful. 
This issue can be illustrated by a number of cultural 
practices. Should black Britons be allowed to practise 
polygamy? Should female circumcision be available to those 
who want it? Should those of Asian origin be encouraged to 
treat women in a way that western women find "sexist"? 
Should Rastafarians claiming that cannabis smoking is a 
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religious practice be allowed to smoke this (presently 
illegal) drug? Should Moslems be given the opportunity 
during working hours to pray to Mecca if this disrupts 
normal work schedules? Should Christians be able to 
enforce Sunday trading laws? Should Shobeenst illegal 
unlicensed gambling, drinking and drug-taking clubs, be 
encouraged on the grounds that they are part of the 
Caribbean culture? Should Moslem girls be segregated from 
male pupils in mixed sex state schools? Should the death 
penalty for murder, part of Jamaican culture, be encouraged 
in Britain? Should the hostility of the National Front's 
supporters to black Britons be fostered since it can be 
argued to be a manifestation of a group's culture? Should 
Asians be able to slaughter animals in ways which many 
white Britons consider cruel? Should a persuasive 
educational campaign be directed towards the white British 
group when their views can be seen to be derived from their 
group culture? Should jokes at the expense of racial or 
national characteristics be allowed? 
All these practices, and many others, can be viewed as 
culturally-derived diversity and yet they give rise to many 
problems. Some are presently illegal, others conflict with 
white British traditional values. Unlimited diversity, it 
can be concludede is not the ideal of a plural societyl 
limits have to be set. Achieving a consensus on these 
limits is made more difficult, as was suggested in Chapter 
Six, by social determinist thinking. It is unclear how 
social practices can be judged harmful in a diverse society 
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consisting of socially determined members. Ideas of what 
is harmful are presumably the result of the influences of 
the environment on the individuall in a plural society# 
group culture adds to this influence. This argument 
implies relativity of social thought: members of one social 
group believe something is harmful or beneficial because 
their group culture believes it to be so. Members of 
another group may not support their view for the same 
reasons. A Moslem may favour values which view wives as the 
housebound, obedient property of their husbands; western 
feminism may be regarded by Moslems as a threat to their 
values and way of life. It is difficult in a plural society 
to adjudicate between competing group views. Adjudication 
is made even harder when the views of minority groups clash 
against each other. When Moslems disapprov e of homosexual 
practice, which minority group should be supported? 
Traditionally, British practice has relied upon the concept 
of a reasonable man, notionally on a Clapham omnibus# to 
act as a litmus test of harm and offence. Reasonable men 
in a plural society, however, are unlikely to have a 
coherent and consistent view of what constitutes offence. 
Whilst the plural society exists, group members will be 
differently shaped by their experience of their social 
environments, and consensus on harmfulness is as difficult 
to achieve as any other. 
Agreement on social practices might be reached by 
bargaining, a compromise over certain cultural practices 
until a consensus was reached. The question of relative 
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power between groups would also arise. it is unlikely, 
however, that this consensus would be the diverse society 
originally intended; rather, it would be a homogenous 
society based on a set of compromises. This would both 
limit diversity and depend upon the strength of conviction 
with which cultural practices were upheld. it is difficult 
to see how a plural society can remain plural and yet deal 
effectively with genuine, deeply-felt diversity. Judgement 
on what is harmful must rest upon a consensus, and whilst 
pluralism does not create this consensus, it assumes that 
it already exists. 
Whilst pluralism encourages cultural variety and 
diversity, it requires that the individual does not care 
too strongly about his cultural preferences. If he does, 
and those preferences conflict with those of otherst he is 
unlikely to be tolerant. If, howevere the individual does 
not support his preferences strongly, the diversity he 
represents will not withstand much pressure from the views 
of others, and will not survive. His weak support would be 
replaced by bland, tolerant indifference. 
IV 
A plural society is richer than a homogenous society. 
Perhaps the most common argument and justification for 
the plural society has been that a diversity of culture 
wil. 1 produce a richer society. The mixing of religioust 
cultural and racial groups, it has been argued, will enrich 
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the whole of society. Britain, before the start of 
immigration from the New Commonwealth, it is implied, was 
dull. 37 
Roy Jenkins, speaking for the Labour Party during the 
discussion of the 1971 Commonwealth Immigration Bill, 
rejected Enoch Powell's view that black Britons would form 
unassimilable concentrations in the English cities. 
Jenkins argued that immigrants to Britain in the past had 
pushed Britain out of its insular sluggishness# and that no 
institution could be pre-eminent if it drew solely on its 
own racial grouping. 38 Church leaders argued similarly# 
and seemed particularly keen to stress this point. Bishop 
Woods spoke for the Established Church during the debate on 
the 1976 Race Relations Bill, and said that the cultures of 
black Britons were beneficial to the host communityj 
bringing with them more variety and interest-39 The 
Archbishop of Canterbury in his 1976 Christmas Day sermon 
said that the new immigrants brought enrichment with them, 
and that if this enriching quality were recognised, racial 
hostility would be much reduced. 40 During the debates on 
the 1971 Commonwealth Immigration Act, the Bishop of 
Coventry spoke of the need to emphasise the positive side 
of immigration, that of creating a multi-cultural# multi- 
racial family vibrant with life and rich with many-sided 
culture'. 41 
In its 1966 Report, the National Committee for Common- 
wealth Immigrants confirmed that its business was to make a 
new society, 'enriched rather then disturbed' by the 
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presence of immigrants. 42 Michael Winstanleye speaking for 
the Liberal Party in 1968, suggested that it was a strength 
of Britain that the nation consisted of a variety of 
groups, each group contributing something of value to the 
whole. 43 A Labour Party documentr Labour Against Racism# 
published in the mid-1970s, emphasised that without the 
immigrant population, many public services would be unable 
to operate, and welcomed the wider choice of restaurants 
and foods now available. 44 This utilitarian argument was 
considered in some detail in Chapter Seven abovel the 
implications of this argument for pluralism are considered 
here. 
It is clear that the idea of an underlying consensus 
referred to earlier runs through this argument also; whilst 
diversity of culture is seen as a good thing# the evidence 
above suggests that this diversity is to be carefully 
controlled. The plural society is one whose members 
experience cultural diversity in a relaxed manner. There 
is an inherent presumption of harmony, and that diversity 
can be experienced in a tolerant and mutually beneficial 
manner. It is plain that there must be a clash of 
cultures, since groups have to exist separately and 
differently for there to be enrichment, The assumption is 
that this is a society where it is challenging for cultures 
to interact and clash with each other, and that social 
progress is made by such interaction. Yet underlying this 
is the assumption of consensual harmony, that all will be 
appreciatede understood and enriched by every group. 
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The concept of "enrichment" ist however, not detailed. 
It is not clear, for example, how a black Pentecostalist is 
enriched by the existence of mosques, or how western 
feminists can be enriched by Moslem attitudes to women# or 
how liberals might be enriched by Powellites. Whilst 
cultural enrichment is celebrated, here, paradoxically the 
plural society seems indiscriminate about culture. On the 
one hand, the plural model places heavy emphasis on group 
culture and celebrates cultural diversity, but on the 
other, it appears to assume that all cultures are equally 
valuable and beneficial. There is little or no evidence of 
any desire to evaluate or discriminate between cultures. 
Yet given the diversity of cultures, it is unlikely that 
all can be beneficial, and a critical evaluation is called 
for. It seems that in practicel the cultural diversity 
brought by New Commonwealth immigrants to Britain is 
simply, and wholly welcomed, without such critical 
appraisal. 
The pluralist model makes few judgements on competing 
life styles and cultures. Again, there is an assumption of 
consensusl and group cultures are assumed to be of equal 
merit and equally capable of contributing to the plural 
model. Group cultures must, however, differ from each 
other# and are encouraged to do so by the plural society. 
One group's culture may be individualistic, hardworking, 
competitive and secular, but another may be less 
competitive, group-oriented and religious. The plural 
society appears to make no critical evaluation of these 
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very different cultures. it is difficult to know what 
criteria could be used in such an evaluation by a plural 
society, since opinions of social good are likely to vary 
with group membership. 
The make-up of the plural society may also inhibit 
enrichment. Groups in a plural society should agree on the 
basic principles of society, but go their separate ways in 
cultural, religious and other matters. But it is these 
very areas which the plural model encourages to keep 
separate and distinctive# which are to be the source of 
enrichment. Who is likely to be enriched by such 
diversity? It is unlikely to be the individual strongly 
committed to his own group identity, and the weak group- 
member who assimilates the views of others gives little in 
exchange. The Moslem fundamentalist, the black Pentecost- 
alist, the liberal and the Powellite, for examplel are 
unlikely to feel themselves enriched by each other's 
existence. The person strongly attached to his group 
identity is unlikely to benefit by social diversity if he 
does not value the culture of other groups. 
The person whom the plural arrangement most favours is 
the consensuall tolerant# bland, culturally neutral person 
who holds few preferences strongly. Such a person can move 
through group society tasting alternative cultures and 
religions everywhere# happy to attend a cathedral, mosque 
or a Pentecostal church in succession. 45 It is those who 
do not hold religious or cultural preferences very strongly 
who enjoy the full diversity of plural society, not those 
331 
who have deeply-held convictions. The greater the number 
of those lacking strong group commitment in a plural 
society, the less plural that society will be. The 
argument for enrichment benefits most the cosmopolitan non- 
group members who would unconsciously weaken the diversity 
of a plural society. 
Another assumption of the pluralist model is that members 
are self-interested: they recognise that they can benefit 
or be enriched by the plural society and conversely will 
lose by the existence of a homogenous society. This has 
interesting consequences for the pluralist model. 
Pluralism requires consensus, tolerancee commitment to 
inter-group harmony. Encouragement of self-interest in the 
members of a plural society, however, is likely to work 
against this tolerant consensus, for selfish people are 
unlikely to produce harmony and consensus. Insteado 
selfishness, individualism and inter-group competition are 
likely to result. This is evidently not the desire of 
supporters of pluralism, but once self-interest is appealed 
to, it is a possible result. The plural model requires a 
prior commitment to other values before full-bodied self- 
interest. Otherwise, justification of plurality by appeals 
to self-interest are likely to undermine the values which a 
plural society rests upon. 
It is not clear that the outcome of a genuinely plural 
societyg embodying varied racial culture and religion, will 
be a richer society. At least three outcomes appear 
possible. A varied society may lead to a vigorous, healthy 
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society; a society whose members are anxious to sample a 
variety of cultures and religions, to find the best 
synthesis for themselves. A second possibility is that 
such a society will produce a nation where separationt 
segregation, division and antagonism exist; a society where 
all feel offended and "harmed" by others. In this 
instance, members of each group resent the race# culture 
and religion of other groups and discriminate against each 
other on group criteria. A third possibility is a society 
whose members are not enriched by diversity; no-onet and no 
particularly groupg is enriched, or particularly offended 
by the beliefs of others, since no-one cares very deeply. 
All cultures and religions are seen as matters of personal 
choice, equally valid and legitimate# worthy of equal 
respect; none are worth arguing over. The ethos of such a 
society is that everyone should do whatever pleases them 
most. 46 
Whilst the first possible outcome is that expected by the 
supporters of plural policies, there is little to justify 
their expectation. This outcome is likely only if all 
groups agree the liberal viewpoint of what is acceptable 
and desirable. Such agreement would, however, undermine 
the continuation of plural diversity. 
Finallyl the plural society would appear to be a 
transitory phenomenon. If it were to work in the area of 
race# then after a few generations, a homogenous society 
would reappear. Members of differing groups would be 
enriched by the beliefs and practices of other groupse 
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embracing those practices and adapting them for themselves. 
The result would be the disappearance of a plural society, 
and the reappearance of a homogonous society in its place. 
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Chapter Ten: Community 
The ideal of community has been much used in the liberal 
response to the politics of race: "community" and the 
practice of "community relations" have been presented as 
desirable goals. Unfortunately, the meaning attached to 
community in this area has been largely unexplained; the 
term has been used principally to describe the goal of 
liberal values and policies. The values identified in this 
study as being key ones in the response to race politics, 
that is a social determinist view of man, rationality, 
equality and pluralism, are understood here to have as 
their goal the idea of community. Close study of these 
arguments suggests that in several respects, the ideal of 
community is undermined by certain aspects of these values. 
ii 
The word community, or similar terms, has been used freely. 
The Labour Government's 1965 White Paper 
_Immigration 
from 
the Commonwealth, for example, affirmed the need for 
'harmonious relations between different races who now form 
our community'. 1 The race relations body# the National 
Committee for Commonwealth Immigration, wrote of its work 
that it was 'bringing new ideas to bear on new situations# 
changing attitudes and infusing a new spirit into the 
community life'. 2 During the Second Reading of the 1968 
Commonwealth Immigration Bill, James Callaghan spoke of his 
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Party's commitment to 'a society in which all communities 
will have respect for each other'. 3 The Liberal Party's 
document Forward with the Liberals in 1973 presented a 
policy for the 'long-term good for a nation of multi-racial 
communities'. 4 In 1968 the Archbishop of Canterbury 
stressed the need for education to help 'our community... 
to know what is the contribution that some immigrant 
communities have been giving... '5 Lord Scarman, following 
the Brixton riots, spoke of the need to involve 'not just 
black people, but all the community' in tackling the 
problems he had identified. 6 During the debate on the 
1976 Race Relations Act, Roy Jenkins argued that 'Racial 
discrimination and the disadvantages experienced by 
sections of the community are morally repugnant'7 and 
during the same debatep Liberal Alan Beith suggested that 
#a time of national economic crisis is a testing time for 
the whole community. It puts severe pressure on minorities 
and their relationship with the majority community'. 8 The 
Commission for Racial Equality wrote in 1980 that '... it is 
clear that many whites still do not accept blacks, even 
young blacks who were born herel as members of the 
community in the same way as themselves'. 9 
In spite of this widespread usage, the meaning of the 
term "community" is not explicit. This had been noted by 
some of those engaged in the debate: the Community 
Relations Commission, for example, referring in its 1972-73 
Report to its own work, commented that 'its general 
function to encourage the establishment of harmonious 
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community relations - has never boon satisfactorily 
defined'. 10 Perhaps the 1968 Race Relations Act gave the 
clearest definition, by defining community relations as 
'relations within the community between people of different 
colour, race or ethnic or national origin'. 11 Such a 
meaning, however, still takes the term "community" for 
granted. The 1976 Race Relations Act gave the Commission 
for Racial Equality the task of promoting 'good relations 
between persons of different racial groups'. 12 
This general and somewhat broad usage presents 
difficulties in analysing the ideal of community in the 
politics of race. This difficulty is reflected in 
discussion of the use of "community" in other areas of 
social policy. For example, the sociologist Margaret 
Stacey has written that 'it is doubtful whether the concept 
"Community" refers to a useful abstraction'. 13 it is 
Halsey's view of the concept of community that 
$unfortunately it has so many meanings as to be 
meaningless'. 14 One study reviewed 94 different 
definitions of community, and suggested that the only 
common feature among them was that they were concerned with 
people. 15 Whilst doubt about the usefulness of the term 
"community" and its synonyms is acknowledged, difficulties 
of definition cant perhaps, be over-emphasised in British 
race politics. Close study of the way that the term has 
been used allows a reasonably clear image of its generally 
accepted meaning. Community in British social policy 
usually suggests social cohesion, unity, harmony, shared 
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values and geographical proximity. 16 The arrival, in the 
face of widespread hostility, of large numbers of Now 
Commonwealth immigrants, distinguishable from the 
indigenous population by racial, culture and religious 
characteristics, triggered the use of the term community in 
race politics. Community was then used to describe the 
indigenous white British population, the new black Britons, 
and sometimes both groups collectively. Community 
relations came to refer to relations between groups of 
differing racial, cultural and religious characteristics. 
Community is a prescriptive term; it is an ideal which, 
at least until it is given specific content, gains almost 
universal acceptance. 17 More than that, the word 
legitimises policy and policy goals. Whilst it has been 
common among liberals to refer, for example, to black 
British communities, reference is not made to the Powellite 
community or the National Front community. Certainly it 
would have been eccentric for an individual to claim during 
the period under discussion (1961-1981) that he was 
'against community'. As mentioned above, community brings 
to mind warm human companionship, a sense of consensus# 
harmony, agreement and belonging. For two hundred years 
and more, social theorists in the western world have 
favoured ideals of community; often these ideals have been 
viewed as the antithesis of urban capitalistic society-18 
In race politics, community has been a valuable 
legitimising concept, given the liberal assumptions of what 
constituted community and good race relations. White 
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Britons' hostility to New Commonwealth immigration and the 
creation of a multi-racial society (see Chapter Five above) 
made it unlikely that black Britons would readily be 
accepted as part of the existing community. This was 
sometimes acknowledged at the time: the National Committee 
for Commonwealth Immigration's report for 1965, for 
example, desired policies which would 'transform the 
present negative picture of a troubled society unable to 
cope with the concept of heterogeneity'. 19 The ideal of 
community had then a commendatory meaning in race politics# 
suggesting wholeness and unity, a fundamental unity of 
identity and purpose amongst both black and white Britons. 
Indeed, the liberal concept of community seems best 
characterised by the word "harmony"; harmonious relations 
between black and white Britons were seen to be the key to 
the good community. 
III 
An interesting feature of the concept Of community in race 
politics is that it has not been assumed to be a natural, 
inevitable occurrence: it has to be created and fostered. 
James Callaghan, speaking in 1968, said of the ideal of a 
multi-racial society that it 'will not happen of its own 
accord. It is something that has to be worked for. our 
policies must establish the ends that we will'. 20 Speaking 
against the Commonwealth Immigration Act in the same year, 
the Archbishop of Canterbury stated that such a bill would 
harm community relations and that, 'in recent years we have 
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been discovering more and more that good community 
relations do not entirely look after themselves'. 21 This 
view was shared by the Community Relations Council: 
'Community relations do not take care of themselves. 
Urgent and positive policies are needed in all sections of 
British life'. 22 The common claim that a clear example of 
leadership by governmental institutions# together with a 
persuasive educational campaign was needed to create good 
community relations also illustrates this theme. 23 The 
very existence of successive race relations bodies, the 
Commonwealth Immigrants Advisory Council, the National 
Committee for Commonwealth Immigrants, the Race Relations 
Board,, the Community Relations commission and the 
Commission for Racial Equality, shows that community 
relations were not expected to be generated without 
assistance. The purpose of such bodies, reflecting over 
the years the changing requirements of both the immigrant 
groups and the host community, has been the creation, 
supervision and promotion of good community relations. 
The achievement of community in race politics, it would 
appear, is not a natural and spontaneous product. Rather, 
it is a result of commitment, moral persuasion, education# 
leadership and the application of correct social policy by 
government. The idea that community and harmonious race 
relations must be created gives support to the view that it 
was recognised that the indigenous population did not 
welcome large-scale New Commonwealth immigration. if it 
were otherwiset there would have been no need to take 
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active steps to encourage a spirit of community. It is 
evident that one of the features of this idoa of community 
is that it was understood that its fundamental values must 
be provided by political leaders and educated opinion. 
Liberal opinion formers appear to have recognised that the 
new ideal of'community would not naturally spring from the 
majority of white Britons, given their hostility to large- 
scale immigration. 
The creation of community espousing liberal values and 
goals reflects some of the assumptions about human 
behaviour identified in Chapter Six. The strong theme of 
social determinism apparent in liberal values*views man as 
a malleable creature, susceptible to external influences. 
This understanding encourages the idea that leadership and 
education in "correct" values is required, and will be 
effective, in creating genuine community. Hence the 
liberal conception of community in race politics does not 
stem from loyalties generated freely by autonomous 
individuals, but from values of which individuals have to 
be persuaded. 24 This reflects the liberal assumption that 
New Commonwealth immigration to Britain* and the creation 
of a multi-racial societyl was an entirely acceptable 
process and goal. 25 The majority of white Britonso 
however, did not share this view. The liberal ideal of a 
multi-racial community could not be derived from the 
freely-expressed values of the white British population; it 
had to be created. 
The limited view of. individual autonomy encouraged by 
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social determinist assumptions presents problems for this 
Ideal of community. It is difficult to perceive how a 
vigorous, viable community could be created by people whose 
attitudes and behaviour were so strongly dictated by social 
circumstance. People whose autonomy and individuality can 
be overridden and moulded by tactics of persuasion are 
unlikely to be promising material for a good community. 
Those who are assumed to be unable to control or overcome 
their environment are more likely to be passive, mechanical 
and lacking in vitality; they might be expected to 
experience a sense of alienation rather than commitment to 
the values of a liberal, or indeed any, community. 
Linked to this is the problem. of achieving a sense of 
community. It was argued earlier that the key liberal 
values identified in this study, a social determinist view 
of man, rationality, equality and pluralisme have a common 
goal of harmonious community. However, it was argued in 
Chapter Six that in the social determinist view, values do 
not spring from the individual, but are the product of the 
environment and social experience. New values have to be 
given by a force outside the social sphere, otherwise they 
must be viewed as social determinist preferences 
themselves. This attitude produces an immediate division or 
inequality in the community between those who hold the 
"correct" values, and those who do not. Such a division 
inevitably strikes against any concept of community as a 
united, harmonious whole. 
The appeal to Utilitarian self-interest arguments raises 
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a number of issues for the ideal of community. 26 The 
argument, for example, that hostility against black Britons 
was fuelled by competition for scarce resources such as 
housing and jobs, implicitly challenges the idea of 
community. It downplays and disregards the existing sense 
of community in the indigenous population: it presents 
black Britons not as a challenge to traditional community 
values, but as a challenge to material progress and 
achievement. Presenting black Britons as competitors for 
scarce economic resources highlights their distinctiveness 
and their being outside the community; it shows them as 
being different and somehow competitors for something to 
which white Britons are entitled and they are not. 27 
Much policy in the area of race politics has been 
materialistic in nature. Social determinist ideas 
emphasise the effect of the social *environment on the 
individual, other policy argues that economic and cultural 
benefits were a natural result of immigration, and yet 
other policies view black Britons as competitors for scarce 
resources. Such emphasis on material gain, social shaping 
and competition seem to be unlikely components of a 
racially-harmonious community with a strong sense of unity 
and identity. 
The argument that black Britons should be accepted by the 
indigenous population for reasons of self-interest, because 
they bring economic and cultural gain (see Chapters Seven 
and Nine) seems somewhat anomalous if harmonious community 
is the desired goal. Black Britons are welcomed in this 
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instance not for their intrinsic worthi but for what they 
can contribute; the newcomers become on this basis an 
implement for the use of the existing community rather than 
full members of it. 28 If white Britons view black Britons 
as being people whose main role is to be used for 
enrichmentl whether financial or cultural# it is unlikely 
that black Britons will be viewed as fully-accepted equal 
members of a united community. Rather, they will remain 
outsiders, seen as "providers" rather than belonging to the 
community. Furthermore, the use of arguments of self- 
interest in appealing to white Britons suggests that they 
are highly susceptible to a profit motive and see life in 
terms of calculating profit and lossi such people are not 
naturally the sort to encourage a harmonious, co-operative 
community. Encouragement of self-interest would appear to 
be more likely to discourage harmony# and promote 
competitiveness rather than co-operative community. 29 
Supporters of the free market often claim that a pursuit 
of self-interest ultimately benefits society as a whole-30 
However, both free-market protagonists and their critics 
generally agree that freedom to pursue self-interest also 
leads to inequalities: some will prosper more than others. 
In a homogenous society such inequalities may not matter 
too much, though the liberal tradition is strongly 
associated with egalitarian values. in a society of 
different racial groupings, where group identity is 
recpgnised and supportedp the pursuit of economic self- 
interest commonly leads to discord. one racial group may 
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be more entrepreneurial than another and become wealthier, 
and this may lead to jealousy and a lack of harmony. It may 
even provoke discord still further by employing other 
groups as labour. The expulsion of East African Asians 
from Kenya in 1968 stemmed partly from this phenomenon# and 
there have been numerous instances elsewhere. This problem 
has not been acknowledged by those who assume that the 
interests of black and white Britons are naturally in close 
harmony. Harmonious community relations, with its 
implications of harmony of interests, could not be 
identified as a central goal of policy unless it was 
assumed that all the interests involved were basically 
reconcilable. 31 This is a major assumption. for in many 
plural societies group interests are not reconcilable and 
are in the nature of non-bargainable disputes. At present, 
Northern Ireland is an example of this phenomenon. 32 The 
emphasis on unity of interest in race politics has not been 
justified by the evidence of the unwillingness of the 
indigenous population to accept New commonwealth 
immigration. 
This emphasis on harmonious community# however, is a 
useful legitimising device, for it has a tendency to 
support the status quo, the established power structurese 
Conflict between different racial groupings, uncomfortable 
discussion, challenge of the accepted wisdom, is not 
encouraged. Instead, it is expected that all will work 
within the harmonious framework set out by liberal 
values. 33 White Britons are expected to tolerate the 
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existence of black Britons# and black Britons are oxpected 
to assimilate and accept the white British establishmont's 
political culture. This is expected in spite of the plural 
emphasis in race politics which might' give the opposite 
impression. The accommodation of black Britonsf and white 
Britons who oppose moves towards a more plural societyt 
becomes a matter of making small adjustments to the 
political framework. This. feature of British race 
relations has received criticism: it has been suggested by 
some authorities that the grievances of black Britons have 
been deflected by channelling them into the liberal 
consensual framework alone, 34 whilst the views of white 
Britons, as this study has concludedf have been largely 
disregarded. 35 Achieving and maintaining an apparently 
harmonious consensus has been made easier by restricting 
public debate (see Chapter Seven). Public debate of the 
"wrong" kind, that is debate which challenged the liberal 
conception of community, was presented as being harmful to 
good community relations. Some opinions, Powellite 
opposition to immigration and black Britons, radical black 
Britons' charges that Britain is a racist society, were 
considered too dangerous to be discussed. Indeed, the 
assumption of harmony of interests itself acts to exclude 
opinions which do not fit this harmony. 
A practical effect of the desire to promote good 
community relations via a consensual framework of mutual 
interests is that measures taken will generally be of a 
low-key nature. 36 To do otherwise might lead to discord 
353 
and arouse passionsi this might explain in part tho quiet 
way in which liberal opinion formers have generally dealt 
with race politics. 37 Given the hostility of white Britons 
to the creation of a multi-racial society and liberal 
support for such a society, there was an obvious appeal in 
the assumpt16n that interests were reconcilable., harmonious 
and bargainable. Active politics in a divided society can 
divide people very deeply. 38 
The emphasis on equality in race politics has interesting 
implications for the concept of community. The argument 
that black Britons suffer disadvantages from the structure 
of British society may hinder harmonious community, Those 
identified as disadvantaged may believe this so strongly 
that they feel alienated from the broader community and no 
longer give it support. Lord Scarman, in his report on the 
Brixton riots, suggested something similar when he 
identified the existence in Brixton and elsewhere of 
alienated young black Britons (see Chapter Three). It is 
also possible, however, that those identified as causing 
such inequalities may resent this and view the 
disadvantaged as merely those who will not join the 
community fully and compete for the social goods 
available. 39 In thisl they would have the support of the 
heavy liberal emphasis on equal opportunity which 
encourages people to compete for social goods. Even if 
there is no resentment amongst those who are seen to be 
disadvantagedi the charge of poverty and "backwardness" may 
encourage white Britons to see such people as not truly 
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belonging to the community. 40 
Equality of opportunity policies can be seen to have both 
a tendency to produce division, and to support the status 
quo. Equality of opportunity is a competitive 
individualistic ideal which pits people against each other. 
Rather than emphasising harmonious community# it encourages 
individuals to compete. In differentiating people on 
grounds of merit and encouraging competition between them, 
problems arise in a plural society. Unless all group 
cultures are identical (and this offends pluralist values)f 
it is possible that members of one group will be more 
entrepreneurial and successful than those of another. 
Economic competition is likely to result in inequalities, 
and this is likely to produce community tension. It was 
suggested earlierl however (see Chapter Nine)# that equal 
opportunity policies in race politics appear to make no 
recognition of cultural differences among racial groups. 
Banton has suggested that competition within a society 
between racial groups tends to damage harmony between them. 
He argues also that competition between individuals tends 
to break down barriers between racial groups. 41 This 
argumentj however, appears to take insufficient account of 
group culture, something stressed by liberals. if 
individuals of one group are by their cultural tradition 
less competitive, then whole groups will be characterised 
as winners and losers and stigmatised by their relative 
performance. 
Some aspects of equality of opportunity support forms of 
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harmonious community, since the opportunities to compete do 
not exist in a vacuum. The opportunities available to the 
individual are to establish himself and become successful 
within the framework of an existing community, and 
therefore reflect the values and ideals hold by that 
community. 42 This poses a major problem, however, if the 
favoured community is a plural one since establishing 
consensual values in a plural society is difficult (see 
Chapter Nine). The opportunities desired by individuals 
may well be those that are valued by their own racial group 
and may differ from other groups. The liberal model's 
ideal is a tolerant society in which everyone competes in 
an orderly fashion for the material and social goods 
available. However, these ambitions may. not be those of 
other groups, who may prefer other less tolerant or 
hedonistic values. 
Support for policies of "positive action" designed to 
achieve more equality, particularly reverse and positive 
discriminatione differentiate members of different racial 
groups, in order to achieve, it was argued in Chapter Eight 
above, proportionate equality. it was suggested in 
Chapter Eight that the extent to which racial criteria 
should be the basis for different and favourable treatment 
has been left unclear. However, even if the criterion is 
"need" alone, if this need is concentrated in a racial 
group whose members are then allocated extra resources, 
this is likely to provoke discord and resentment by members 
of other racial groups. 43 This potential discord has been 
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recognised by race relations bodies and by opinion leaders 
in race politics. For example# the Race Relations Board 
tried to make a distinction between different and 
privileged, treatment of racial group members. 44 Tho Board 
acknowledged that its aims gave it the appearance of being 
a partisan organisation, and it wanted 'the widely hold 
myth that the minorities constitute a privileged section of 
society' to be refuted. 45 Similarly, when the Urban 
Programme was initiated, opinion leaders were anxious to 
stress that the special help was directed towards 
geographical areas where need was concentrated rather than 
towards immigrants per se. 46 The cost of favouring one 
racial group will always be borne by other racial groups. 
If taxpayers in other groups have to pay extra to support a 
particular' group, or if they miss opportunities because 
members of another group are being favoured, community 
relations will be put under strain. 
The desire for a plural society poses perhaps the 
greatest difficulties for the idea of community, since 
community celebrates unity# whilst pluralism celebrates 
diversity. 47 A delicate balance is required in a plural 
society if inter-group harmony is to be either achieved or 
maintained. Members of a plural society are likely to feel 
more sense of loyalty to their own particular racial group 
than they are to the wider community-48 Perversely, the 
singling out of racial groups as being especially 
disadvantaged and in need of help is likely to foster the 
identity of that group rather than the community. Race 
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Relations initiatives such as the Community Relations 
commission's call in 1970 for a black Britons' civil rights 
movement encourage separate group identity. 49 One cost of 
such a programme is that any loyalty to the national 
community may be damaged, and loyalties towards such groups 
may be nurtured. 
This division of loyalties is made more likely because of 
the apparent inability of plural society to foster a sense 
of "common" good. 50 The ideal of a plural society embraces 
moral diversity, cultural diversity and hence disagreement 
over the ends of policy and politics. To the extent that 
racial groups are allowed to be genuinely diverse, to that 
extent plural society will be made up of sub-communities 
based on each group's individual interests and conception 
of the common good. Pluralism must provide an underlying 
cohesion and unity if community is to work. This unity is 
not of religion, nor is it of culture or racial group 
identity. In a strictly plural society, this unity is 
perhaps a minimalist framework of individual laissez faire. 
It was suggested in Chapter Nine that pluralism might 
result in unity, discord or bland indifference: each is 
possible. 
IV 
The ideal of community has been applied to British race 
politics at a time when it was feared that discord and 
inter-racial group hostility might erupt* The concept has 
been used widely and varyingly, but its main application 
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has been as a legitimising device which stressed harmony, 
common interests and unity. However, several aspects of 
other key liberal values act to undermine or negate this 
conception of community. Social determinist explanations 
of behaviour do not provide the individual with the 
qualities necessary to build a community; restrictions on 
public debate in the name of rationality and good race 
relations inhibit the community from developing a sense of 
common purpose out of widespread discussion. Moreover, the 
unequal treatment of racial groups serves to separate 
groups from each other, whilst pluralism calls into 
question the concept of a united community. Perhaps these 
problems are inherent in the idea of community; they arer 
however, compounded in this case since the community in 
question is an artificial creation. 
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